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COMMENTATOR ON KREISKY/VRANITZKY DIFFERENCES, NEW CABINET

Vienna PROFIL in German 19 Jan 87 p 8

[Article by Peter Michael Lings: "Vranitzky Makes It Possible--Bruno Kreisky Dismantles His Statesman's Image While Franz Vranitzky Adds to His More and More"]

[Text] Bruno Kreisky threatens to become a tragic figure. It is unfortunate if toward the end of one's life one has to look on as one's policies collapse. Nothing remains of his foreign policy--it always having been unrealistic to put one's stakes on Qadhdhafi and Arafat. Of his economic policy there remains a huge budget deficit and a nationalized industry that is in dire straits nevertheless. And his hope of keeping the OeVP [Austrian People's Party] away from power for all time with the help of a liberal FPÖ [Austrian Liberal Party] has ended in the election of Joerg Haider and the Grand Coalition.

But now Bruno Kreisky is also beginning to dismantle himself. He could not have found a worse reason for resigning as his party's honorary chairman. It was his last shot--and he used it at the wrong time and for the wrong reason.

Is it permissible for someone who made Willibald Pahr foreign minister to be indignant about letting the OeVP have the Foreign Ministry? Or is he in fact concerned not about Austrian foreign policy but only about his own foreign policy, which was obediently carried out by people like Pahr?

I once caused a great outcry among readers and fellow journalists when I wrote that Bruno Kreisky might be an outstanding politician but not a statesman, because a statesman is concerned first about the country and only then about his party, let alone about himself.

I said so polemically at the time, hoping to be proved wrong. But as the years passed, Kreisky increasingly confirmed any prejudices one might have harbored against him. That does not fill one with pleasure at having been right but with regret, for all criticism notwithstanding one did want to retain the image of a great man.

On the other hand Franz Vranitzky has shown once more that he has what it takes to be a statesman: He found it more important to come up with a government than to bargain for weeks on end over one ministry more or less for his

party. Rightly all papers say that Alois Mock got more out of these negotiations than could have been expected, but that testifies less to the OeVP chairman's negotiating skill than to the sense of responsibility of the head of government, who had the courage to show a victor's generosity.

My colleagues who deal with domestic politics are upset about how haphazardly the government was established--particularly on the part of the OeVP--how much there happened in the way of bargaining, dealing, and intriguing.

I think we should wean ourselves from this kind of sensitivity. Helene Von Damm, on whose memoirs I have just put the final editorial touches, takes two chapters to relate how Ronald Reagan's first administration was formed: about like the presidium of a tavern savings club.

Wherever human beings are involved things happen in a human way. Personal aims almost always take precedence; only then comes grand policy. Just as even among the loftiest journalists one's own pay raise is considered far more important than the quality of the paper.

One should take note of that and talk about it openly instead of expecting of politicians superhuman things which they cannot come up with.

Exaggerated demands made of the selflessness of politicians, just as their far too great selfishness, prepare the ground for Joerg Haider, giving him an undeserved opportunity to sell himself to the people as a "new type of politician."

Journalists should apply to politicians the same standard as they apply to themselves. Then their judgment will be neither too mild nor too harsh.

The new government team neither arouses enthusiasm nor is cause for alarm. In the person of Professor Hans Tuppy a man has been added who might prove as outstanding as Professor Stephan Koren did at one time. Robert Graf is sure to be a better minister of trade than Norbert Steger. Josef Riegler is preceded by a good reputation, Heinrich Neisser by an excellent one. Only Robert Lichal probably will at least find it difficult to make the kind of impression among his team and among the public that the outgoing Helmut Kruenes made. And the OeVP tax proposal is not necessarily a recommendation for the new state secretary in the Finance Ministry, Johannes Ditz.

And, for that matter, the only new SPOe [Austrian Socialist Party] nominee, Hilde Hawlicek, so far has actually excelled only by her enthusiastic stands in favor of Hannes Androsch.

But compromises were necessary not only between the OeVP and the SPOe but also between the left and right wings of the SPOe. The fact that in the persons of Blecha, Lacina, and Dallinger three "leftists" hold key portfolios testifies once more to Vranitzky's ability to become a real figure of integration in the SPOe.

As far as structure is concerned, I think some of the things in the new government are better and some worse. I think environmental policy is so important that without a doubt it would have deserved a ministry of its own within the Office of the Chancellor, because that would have made it possible to have a governing effect on all other ministries. As things stand, the minister for environmental protection will again primarily depend on how effective he is among the public--and it remains to be seen whether Marlies Flemming can be anywhere near as effective in that way as the departing Franz Kreuzer.

Public health has been in the wrong place for 17 years. It belongs in the Ministry of Social Administration, because that is where social security, the actual power in public health, is located. But apparently to increase Dallingier's power was just as impossible as to narrow it by eliminating social security from his past sphere of influence and incorporating it in the Ministry of Health.

While these deficiencies are nothing new, I think one big step forward has been made by nominating a justice minister who is as nonpartisan and as independent as possible.

This does reflect some new feel for democracy which raises the 1987 Grand Coalition above the level of the one which was elected 20 years ago.

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CSO: 3620/136

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN 1987 FORESEEN

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 11-12 Jan 87 pp 1, 3

[Article by Kostas Kekis: "The 'Greek 1987' in EEC and NATO"]

[Text] As the first month of 1987 moves on a glance at the most significant international organizations, of which Greece is a member--EEC and NATO--is enough to realize that this year, too, our foreign policy is mortgaged to our relations with Turkey.

In 1986, within EEC and NATO, Greek-Turkish differences remained--in fact, they became more acute. In NATO, Athens and Ankara followed a policy of mutual elimination of decisions which were of interest to one or the other country. In EEC, Greece made every effort--within its own power and without provoking strong displeasure among its partners--to push further into the future any move to improve relations between EEC and Turkey.

A Neutral Position

The Greek stand and arguments against the Turkish expansionist policy may have failed to convince all partners and allies, but at least made them take a diplomatically neutral position on Greek-Turkish differences. However, this neutral position is subject to varying interpretations. Athens believes this neutral attitude works in favor of Turkey while Ankara claims the opposite.

The key characteristics of our foreign policy in the last 12 months under the PASOK government are rather contradictory. First, we had a spectacular improvement in Greek-American relations. The visit of Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias had a positive effect--according to diplomatic observers--among our partners in the EEC. These partners continue to have reservations about the international behavior of the PASOK government and its special relations with regimes and governments which cause headaches in the European capitals.

The second, unpleasant, feature is the government's inability to win some or even one friend to offer support when Greece has problems with Turkey--possibly because of dogmatic narrowmindedness or lack of diplomatic subtlety. In this sector the failure has been spectacular. To some degree the government's insistence on stressing the "Greek special position" on terrorism and

the absence of stable positions and planned moves on issues which have no direct relation to our foreign policy (but which were of interest to other partners or allies) ruled out any chance for gaining support of a European government and take the first step in forming a club of friends.

Of course, the "symptoms" of our Mediterranean character were not absent. Knowing that we are right on the Turkish question, we lost our sense of diplomacy and started throwing angry words in every direction. One illustration is the "diplomatic war" which broke out between Athens and The Hague in the last 3 months with bad effects on Greek interests. This war was caused by too much talk.

The Turkish Side

On its part, Turkey makes every effort to take advantage of these weaknesses in our foreign policy. Turkey misses no opportunity to portray Greece as "the bad boy" and show it in a bad light among our partners and allies. As long as relations between Greece and Washington were cold, Turkey was not worried because others were doing its job. But now with improvement of Greek-American relations, Turkey alone carries the task of accusing Athens.

The Problems of 1987

On this point, this situation leaves many indifferent. It is useful to others. Only naive people would fail to see that certain powers take advantage, politically and militarily, of Greek-Turkish differences. These powers are found in every direction of the geographic horizon...

And now let us turn to the 1987 problems which Greek foreign policy will face within EEC and NATO. In the EEC economic sector, the prevailing subject and key negotiating issue among the partners is the triptych: Increase of EEC revenues, restructuring of a common farm policy, and financial cohesion. If the financially weaker partners agree to form a common front, they may be able to come out without losses if not with gains.

The Chairman of the EEC Commission, S. Delor, will visit the capitals of the EEC countries. He will come to Greece around the middle of February.

In political relations between Greece and the EEC, the most significant problem will be relations between Turkey and the EEC. For the time being, it appears that the Belgian presidency of the EEC is not inclined to move on formally to an improvement of these relations. Whatever is going to be will happen in the first half of the year, mostly behind the scenes.

In a way, this is the explanation for recent threats by Ankara that Turkey will submit an application for induction into the EEC even though it knows that under the current climate there is no chance the application will be approved.

To rid themselves of Ankara's annoying pressures, the partners want to activate economic aid to Turkey and related protocols. Athens will face pressures on this and much will depend on the way our government handles the problem as a whole.

The Situation in NATO.

In NATO the situation appears as follows: In "bilateral" Greek-NATO relations there seems to be some improvement, and this because in practice (due to wider international relations) there was a narrowing of differences on questions on which Greece in the past had totally different views--such as disarmament, Poland, Afghanistan, etc.

The current differences on the Greek side--which show up mainly in the form of notes in the communiques--are now so weak they no longer annoy the allies. Thus, within NATO the major problem will once again be Greek-Turkish differences which will continue to affect the NATO mechanisms and procedures--defense planning, participation in war games, etc.

While problems with Turkey become more acute and press on our foreign policy, the inability to understand the need for effective international relations or the deliberate (and then dangerous) indifference of the Finance Ministry, and even of the premier himself to increase the budget of the Foreign Ministry, have piled up tremendous problems for our diplomatic service. [This policy] has significantly reduced activities of the diplomatic service, allowing Turkish diplomats to reap benefits in their international relations.

This is a political error of the PASOK government which will have to give account to the Greek people at a critical moment--and the people are not in power to share the government's guilt.

7520

CSO: 3521/56

STRUGGLE REPORTED BETWEEN INTRA-PASOK FACTIONS

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 18-19 Jan 87 pp 1, 3

[Article by Nikos Nikolaou]

[Text] I KATHIMERINI is reliably informed that last Thursday a serious rift in the government was averted at the very last moment. The crisis, which has been in the making for several days (I KATHIMERINI was the first newspaper to write about it on Wednesday), started with the systematic undermining of the National Economy minister by a group of party and government cadres led by G. Genimatas.

This group, in an exact repeat of the scenario associated with the dismissal of Ger. Arsenis, takes advantage of the influence exerted by Social Insurance Foundation Director Th. Katsanevas within the premier's family circle. This group, strongly supporting opposition of working people to the harsh income policy, tries to scare the premier by giving him a picture of a wider popular uprising against the government and pressuring him to demand from the Ministry of National Economy to tone down his measures and give an extra special allowance to the low-wage earners.

Thursday morning K. Simitis went to the premier's home and told him point-blank that he is not a civil servant to carry out different orders from one day to the next. "I took over the ministry," he said, "at a difficult time to implement a policy we all had agreed to follow without fail. It's up to you to change policy now, but I am not the person to carry out any new policy."

This is what Simitis said according to I KATHIMERINI's information. Naturally, the premier moved swiftly to blunt a crisis which could have speeded up political developments if left unchecked.

No one can tell whether the crisis will end here. What is certain, however, is that A. Papandreou worries about the activities of G. Genimatas, while beyond the horizon he can see a new and potentially more dangerous threat coming from the Laliotis hardliners. This latter group is already systematically preparing to set up a "genuine" Third World party the day after a PASOK electoral failure.

Independent observers note that the origin of this new phase of intra-party squabbling within PASOK is found in the complete failure of its economic policy and the social unrest this failure has caused. Indeed, the successful all-worker strike last Thursday added a new dimension to the country's economic and political problems. It has also added a new element which was completely absent during the past 5 years. This new element is the role of the trade union movement which the more it becomes independent from the paternalistic embrace of PASOK and control of KKE will influence the country's political course with its own dynamics.

Government Weaknesses

A. Papandreou has already understood this change in the political landscape. He now tries carefully to minimize its negative effects on the cohesion and effectiveness of the government. Two developments in particular draw his attention or, rather, worry him.

First, the feuds and intra-party and intra-government conflicts have grown in intensity to the point that the government is paralyzed and cannot reach decisions on critical and urgent matters. Incidents such as fuel shortages, electric power outages, the confusion caused by the Added Value Tax [FPA], etc., appear for the first time and betray an advanced disorganization and breakdown of governmental machinery.

Second, the steady loss of governmental influence over the working class awakens and energizes the leadership ambitions of PASOK's Left wing. Its prominent cadres already make plans for their party and political survival after Papandreou is gone.

Moves of Top Cadres

Information known to independent observers says that A. Papandreou is particularly worried by the messages brought to him by his associates. According to these messages, highly placed party and government PASOK cadres are gathering tremendous economic resources and influence in terms of men and positions which at a given point in time could provide the foundation for setting up a genuinely Marxist party with Third World orientations.

Indeed, certain moderate PASOK cadres speak about preparation of a Greek Qadhdhafi and warn the premier that "the responsible members of the Movement must now block the way to those who want to overthrow the social system and threaten to shrink the majority party and turn it into a small revolutionary faction...!"

No one knows to what extent these fears are valid and whether the government machinery is used by some officials for questionable purposes. Some officials are trying to create their own industrialists; others see state purchases as a lucrative method to finance a new party; others hire their own people for public enterprises and agencies, etc.

What is certain, however, is that the specter of a coming electoral defeat has led all aspirants to PASOK's leadership to work only for themselves and not for the party as such.

It is true that PASOK always had factions, groups and the like, but most of them were temporary and had short-term objectives. Their confrontations had the character of settling personal accounts rather than ideological reorientations.

For example, the group which was formed in 1985 against Ger. Arsenis had no common ideological ties since it was made up of dissimilar elements ranging from conservative M. Koutsogiorgas to the leftists.

Alliance With the KKE

This time, however, it appears that PASOK is undergoing serious changes which tend to crystalize in formations and groups which have greater ideological cohesion since they have fixed statist views on economic policy and favor the formation of a front--an electoral front at first and a governmental coalition later with the communist Left in order to assure a new course in the country's political life and its foreign relations.

The Laliotis group seems to possess such characteristics for future action. It has strong support in the party machinery and in the government it has as allies two ministers and an energetic secretary general whose power is very great since he is in charge of government purchases, and of the reorganization of private industry, etc.

By contrast, the group which now includes the syndicalists of the General Confederation of Labor is looser and although it, too, talks about the need to have PASOK go back to the roots of the "Third of September Declaration," in effect it serves leadership ambitions and reflects above all the concern that the premier's son George is being prepared for the premiership. In any event, at this stage it is the Genimatas group which has taken the lead in bringing about intra-party changes.

This is the group which channels populist news against Simitis through certain newspapers. This is the group which publicized the "opposing views" of Labor Minister K. Papanagiotou against the price policy planned by K. Simitis and Vas. Sarantitis.

On the other hand, according to our information, Men. Koutsogiorgas is not participating in this committee. First, because he has practical views on economic policy and second, because he has his own ambitions.

In closing, the economic observers emphasize that although A. Papandreou is trying at this phase to balance the various tendencies and avoid a governmental crisis, sooner or later he will be forced by reality to clash with them as the economic crisis deepens and the popular opposition thickens these factions will air their feuds more openly in order to assure them survival when A. Papandreou is gone.

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CSO: 3521/64

FUNDING OF SMALLER PARTIES CANCELLED

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 13 Jan 87 p 1

[Article by G. Tambakopoulos]

[Text] The number of political parties entitled to financial support from the state budget is being reduced and so is the total sum given to them under the law "on financing political parties." On the basis of the state budget and following a ministerial decision, political parties will receive 1 billion drachmas for 1987 (in 1986 they received 1,360 million drachmas and in 1985 1,215 million drachmas).

A draft law introduced in the Chamber of Deputies jointly by the Ministries of National Economy and Interior amends Article 1 of the law on financing political parties. This is because this article conflicts...with the sum of 1 billion drachmas which will eventually be given to political parties. More specifically, the article states:

"The total sum given annually for this purpose is set at one thousandth of the regular revenue of the state budget." The sum of 1 billion for 1987 is smaller than one thousandth of the budget revenue.

At the same time, reliable sources report that there is no plan to introduce "a special amendment," as was done in the past, to provide small parties with funds. These small parties--the Democratic Socialist Party, the Democratic Center Union, Christian Democracy, and the United Socialist Front of Greece--will not receive funds, according to these reports.

One may recall that last year, under a special amendment, so-called small parties received 100 million drachmas (because 1986 was an election year). This justification, according to Interior Ministry spokesmen, does not apply this year. As a result, the 1 billion will be distributed among PASOK, ND, the Democratic Renewal, KKE and possibly KKE-Int., according to their strength in parliament, under a Ministry of Interior decision which will be issued during the first quarter of the year.

However, it is certain that the government's refusal to support small parties will put them into a difficult financial situation. It may be noted that

even the large parties face serious economic problems. In fact, one of them has received as an "advance" in 1987...a large loan from the Bank of Greece!

It is also recalled that under one article of the law on financing political parties--an article many say has been forgotten--the parties are required to publish during the first quarter of each year in at least two Athenian dailies, a balance sheet of revenue and expenses. Indeed the proper composition of the financial statement and its timely publication are verified by the president of the Chamber of Deputies after a check conducted by a multi-partisan committee.

At the same time, political parties are required to keep a special record book of expenditures and revenues in which to register their receipts and monies they have expended.

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CSO: 3521/56

PCI'S OCCHETTO VIEWS REFORM PROCESS IN USSR

PM301612 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 28 Jan 87 pp 1, 18

[Interview with PCI Secretariat member Achille Occhetto by Ugo Baduel in Rome on 27 January]

[Text] [Baduel] Mr Occhetto, does it not seem to you that Gorbachev's report delivered yesterday is an enlightening confirmation of the CPSU general secretary's efforts to introduce change?

[Occhetto] During my conversations in Moscow it was revealed to me that the plenum on party cadres would constitute a very significant event and that Gorbachev himself considered it a very important step in the further development of the issues already broached at the congress. From an initial and necessarily hurried reading of agency dispatches on the Gorbachev report I derive a confirmation of what I said on my return from Moscow--that is, of Gorbachev's resolute intention to center the whole issue of reform on the relationship between democracy and socialism, with a fairly radical critique of the past. The very fact that Gorbachev regards the break between democracy and socialism and the preponderance of executive bodies at all levels as a factor that has left a crucial and negative mark on the past (and especially on what is known as the "Brezhnev era") seems very significant to me.

I also perceive that together with an element of cultural and political reappraisal--to which we must certainly return--there is also an attempt to identify certain important points apparently to be reflected in legislation on at least four topics: 1, the proposal of a new general law on socialist ownership (it remains to be seen how specifically the issue is tackled); 2, the appointment of managers by collectives; 3, a reform of the electoral system; and, 4, the proposal of new forms of organization of the party's internal activities.

I certainly regard all this as significant and worthy of attention.

[Baduel] Can these objectives of reform lead to what Italian Communists have in mind when they talk about the complete development of political democracy in contemporary society?

[Occhetto] Frankly, I believe (as I did following my meeting with Gorbachev in Moscow) that there is a fundamental difference between our conception of political democracy and of its relationship with society and the Soviets' outlook. In other words, as seems to me natural and obvious on the basis of our historical background, the fact remains that our conception of a socialist society has been and remains very different from that which may be envisaged and defined in the Soviet Union.

I would like to add, however, that between our own conception and the actual situation in the USSR there is in any case certainly broad scope for a number of significant changes, even within a political and institutional system different from that which we envisage. So from my assessment of what is happening in the USSR now I infer that we are talking about analyses and proposals that confirm to me a will for and continuity of regeneration, partly within the context of a more complex outlook as regards the very analysis of the past and of the innovative proposals.

From this viewpoint, it seems important to me that Gorbachev has said (for the first time, unless I am mistaken) that liberal acts from the top are no longer enough and that it is necessary to address the issue of "objective guarantees." The very use of this expression is rather striking. From what I have read, the plenum report talks in terms of guarantees protected by proper laws, official legal mechanisms that should begin to center on the issue of the defense of individual rights against possible malpractices of the state and its representatives. Of course our assessment of this point too can only be defined if and when we begin to see real conditions being brought into line with certain assertions.

[Baduel] I understand your prudence, but I must add that the impression gained from yesterday's report is of an acceleration imparted by Gorbachev. The innovation is evident particularly with regard to certain analyses of the past. Did you perceive the intention to carry out such a reappraisal?

[Occhetto] I perceived signs of a major commitment on Gorbachev's part to thoroughly pondering the USSR's overall situation, partly in terms of the "loss" of socialism and democracy, and thus a very severe criticism of all the elements of stagnation, of everything that has curbed, and still curbs, society's dynamism. I see from the excerpts of the report before me that Gorbachev talks about "the corruption of people's conscience", the "erosion of values", and "moral distortions": These are striking points.

[Baduel] How did Gorbachev seem to you? Is he the "enthusiastic" type of person--perhaps rather over-emphatic--who uses strong expressions?

[Occhetto] No. That is, he is not the kind of person reminiscent of the Khrushchev image. It is for this very reason, precisely because he appears to be a rationalist, however enthusiastic, that one is struck by remarks as significant as those I mentioned.

This determination of Gorbachev's seems evident to me in the awareness that I now see publicly reasserted by him of the fact that when the innovators first began to introduce the reform they recognized its importance and seriousness but--according to what I was told--that it was only later that they were able fully to appreciate the significance of what had been started, namely, the setting in motion of a process whose proportions and effects were greater than had been envisaged. I believe it is no coincidence that in his report Gorbachev has now gone as far as to talk in terms of a "point of no return," adding that "if we did want to turn back we would not know where to go." These remarks should provide food for thought too.

[Baduel] What with the revision of the electoral system, of the party's rules of activity, and of the principle governing the distribution of assets and the unusual remarks you mentioned, could it perhaps be said that some of the very foundations of "real socialism" are now being challenged? Frankly, having read the report, I do not consider this a far-fetched hypothesis. What about you?

[Occhetto] I have no evidence for making such an assertion. However, we must take a close interest in the fact that some areas of thinking on which the very concept of real socialism rested are now being challenged (though certainly not yet comprehensively) in at least three respects:

1--the awareness that socialism cannot emerge from an individual experience that then becomes valid for everyone, that is, from the particular experience of one or more countries that presume to constitute a model;

2--the awareness that the realization of many of the objectives, values, and even ideals of socialism has still to begin--or begin again--not only outside but also within the USSR. It is rather striking to hear Gorbachev saying now that the analysis of and research into the concept of socialism ground to a halt in Soviet Russia in the thirties and that the fruitful debate was then "curtailed by unnecessary methods"--especially if one bears in mind Gramsci's prophetic 1926 letter about the dangers facing the Soviet Union at that time. Of course we have no way of knowing yet in what form the internal political struggle cited by Gorbachev is taking place, or could take place, or whether it will always be guaranteed by rules that permit free debate with respect for diversity of opinions;

3--the determination to start regarding information and consequently the influence of public opinion as a necessary component of consensus.

[Baduel] Judging from Gorbachev's remarks and the impressions you gained during your visit to the USSR, do you believe there could spread a feeling of mistrust, ultimately strengthening the adversaries of regeneration? By accelerating the process is Gorbachev not perhaps running the risk of prompting repercussions dangerous to himself?

[Occhetto] The impression I gained from my visit and meetings in early January and from today's reports is that there is a growing belief on the part of the Soviet leadership group that the real danger lies in maintaining

the state of stagnation that had come about. In this regard I believe that there is something in the minds of Gorbachev and the innovators reminiscent--albeit in a different form--of the substantial truth of Berlinguer's well-known remark about the "exhaustion of the propulsive thrust." There was very probably no alternative to what Gorbachev calls the "radical change of course." This does not alter the fact that--judging from what I learned during my visit, from the many remarks I heard--the problems of a radical reorganization of the superstructure now manifest themselves in the form of an open political struggle, the struggle of the new versus the old, and a struggle which as far as I could ascertain is motivated by specific social aims. At the moment we have no way of knowing, and I believe we cannot say, how it will end. Of course the challenge that was thrown down was, and still is, a very major one and we cannot know what repercussions it could have on the whole of Soviet society. Gorbachev is issuing the challenge of the possibility of reforming the system, but we do not yet know what paths--possibly dramatic--this reform could take.

[Baduel] In conclusion: When you returned from Moscow you did not conceal your anxiety about the future of Gorbachev and his blueprint. Now, following yesterday's speech, are you more or less worried?

[Occhetto] I have already answered you in part: The challenge has been raised still higher, so the dangers could increase. But I would like to add something further, namely, that the report to the plenum confirms the impression I gained from my conversation with Gorbachev. My impression was that my interlocutor had in mind a kind of timetable or schedule that he is following. Certain things have already emerged. Set against this "ideal" blueprint, even the announcement of an extraordinary congress due to take place within a year to provide a political and legislative framework for the hypotheses stated or proposed here by Gorbachev shows that Gorbachev is pointing to another stage in his struggle for regeneration.

It is this progression that prompts me to believe that Gorbachev, who has acted hitherto in accordance with a clearly defined line, also possesses some strength.

/7358

CSO: 3528/74

PCP'S CUNHAL DESCRIBES VISIT TO PRC, USSR

PM211341 Lisbon AVANTE! in Portuguese 8 Jan 87 pp 2-7 (EM FOCO supplement)

[Unattributed interview with PCP Secretary General Alvaro Cunhal 5 January in Lisbon]

[Excerpts] AVANTE!: You have just arrived from a lengthy tour during which you visited five countries (China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and the Soviet Union) and held talks with the highest leaders of their respective communist and democratic revolutionary parties. What is your overall assessment of those visits and talks?

Alvaro Cunhal: Very positive. It certainly did not go unnoticed by attentive observers that it was a matter not of visits, meetings, and talks fortuitously coinciding in the same month but, accepting invitations extended by them all, of an overall schedule of the PCP, involving talks with the leaders of the five countries visited.

AVANTE!: Was that schedule known previously to the five parties? More specifically and in a particularly delicate aspect, did the CPC know you would go on from the PRC to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia? And did the parties of those three countries know that you would previously visit China?

Alvaro Cunhal: Yes. The plan was made known to them all, and they were asked whether they had objections. There were no objections by any of them. Just as in domestic policy, the PCP adopts clear and responsible stances in foreign policy. The Vietnamese, Lao, and Cambodian comrades, as well as the Soviet comrades, were aware of the process of fraternal rapprochement between the PCP and the CPC which has been developing over the past few years. And the Chinese comrades were fully aware of our fraternal relations of mutual solidarity with the parties of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, as well as with the CPSU.

So these visits, meetings, and talks took place on the sound basis of complete clarity of stances and situations--a basis which we deem essential in relations among communist and workers parties. Perhaps this aspect escapes the notice of some observers, but it was one of the most important aspects of this series of visits, meetings, and talks.

AVANTE!: Let us begin with China, since it was the first country visited. How did the talks proceed, in view of the existence of known differences between the PCP and the CPC? Were the differences and the differing viewpoints discussed? What was the outcome of the talks?

Alvaro Cunhal: As is already known, this visit was paid following an invitation from CPC General Secretary Hu Yaobang. Two general aspects are to be mentioned: The friendly, fraternal, and respectful way in which we were received and the openness to the discussion of views which the Chinese leaders--specifically, Hu Yaobang--displayed in the meetings held. So the differing viewpoints and stances with respect to many aspects of the international situation and of the two parties' activity were discussed.

AVANTE!: Did you talk about the past? About the support CPC gave to the formation and activity of the Maoist groups in Portugal? About the fact that the PRC agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Portugal only when the Mota Pinto/popular Democratic Party Government was formed? About the support given by China to Holden Roberto and subsequently to the National Front for the Liberation of Angola against the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola and against Angola's independence?

Alvaro Cunhal: All this was discussed previously at exploratory meetings held between the two parties. The Chinese leaders acknowledge the facts self-critically. As far as we are concerned, we want this chapter to be finally closed and, without disregarding the historical experience, to look toward the future.

AVANTE!: Can you specify the differences currently existing which were discussed in the talks?

Alvaro Cunhal: Yes. I can give three instances. The first is that the PCP regards NATO as an aggressive military alliance and, with respect to Portugal, as one of the instruments of imperialism--specifically U.S. imperialism--to limit our national independence. The Chinese leaders have on many occasions expressed support for NATO to contain what they call "Soviet expansionism." The second is that the PCP regards Portugal's entry into the Common Market as ruinous for our economy, our people, and our independence. It can be read in the Chinese press that entry into the Common Market is advantageous for the Portuguese people. The third is that the PCP has relations of close friendship and mutual solidarity with the fraternal parties of the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Afghanistan. The Chinese leaders refuse to establish relations with the parties of those countries and with respect to some of them (Cambodia and Afghanistan) are conducting activity of overt hostility and intervention in their respective countries.

AVANTE!: Since it is known that the CPSU and the Communist Party of Vietnam have expressed their readiness to discuss with the CPC the issues in dispute, what grounds do the Chinese leaders cite for rejecting these proposals?

Alvaro Cunhal: The Chinese leaders speak of what they call the "three obstacles" (border disputes with the Soviet Union, the situation in Cambodia with the Pol Pot regime's defeat and with the entry of the Vietnamese troops,

and the situation in Afghanistan), but in the talks held with us it became clear that the obstacle which they place first is currently that of Cambodia.

AVANTE!: We are interested in going more deeply into this issue, but since it is important for its analysis to learn the outcome of the visits and talks conducted in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and the Soviet Union, we will return to it later. A visit to Afghanistan was not included in the schedule. How did the PCP and the CPC understand each other in this respect?

Alvaro Cunhal: We hold contrary stances on this issue. Our party has long had fraternal relations with the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan [PDPA]. Members of our leadership and other comrades in our party have visited Afghanistan. PDPA leaders have visited Portugal at our party's invitation. They were at our 9th and 10th Congresses. They have taken part in the Avante! festival. Our party knows the PDPA and the Afghan revolution not through intermediaries but directly. We have always supported and support the Afghan revolution against domestic reaction and against imperialist interference and intervention. The Afghan leaders have declared themselves in favor of a political solution. To that effect we note the statement about national reconciliation made after our return to Lisbon by PDPA General Secretary Jajib. Let the imperialist intervention from Pakistan cease and then a political solution is quite possible.

AVANTE!: Do not the differences between the PCP and the CPC—specifically with respect to relations with the USSR and Vietnam and to Cambodia, and Afghanistan—prevent the continuation of what the PCP calls "the process of fraternal rapprochement?"

Alvaro Cunhal: They are undoubtedly a difficulty, or, if you wish to use the Chinese comrades' language, are an "obstacle" in the relationship between our two parties. Since you are interested in going more deeply into this issue, we will return to it, but I can say immediately that, while being a difficulty, they do not prevent the process of fraternal rapprochement. The CPC already knew the PCP's stances previously. With the visit and the talks the prospect for the process of rapprochement not only still stands but has been strengthened.

AVANTE!: So what can be expected that is new in relations between the PCP and the CPC?

Alvaro Cunhal: Our party leadership will examine the issue very soon in the light of the visits now paid, the talks held, and their results. But I can see no factor to prevent that process from not only continuing but developing.

AVANTE!: Some Portuguese news media, speaking of the visit to China, have said that it was a failure...

Alvaro Cunhal: A commentary of that kind was to be expected. The Portuguese reactionary forces and, in general, all our party's enemies, are neither pleased nor suited by the extraordinary success and source of national and international prestige represented for the PCP by our visit to the PRC, the talks which we held there with the CPC leaders, and the way in which that

process of fraternal rapprochement between the PCP and the CPC is developing positively and responsibly...

AVANTE!: And will continue...

Alvaro Cunhal: It will undoubtedly continue.

China, Socialist Country

AVANTE!: What is your overall impression of the situation existing in China? Many news media report that China is abandoning the building of socialism and heading again toward capitalism. Were you able to confirm or disprove this opinion during your visit?

Alvaro Cunhal: The PCP has always regarded the PRC as a socialist country. Well-known international stances and actions by the CPC and the rift in relations between the PCP and the CPC which occurred for many years never changed that stance. The visit confirmed our conviction that China will continue to build socialism.

AVANTE!: Is that opinion based solely on what the CPC leaders said or did you have the opportunity to witness actual conditions which confirmed it?

Alvaro Cunhal: What the leaders told and said to us is very important. They said not only that the PRC remains on the path to socialism but also that they regard building socialism in China as an integral part of the peoples' liberation struggle. As for direct confirmation, the visit was too short. However, we were able to gain favorable impressions on the visits we paid to a watch factory, a district of Shanghai, workers' homes, and the Pioneers' Palace in Shanghai, as well as historic places connected with the creation of the CPC and its first congress.

AVANTE!: However, the newspapers report that China is opening its doors to foreign capital and that the latter, through investments, will be able to achieve dominant positions in the Chinese economy. Does not the idea contained in the Chinese slogan "One country, two systems" worry you? Is there not a danger that imperialism will take advantage of that open door to undermine socialism and to bring about its ruin?

Alvaro Cunhal: Of course those questions worry us, and we put them to the comrades. They replied that they are abandoning the planned economy model which they have followed and developing a socialist market economy, and replacing the agricultural communes with family-run farms. They replied that they need to develop, that to achieve this they need investments, and that the part of the economy open to foreign capital will be a small portion of the country's economy. They added that the country will be vigilant.

Socialism and Democracy

AVANTE!: Following your visit to China there were major demonstrations by students in Shanghai, Beijing, and other Chinese cities, demanding more democracy. How do you comment on these demonstrations?

Alvaro Cunhal: It is obvious that we do not have (and we believe that no Portuguese citizen has) sufficient information to form a sound opinion on the significance of those demonstrations; about what their real aims are and what ideas and forces are encouraging them. Nor are we able, following this visit, to assess Chinese society's evolution with respect to democracy. But since we are talking about democracy, we Portuguese Communists are certain that, although taking into account the diversity of situations, the intensification of socialist democracy is not only of vital importance for the economic, social, and political development of all socialist countries but is also today a developing process. This is an important guideline defined at the Sixth Communist Party of Vietnam [CPV] congress, which we have just attended. It is an important guideline in the Soviet Union, defined at the 27th Congress held in February 1986, at which we were also present.

Issue of Macao

AVANTE!: Did you discuss Macao?

Alvaro Cunhal: Yes, we did; not, of course, the negotiations under way with the Portuguese Government but the positions of principle. As is known, the PCP adopted a stance on the matter long ago. In the PCP program approved at the Sixth Congress, held underground in 1965, "negotiations and agreements with the government of the PRC for Macao's integration into it" were laid down as an essential measure of the democratic and national revolution. Life has fully confirmed the political and historical correctness of this stance.

As for the negotiations underway between the Portuguese Government and the Chinese Government, it would be a good thing if the Portuguese Government were to inform the Portuguese people of what is happening, since the Portuguese people and the national political forces are entitled to know what stances the Portuguese Government is adopting on this matter and what the prospects are for resolving the problems of transferring sovereignty to the PRC.

AVANTE!: With respect to the transfer of sovereignty over Macao to China, is the PCP's stance confined to maintaining that it is legitimate? Are there no Portuguese national interests to be defended in Macao? Was this issue broached with the CPC leaders?

Alvaro Cunhal: Yes, we raised that issue. Among other aspects we stressed to the Chinese leaders the need to ensure the Portuguese cultural presence in Macao. We pointed out the need to preserve in Macao the memory of Camoes and of the masterpiece of the Renaissance and of Portuguese and world literature which "Os Lusíadas" is. We pointed out that not only the Chinese population and not only a few thousand Portuguese citizens connected with the administration of the territory live and work in Macao but also several tens

of thousands of people whose status must be defined and whose rights must be safeguarded.

AVANTE!: What was the Chinese reaction with respect to those issues?

Alvaro Cunhal: They told us that they are prepared to consider and heed them. Whether they are really considered and heeded largely depends now on the Portuguese Government's activity.

AVANTE!: There are said to be 60,000 inhabitants with Portuguese passports in Macao. What will their future situation be? Following the transfer of sovereignty, will they be Portuguese citizens or Chinese citizens?

Alvaro Cunhal: What must be learned first of all is what they themselves think and feel. It is a delicate point concerning which the Portuguese Government owes the country accurate information. The PRC, while not accepting dual nationality, seems, however, prepared for those inhabitants to live and work in Macao, but without Chinese nationality and hence without the corresponding rights. The Portuguese Government has a duty to conduct the negotiations in such a way as to find a just solution to these problems, but we are opposed to the reactionary forces which currently dominate the government seeking to create artificially in Macao a force which would carry weight in Portuguese domestic politics.

AVANTE!: Some newspapers say that the greatest difference existing between the Portuguese Government and the Chinese Government concerns the date of the transfer of sovereignty over the territory of Macao to China. Were you able to confirm this during the visit?

Alvaro Cunhal: It is not necessary to go to China to know that difference exists. There are public stances on the matter. Thus, for instance, just a few days ago the Chinese foreign minister explained that any proposal for that transfer to be made after the year 2000 "cannot be accepted." It would be a good thing for the Portuguese Government (prompted by the defense of illegitimate interests which have nothing to do with those of the Portuguese people or those of Portugal) not to create problems which impede or prevent real national interests being safeguarded at the time of the transfer of sovereignty over Macao to the PRC.

AVANTE!: In addition to being PCP secretary general, you are a member of the Council of State. We are talking with you today, 5 January. A meeting of the Council of State is scheduled for tomorrow, 6 January, with the Macao issue on the agenda. What stance will you uphold?

Alvaro Cunhal: I am a member of the Council of State, not in my capacity as PCP secretary general but in the capacity of somebody elected to that post by the Assembly of the Republic. However, it is clear that in the Council of State, as in any other situation, the stances which I uphold are those of the PCP. [passage omitted on visits to Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos]

Dispute With China and Need For Dialogue

AVANTE!: Let us return to a matter on which we previously touched. In view of the grave dispute and the absence of relations between the CPC on the one hand and the parties of the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos on the other, what prospects do you deem to exist following the visit and the talks which you have just held?

Alvaro Cunhal: As far as interparty relations are concerned, there is a great difference between the CPC's stances and the stances of the other parties mentioned. The latter declare themselves specifically prepared for dialogue with the CPC, and in all the talks held we had the opportunity to confirm this. The CPC rejects that dialogue. With respect to Vietnam it cites an obstacle—Cambodia. With respect to the CPSU it cites the "three obstacles" (border problems, Afghanistan, and Cambodia), but from what they say it is clear that they rate Cambodia as the number one problem. Let the problem of Cambodia be resolved with the withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops and then dialogue with the CPSU and with the CPV will be able to begin.

AVANTE!: Is that refusal and that demand justified?

Alvaro Cunhal: In our opinion, if there are obstacles which they wish to be surmounted, the right way is not to demand that they be surmounted through prior concession set as a prerequisite for meeting and dialogue, but to hold the meeting and conduct dialogue in order to attempt to surmount them.

AVANTE!: Did you tell the CPC leaders that?

Alvaro Cunhal: Of course. It would be absurd while thinking it not to say so.

AVANTE!: What is the reason why the CPC rates the issue of Cambodia as the main obstacle to the establishment of dialogue with the USSR and Vietnam?

Alvaro Cunhal: The Chinese Communists, who supported Pol Pot and his regime, say that without Vietnam's military support the Cambodian Communists could not have overthrown the Pol Pot regime or defend the new regime. And they add that without the Soviet Union's support Vietnam could not give Cambodia the support which it has given and continues to give. We believe that the overthrow of the Pol Pot regime meant the release of the Cambodian people from a regime of oppression and terror. That is why we supported established, and developed relations of fraternal solidarity with the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party [KPRP] and with the people of Cambodia. I have already mentioned in this interview the Cambodian leaders' proposals for a political solution. We can see no reason for the CPC to refuse to meet and establish dialogue with the KPRP.

AVANTE!: Is Cambodia a reason or a pretext?

Alvaro Cunhal: I prefer not to answer the question, but it is reasonable to ask it.

AVANTE!: The coordinated visit to China, the three countries of Indochina, and the USSR and the talks held inevitably raise a question. The CPC rejects dialogue with the communist parties of the other countries visited. It shows itself prepared to normalize relations with the PCP. It will be said that it distinguishes between the good and the bad. How does the PCP view this difference of treatment?

Alvaro Cunhal: As an attitude with which we disagree and which is (to use an expression used by the Chinese comrades) an "obstacle" to the broad development of relations between the PCP and the CPC.

AVANTE!: Did you also tell the Chinese leaders that?

Alvaro Cunhal: Of course.

AVANTE!: Other communist parties are normalizing their relations with the CPC without heeding the fact which you cite as an obstacle...

Alvaro Cunhal: The PCP's stance is different, and if we adopt it, it is because we believe that it is the correct stance and that which conforms best to a consistent political stance and to the effort to surmount the differences and difficulties and to strengthen cohesion in the international communist movement, including relations of friendship with the CPC.

AVANTE!: Are not we rather confronted with a deadlock? Is there a real prospect of surmounting the situation?

Alvaro Cunhal: For our part, to the modest extent of our means, we are seeking to help ensure that there is no deadlock. This situation must be surmounted, and in our opinion there is a prospect of surmounting it. There is an almost universal realization of the need for dialogue and rapprochement. There is a positive evolution in the CPC's stances and attitudes. There is a new spirit of openness and initiative on the part of the CPSU, marked by the 27th Congress. There is a very favorable development of interstate relations. There are, above all, common interests and common aims which fully justify a rapprochement, dialogue, and future understandings. We therefore feel confident about the future resolution of the existing problems.

Meeting With Gorbachev

AVANTE!: What is the significance of the meeting with Gorbachev after the visit to the Far East? Were matters concerning the visit to China, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia raised?

Alvaro Cunhal: As with all the leaders of the parties of the countries mentioned, international problems were broached with Comrade Gorbachev, including the situation in the Far East and Southeast Asia and problems of the international communist movement, including, obviously, relations among the communist and workers' parties and the need to strengthen the movement's cohesion.

AVANTE!: Does this mean that relations with the CPC were broached?

Alvaro Cunhal: Matters concerning their relations and dialogue were broached with the CPC and CPV leaders. The same happened with respect to the CPC's relations with the CPSU, especially because the absence of relations between the CPSU and the CPC hampers and impairs the international communist movement's cohesion.

AVANTE!: In the report on the meeting published in PRAVDA there is talk of new forms of cooperation among Communists corresponding to the spirit of the present time. What is the significance of this new formulation?

Alvaro Cunhal: The formulation may be new but the communist movement's evolution and the need to strengthen its cohesion under the new conditions of the present-day world have existed for some time. The communist movement currently covers the whole world. The communist parties are struggling under very different social and political conditions. There are new revolutionary forces—specifically those emerging from the national liberation movements. There are differences of opinion. There are problems in relations. The situation requires that routine forms of relationship give way to the spirit of initiative, a concerted and coordinated effort to surmount difficulties, and a search for specific forms of cooperation which will make it possible to respond to tasks for all Communists which are common and urgent.

AVANTE!: For instance, the struggle for peace...

Alvaro Cunhal: Yes. In the existing international situation the struggle for peace and against the aggressive policy of imperialism, specifically U.S. imperialism—and specifically the struggle to end the arms race, to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons, to prevent the militarization of space, and, in short, to save the world from a nuclear holocaust—is a central task not only for all Communists but for all democratic and progressive forces. But the aims and the necessary and possible forms of cooperation in the communist movement cover many other aspects and problems.

AVANTE!: What importance did the Reykjavik summit have in the struggle for peace? Was it a positive or negative factor?

Alvaro Cunhal: The USSR's proposals, put forward by Gorbachev in Reykjavik are known—a 50 percent reduction of strategic nuclear weapons and their complete elimination within 10 years, and the elimination all U.S. and Soviet medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, with a simultaneous freeze on tactical nuclear weapons and limitation of the USSR's medium-range missiles on its Asian territory. These are proposals of extraordinary importance which show the USSR's profound desire for peace and which, if accepted and implemented, would dispel the danger of nuclear war...

AVANTE!: Reagan accepted them...

Alvaro Cunhal: Yes, Reagan accepted them. Agreement on all of them was virtually reached in the talks. But the talks failed because, in addition to those proposals, the USSR made another: That the 1972 ABM treaty be maintained and consolidated; that is, that the conducting of tests of the so-called Antimissile Defense System be banned; that is, that the militarization

of space be banned. And that proposal, from which the first proposals were obviously inseparable, was rejected by Reagan. In the last analysis Reagan wanted the USSR to carry out nuclear disarmament, but in the meantime with the militarization of space he would be in a position to raise U.S. nuclear weapons and offensive potential to an extraordinarily more dangerous and aggressive level.

Reykjavik made clear in the eyes of the world the contrast between the USSR's deep desire for peace and constructive proposals and the dangers and adventurism of U.S. imperialism's policy of an arms race, aggression, and war.

AVANTE!: The PCP supports the Soviet proposals...

Alvaro Cunhal: All peoples and all those who wish to prevent the world from heading toward a nuclear catastrophe likely to destroy mankind itself should support them.

AVANTE!: Do you wish to say something about the new course in Soviet domestic policy--the renewal of economic policy and liberalization and democratization measures? Various reports seem to indicate that there is resistance to the new policy.

Alvaro Cunhal: Just as in foreign policy the USSR is tackling problems with great dynamism and initiative, so current domestic policy, in implementation [words apparently dropped in newspaper] defined by the 27th CPSU Congress, is a dynamic line, confronting problems squarely, detecting shortcomings and delays, pointing out new solutions, encouraging and mobilizing the energies and creative ability of the party and the people in order to ensure a more rapid economic, technological, social, and cultural development of the USSR, and undertaking serious measures to ensure the deepening of socialist democracy.

It is an innovative and revolutionary struggle, and because it is so, it needs to overcome routine, attachment to ossified formulas, and allegedly unchangeable situation.

For our part, we are convinced that the new course in Soviet policy laid down by the 27th Congress will be crowned with complete success.

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CSO: 3542/47

GOVERNMENT PROPOSES INCREASED AID TO VIETNAM, ETHIOPIA, ANGOLA

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 10 Jan 87 p 14

[Article by Kaa Eneberg: "Vietnam Aid Continues This Year"; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] Next budget year will be something of a fateful year for the disputed Swedish aid to Vietnam. Then the government must take a position on the nonsocialist government's repeated demands in the Riksdag to completely terminate Vietnam aid. In accordance with previous decisions the government is appropriating 300 million kronor for Vietnam, and intimating nothing about its plans for the future.

Minister of Development Aid Lena Hjelm-Wallen is asking for an increase in the aid budget of 930 million to a total of 9.87 billion. According to the budget proposal that corresponds to one percent of the calculated gross national income (BNI) for the calendar year 1987.

Of the proposed sum, over half or five billion kronor will go via the aid organization SIDA [Swedish International Development Authority] which will use it primarily for so-called bilateral work with over 20 receiving countries. Nearly three billion will go directly to international aid programs such as the UN development program UNDP, which is proposed to receive more than one-half billion kronor.

The minister of development aid will prioritize aid cooperation with the exposed independent countries in southern Africa, and is recommending an average of 10 percent increases for countries such as Tanzania (increase of 35 million to 510 million), Zambia (increase of 25 million to 230 million), Mozambique (increase of 25 million to 325 million) and Zimbabwe (increase of 15 million to 150 million).

Concern About Ethiopia

Even Angola, where it has been difficult to introduce aid, will get an increase of 15 million to 140 million. As for Ethiopia, Hjelm-Wallen expresses concern about that regime's respect for human rights. While waiting for a report on future agricultural investments, however, she is willing to

increase aid by 15 million to 145 million. Guinea-Bissau is criticized for lacking respect for human rights, and must be satisfied with an unchanged amount, 75 million. Regional cooperation in southern Africa via the cooperative organization SADCC is recommended to receive 175 million kronor.

A numerical reduction--even an unchanged appropriation really means a reduction, of course--is recommended for Bangladesh, one of the world's poorest countries with many aid benefactors. The reason is the difficulty of reaching the country's poorest groups, who are the targets of Swedish aid.

The largest percentage increase goes to Nicaragua, Sweden's only current aid recipient in Latin America. The country, which is said to have good receiving ability, is recommended to receive 160 million, 35 million more than this year. This aid, which is primarily going to mining, forestry and energy development, will also be available for acute needs such as import support and catastrophic help.

Vietnam

About Vietnam, which since 1970 and until July of last year received a total of 4.4 billion in Swedish aid, it is confirmed that several evaluations will be conducted during 1987. These will involve the difficult working conditions in the forest of the so-called Vinh-Phu Project (formerly Bai Bang) among other things.

Sweden has agreed to support the Vietnamese in the operation of the large paper mill until 1990. Last year it was calculated that 30,000 tons of paper were produced, but there were raw material problems.

Another country in which future Swedish help is uncertain is Sri Lanka, which is still recommended to receive 210 million for the large hydroelectric project Kotmale, which purchased much equipment from Sweden, and agricultural projects. The development aid minister explained that for future aid projects, attention would have to be paid to the ongoing ethnic conflicts in the country.

Last year's debated return of unutilized reserve funds of over 200 million kronor to the national treasury will not be repeated this year, say the budget experts.

Other aid items in the budget:

- 460 million to ease the debt problems of the poorest countries,
- 265 million (plus 33 million) to research in underdeveloped countries through SAREC,
- 40 million to the Swedfund for establishment of businesses in underdeveloped countries.

9287

CSO:3650/49

EEC'S USEFULNESS, ASSISTANCE STRESSED

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 10 Jan 87 p 5

[Text] At the risk of becoming boring we shall not cease pointing out and stressing certain facts which are vital to the survival of the nation and whose awareness is, therefore, of fundamental importance in enlightening the sovereign people when they chose those who govern the country. One such fact is EEC and Greece's membership in it. And the reason for stressing this fact is information the Bank of Greece made public yesterday concerning the Balance of Current Accounts [ITS].

According to the bank's report, the ITS deficit (1,637 million dollars) during the 1986 January-November 11-month period appears reduced compared to the corresponding 1985 period (2,919 million dollars) mainly because of two factors: the so-called net influx of resources (free grants, that is) from EEC and the drop in international prices of oil.

During the 1986 January-November 11-month period, EEC grants reached 1,217 million dollars (compared to 768 million dollars during the corresponding 1985 period) while for importing fuels Greece spent in the same period 1,565 million dollars compared to 2,927 million dollars during the corresponding 1985 period. We copy here the relevant report as published yesterday in AVGI:

"The relatively small deficit in November is mainly due to reduced costs of imported fuels and the exceedingly increased net influx [of grants] from EEC, the large sum of which surprised even Bank of Greece officials. Both figures were more favorable in November than during the 11-month period. Fuel imports reached 111 million dollars and showed an annual reduction of 57.8 percent (46.5 percent during the 11-month period). EEC resources reached 198 million dollars--an increase of 76.8 percent (58.5 percent) for the 11-month period."

One wonders what our country's ITS would be today if it were not an EEC member (as those who rule it today did not want it to be and spoke so wretchedly against the European Community). The significance of the EEC grants becomes still clearer if one takes into consideration the fact that, with the

exception of fuels, all other items of the deficit appear reduced compared to last year's corresponding items. In other words, without the EEC grants and the reduction in the price of fuels, the ITS deficit shows, in the rest of its items, an increase by 15.1 percent compared to the corresponding 1985 period...

But besides the grants (about 4 billion dollars in the past 5 years) we have EEC appropriations either within the framework of the Mediterranean Integrated Programs or from the European Regional Development Fund for infrastructure projects, etc., as we mentioned in this column a week ago.

We should also add the 1,500-million loan EEC granted to Greece in two installments for coping with the ITS deficit and the terrible economic situation to which the government of the past 5 years has led us.

Therefore, let us reflect on how we would fare today (and not only in the economic sector) if our country were not an EEC member and let us assess the responsibility to the nation and its future on the one hand of those who with superhuman efforts succeeded in the (timely) association of our country with EEC, and on the other hand of those whose basic slogan was to dissassociate it from the Community...

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CSO: 3520/56

REPORT ON LARGE, SMALL INDUSTRIES' ACTIVITIES

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 25 Jan 87 p 31

[Article by Mikh. Papagiannakis]

[Text] ICAP's data on the Greek industry (corporations [AE] and limited ability companies [EPE]) do not provide momentous reviews on studies about this strategic sector of the Greek economy.

1. The number of large industrial enterprises (those employing more than 500 persons) and the relative burden of the 100 biggest enterprises studied showed a decrease (see table) which was accompanied by a drop in personnel and by pressure on the development of unemployment. The decline in the relevant importance of the 100 largest industries--a phenomenon observed for many years--affects the strength of the Greek industry and economy, a strength which obviously favors the relatively smaller and medium industries. Finally, the partial downslide of "ailing" enterprises undoubtedly contributed to the stagnation of the "large" ones.

2. The number of employed persons by enterprise decreased in 1985 compared to 1983, but continued to increase in the large enterprises. In "medium" enterprises (100-499 working persons) the number decreased and continued to decrease steadily in the "small" ones (10-99 persons). The explanation of this phenomenon can be debated extensively. Certain possible and inconsistent versions could be: the small enterprises are becoming smaller and smaller--an argument reinforced by the relatively small increase in their assets. Or, small industries succeed in becoming modernized faster than others and in intensifying their work more than the others, something which is possible if one knows, albeit in a sampling way, work conditions and relations prevailing there.

On the other hand, the large and medium industries are also expanding as proved by the development of their assets. Perhaps many of them are subjected to great pressures for an increase in personnel or, the working people succeed in resisting more "effectively" their "modernization", layoffs, etc.

3. As for assets, their development is generally average or bad, especially in medium and small industries. Most probably, they reflect the overall climate of stagnation in the whole industry. The same is true in the case

of assets' development per working person which alludes to the trend of providing the work place with more modern means of production, a trend which is not recently apparent.

4. Capital efficiency in industry is generally negative. It is mainly due to the worsening condition of the large industries. The condition of small industries is improving while that of medium is bearable. That is, small industries, and, to some degree medium industries, are developing more effectively than the main parameters of their activity; that is, their salary and wage earners, the state and the laws.

5. This last fact leads many to conclude that "the future" of the Greek industry lies in the small and medium enterprises, while few express the opinion that large enterprises are, in any form or organization, condemned and rejectable. However, all believe that new "big" industries will spring from the first--the small ones. They forget, of course, that small and medium enterprises have no desire "to expand," at least in the present institutional and developmental framework; that they have no incentive at all toward such a goal; and that their relatively positive efficiency is not at all irrelevant to the form of relations they maintain with the large (usually nationalized or strongly affected by the state) industries and to their unique but effective and rewarding attitude toward the working people, consumers, the public, environment and the society in general.

Development of Industry

	1972	1982	1985
Number of Enterprises (AE & EPE)	1,596	2,624	2,997
Number of Persons Employed	220,993	291,087	288,781
Persons Employed Per Enterprise	138	111	96
Total Assets (billion drachmas)	138.2	1,117.0	2,002.8
Total Assets per Enterprise (bil. drachmas)	87	426	668
Total Assets per Each Employed (mil drach.)	0.6	3.8	6.9

Enterprises With More Than
500 Working Persons

	1972	1982	1985
Number of Enterprises	89	102	90
Total Employed Personnel	94,457	120,174	110,334
Persons Employed per Enterprise	1,061	1,178	1,225
Total Assets (billion drachmas)	68.4	585.5	1,154.7
Total Assets per Enterprise (bil. drachmas)	788	5,740	12,833
Total Assets per Employed (mil. drach.)	723	4,872	10,425

Enterprises With 100-499 Working Persons

	1972	1982	1985
Number of Enterprises	371	506	495
Total Employed Personnel	80,304	103,221	193,603
Persons Employed per Enterprise	216	204	209
Total Assets (billion drachmas)	45.5	332.9	514.4
Total Assets per Enterprise (bil. drachmas)	123	658	1,039
Total Assets per Employed (mil. drach.)	567	3,225	4,965

Enterprises With 10-89 Working Persons

	1972	1982	1985
Number of Enterprises	728	1,803	2,070
Total Employed Personnel	30,211	64,663	71,514
Persons Employed per Enterprise	41	36	34
Total Assets (billion drachmas)	15.7	152.3	318.4
Total Assets per Enterprise (bil. drachmas)	22	107	154
Total Assets per Employed (mil. drach.)	521	2,973	4,452

Efficiency of Own Capital

	1972	1982	1985
Total Enterprises	13.40	3.25	--11.70
Enterprises With 10-99 Employees	16.10	2.32	8.45
Enterprises With 100-499 Employees	14.30	0.69	0.59
Enterprises With Over 500 Employees	13.20	8.14	-48.05

Position of 100 Biggest Enterprises (%)

	1972	1982	1985
Number of AE and EPE Industries	6.0	3.8	3.3
Total of Employed Personnel	40.0	36.9	35.8
Total of Working Capital	55.0	57.4	63.3
Other Data:			
Number of Working Persons	88,526	107,542	106,241
Working Persons and Enterprises	8.85	10.75	10.62
Total Working Capital (bil. drachmas)	75.9	641.3	1,268.5
Total Working Capital Per Enterprise (billion drachmas)	0.8	6.4	12.7
Total Working Capital Per Working Person (million drachmas)	0.9	6.0	12.0

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CSO: 3521/64

BRIEFS

UNEMPLOYMENT RISES—In 1986 unemployment increased at a rate as explosive as that of inflation. According to Labor Ministry data, the (registered) unemployed increased by 23.3 percent. The Ministry estimates that unemployment increased from 5.1 to 6.1 percent but both EEC and the National Statistical Service of Greece estimate it to be over 8.0 percent. The most impressive increase is among women (more than 30 percent). According to the Labor Ministry unemployment among women has reached 8.3 percent (6.6 percent in 1985), but the true figure approaches 10.0 percent...On the other hand, the number of unemployed to which the Labor Force Employment Organization pays benefits has increased by 54.4 percent. [Text] [Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 21 Jan 87 p 1] 7520

UNCERTAINTY ABOUT GORBACHEV'S TRIP—Not only the date but the visit itself by Gorbachev to Athens is uncertain. This is supported by yesterday's announcement that foreign Minister Papoulias' trip to Moscow is postponed and by the government spokesman's statement that the trip will be realized after the Gorbachev visit. Political observers point out that this uncertainty as to Gorbachev's visit prompted Papoulias to postpone his trip, which was scheduled to take place between the end of January and the middle of February. Speaking to reporters yesterday, Papoulias said he postponed his trip so he could personally review texts of the agreements about to be signed in Athens. However, both he and the government spokesman pointed out that they did not know the exact date of Gorbachev's visit which, they said, may take place in the spring between the end of March and the middle of April. Yet, diplomatic circles claim that if Gorbachev was definitely coming in April, Papoulias would not have postponed his visit. They added that since the Kremlin was undecided on the date of Gorbachev's visit, the Greek side felt it necessary to transfer to another date the Papoulias visit so the minister would not have to return from Moscow in February with "empty hands"---without, that is, having something to say about Gorbachev's visit. [Text] [Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 21 Jan 87 p 20] 7520

CSO: 3521/64

PAPER ASSESSES GOVERNMENT BUDGET BILL, FISCAL POLICY

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 15 Jan 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Getting Sweden Into Balance"]

[Text] Ministers of finance usually sleep well at night. Without this ability they would promptly choose some other line of work. More sensitive persons in public office in Sweden must, however, have had regular nightmares over the past 15 years because of the balance of current payments. And that is still an appropriate subject for concern.

Last year the balance of current payments improved by about 19 billion kronor to a surplus of more than 8.5 billion. In December The National Institute of Economic Research calculated that 1987 would also produce a stable surplus of 6.9 billion kronor. One month later the forecast in the national budget was reduced by one-half, to 3.6 billion kronor.

A closer look at the figures shows that the balance includes a net reduction in interest costs for foreign loans of about 4 billion, and a reduction of oil costs of about 20 billion. International interest rates are largely decided by the monetary policies chosen by the dominant economies--United States, West Germany and Japan. And the price of oil is not entirely stable--during 1986 it fell by about 60 percent, primarily because of Saudi Arabia's price policy. A return to the price level of January 1986, with everything else remaining the same, would turn the Swedish balance of current payments into a dramatic deficit.

This reasoning shows that the good year 1986 could be a one-time event for the Swedish trade balance abroad.

Equilibrium in the trade balance--meaning that trade and remittances abroad go steadily up--is necessary over an entire business cycle as a restriction on economic policy. A country such as Sweden which borrows abroad must in addition have a surplus which over time will repay the debts. Beyond that a surplus has no value by itself. Except that in a functioning market a stable surplus will lead to a currency movement which presses the exchange rate of the krona upward, after which exports slow, imports rise, and in this way the surplus is automatically reduced.

Both the discussion and the stabilization policy must distinguish between two types of deficit (even though in practice both sometimes appear at the same time, one superimpose on the other).

A deficit which depends on the economic situation is a normal phenomenon in the Swedish economy. Swedish exports are dominated by raw materials and investment goods which are highly sensitive to economic fluctuations. When the demand from abroad slackens, exports decline. But consumption does not vary in the same way as the economic curve, and furthermore it stays mainly with imports. The deficit which appears immediately after the economic curve turns down is a logical reflection of the structure of industry and foreign trade. A sharp tightening up, such as Asbrink and Strang carried out in 1970-71, can probably do more harm than good.

Until 1973 the regular deficit was determined by the trend of economic activity, and the entire stabilization policy was determined in accordance with that. Economic thinking was totally determined by the Keynesian stabilization theory. That is probably the reason why traditional means were used against the enormous deficits of the 70's which were structural rather than determined by the trend of economic activity--a reaction first to wage costs trending upwards more than those of competitive countries, and later because industrial profits and investments were depressed by private and public consumption.

The only new input into economic policy is devaluation (which became permissible following the abandoning of the Bretton Woods system). And Swedish governments of all kinds have energetically tried during the past 10 years to devalue the country out of the cost problem and deficits. But devaluation alone functions largely as a painkiller. In the long run the market takes over and brings about a rate of exchange which reflects the industrial strength and the relative cost situation.

That the change in the balance of payments now coincides with the current international exchange and price movements indicates that Swedish industry is still not large and flexible enough to support the total consumption (including payment of foreign borrowing which financed politically popular consumption instead of investment).

It happens like this when we act as we do.

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CSO:3650/49

VATICAN CALLS FOR AID PLAN FOR THIRD WORLD

AU271235 Paris AFP in English 1229 GMT 27 Jan 87

[Text] Vatican City, Jan 27 (AFP)--The Vatican on Tuesday urged industrialized countries to launch a "broad plan of cooperation and assistance" to solve the problem of Third World debt, and criticized the International Monetary Fund (IMF)'s "authoritarian and technocratic" handling of the matter.

In a 30-page report drawn up by a papal commission at the demand of Pope John Paul II, the Vatican called on rich countries to "start working on a new system of aid" that would "constitute a commitment of several years."

"Such a contribution ... would seem indispensable ... to enable the developing countries to launch and conclude successfully, in cooperation with the industrialized countries and international organizations, the long-term programs they need to undertake as soon as possible," the report said.

The Vatican noted that "special responsibility" of the IMF, which offers aid to member-states to solve balance of payments problems and often ties the aid to specific economic targets.

"In numerous cases, however, the IMF's decisions have been ill-received by the ... countries in difficulty," the report said. They "may seem to have been imposed in an authoritarian and technocratic way without due consideration of urgent social requirements and the specific features of each situation."

"It would be advisable to bring out clearly that dialogue and the service of all concerned are values which guide the actions taken by the IMF," it added.

The Vatican asserted that austerity conditions set by creditors often led to unemployment, recession and a drastic fall in the standard of living in indebted countries. It also underlined the "egocentricity" of rich countries which disregard "the effects of interdependence."

The creditor countries should modify current world trade rules for "a more just distribution of the fruits of growth" and avoid erratic fluctuations in exchange rates which "prompt illicit profits on currency speculation and drains in national capital reserves," often in the indebted nations themselves.

The report warned leaders of developing countries not to make other nations responsible for "their own actions, errors and abuses," such as "tax frauds, corruption, (and) kickbacks in international contracts."

The Vatican suggested that the indebted countries adopt spending cuts, especially on expenditures "for reasons of prestige and for armaments," and other urgent measures, such as tax reform, agrarian reform, and initiatives for private enterprise.

It also urged creditors to help avoid defaults on debt obligations, and the concomitant effects on the international financial system, by rescheduling part or all of these obligations.

As part of an "ethical approach" to the debt question, the rich countries should also adopt measures to relaunch growth, reduce protectionism, lower interest rates and assign "a just value" to raw materials, the report added.

But the Vatican warned against "an immediate and total liberalization of international trade" which "would risk generating competition that would endanger the economies of the developing countries and would oblige them to make overly rapid and destructive adjustments in certain sectors."

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CSO: 3528/74

GROUND, NAVAL VULNERABILITY OF BALTIC APPROACHES ANALYZED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 10 Jan 87 p 5

[Article by Horst Bacia: "Control Over the Baltic Approaches is at Stake-- Baltic NATO Headquarters for 25 Years"]

[Text] Karup, Jan--In the middle of Jutland, between farms, fields and forests lies Karup, the site of NATO Headquarters, Baltic Sea Approaches. An air base with easily 30 km of concrete runways is the most visible part of the extensive military facility. The take-off and landing strips, which are also used in part for scheduled landings by the Scandinavian airline SAS, were built back during the last war; beginning with Danish plans and finished by German troops after the occupation of the country in April 1940. But it has been 25 years since the Headquarters of Allied Forces Baltic Approaches (Baltap) was formed in Karup in January 1962. The allied land, air and naval forces would be subordinated to this command in case of crises or conflict; they would defend an area extending from the Elbe out to Skagen, at the North peak of Jutland. This means all Danish soldiers, the 6th Armored Infantry Division of the West German Army, all operational units of the West German Navy, about 100 aircraft of the West German Air Force, and the allocated reinforcements from other member countries of the alliance. The supreme commander of BALTAP HQ is always a Danish General or Admiral, his deputy is a German officer of the same rank. The staff is composed one-third of Danish, one-third of German, and one-third of American, British, Canadian and Norwegian officers.

The Baltap command area is subordinate to the NATO supreme commander, North Europe in Kolsas by Oslo, and belongs among the strategic, key positions for the joint defense of NATO countries in Europe. If control of Denmark and the access routes to the Baltic Sea were lost, then the enemy would have made a decisive strike. This would be a dangerous flanking development for ground forces on the Central European Front; the Soviet Air Force would have a corridor for attacks on Great Britain and landing harbors for reinforcements arriving by sea, and for the submarines and larger warships of the Baltic Fleet finally, the way into the Atlantic would be free. These objectives would have to be attained by a rapid and massive thrust by Warsaw Pact ground forces via Schleswig-Holstein to Jutland and the occupation of the Danish islands.

The potential for such actions now exists. The superiority in conventional armed forces, which is an expression of the offensive military doctrine and strategy of the Soviet Union, comes to bear here as well. Ten highly mobile Soviet divisions equipped with heavy and modern weapons are deployed in the North GDR and Poland. In addition are several air-mobile divisions, which likewise could be used for an attack on Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark. Amphibious craft are available for a marine brigade of about 2,500 men stationed near Leningrad, for a Polish division of marine infantry of 5,000 men, and for specially trained detachments in the GDR, which could land 5,000 to 6,000 men with full equipment in one wave. These detachments sometimes also have air-cushion vehicles, which combine high speed and low vulnerability to conventional mines. An amphibious landing or a parachute landing on a large scale presumes, however, that [our] own air and naval forces have general mastery of the situation. This might not be the case. The conquest of Jutland by land via Schleswig-Holstein would thus be necessary in order to actually gain control of the Baltic Sea approaches.

The Soviet Potential

The Soviet Baltic Fleet consists of 50 cruisers, destroyers and frigates, more than 80 smaller warships and submarines (including six of the Golf-II class, each with three nuclear armed ballistic missiles, and five of the Juliett class, equipped with AS cruise missiles), landing craft and a large number of minesweepers. These naval forces also have around 200 aircraft and 40 helicopters. The GDR "People's Navy" and the Polish fleet also have a larger number of modern, missile-equipped corvettes and speedboats. Of the approximately 700 combat aircraft of the Warsaw Pact air forces stationed in the western Soviet Union, in Poland and in the GDR, a part could be employed in fighting for the Baltic Sea approaches.

Only if there is sufficient advance warning and only when the allocated reinforcements arrive in time could NATO employ appropriate forces to oppose the Warsaw Pact armed forces in this sector. Above all, the Danish army troops would need time to mobilize. In case of war, the commander of Allied ground forces in Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland, with HQ in Rendsburg, would take over the command of the 6th German armored infantry division which its nearly 20,000 men, it is the strongest unit of the West German Army) the home defense brigade 51 and the Danish Jutland division and all arriving reinforcements. The commander of ground forces east of the Great Belt could only rely initially on two Danish armored infantry brigades and four combat groups trained especially for the defense of endangered coastal regions on Seeland but without possible reinforcements; on Bornholm Island there would be one reduced brigade available. Almost all detachments of the Danish Army, which numbers about 54,000 soldiers after complete mobilization, are well-trained, however. In addition, there are units for facilities defense, and the male and female members of the "home defense," with a total of 78,000 personnel. But the personnel strength of fully operational, standing units amounts to only between 7,000 and 9,700.

Too few standing combat units, as Deputy Commander Lt. Gen. Raulf admits, is one of the weak points in the command authority of the Baltic Sea approaches.

The allocated reinforcements, perhaps a British infantry brigade, cannot make up for this deficiency. The weak air defense also causes concern for the air force general. The Danish air force will soon have eight, instead of the present six, "Hawk" missile batteries; but longer-range systems like the "Patriot" are missing. So a less defended corridor could develop over Denmark which would make it easy for Soviet aircraft to fly around the air defense in Central Europe or attack targets in Great Britain. Therefore, Raulf believes a solution will have to be found within the alliance. Five American and two British wings are definitely allocated for reinforcement of the Danish air force and the German airborne units in Schleswig-Holstein.

Criticism of Denmark

The German and Danish navies, according to Fleet Admiral Schuur, Chief of Staff to the Commander of Allied Naval Forces, Baltap, are standing in the Baltic Sea "quite tolerably". However, it is unfortunate that the Danes had to take their two frigates out of service temporarily for cost reasons, and reduce the number of training days at sea. In the German Navy, by contrast, efforts began more than ten years ago on modernizing the speedboat and refitting it with guided missiles. An important improvement in deterrence and defensive capability will also result from the equipping of the four Navy air wings with the "Tornado", which is nearly completed. With its flight properties and long-range missiles to engage ships, the "Tornado" is a particularly effective weapon system for conducting naval warfare from the air. In spite of their relatively small numbers, the 24 German and the 4 Danish submarines can tie up relatively large proportions of enemy submarine defense, hinder the approach for an amphibious landing, and impede the transport of supplies over the Baltic Sea.

With all the reservations of the military personnel operating in Karup, there are also many assertions about timid political actions. Denmark has been repeatedly called on to do more for the common defense--both by the allies and by NATO General Secretary Carrington--and not to be only a token force in the alliance. Whenever NATO communiques mention nuclear weapons, Denmark always draws attention to itself by "footnotes." This reflects the majority opinion in the Danish Folketing, where the non-Socialist Four Party Coalition has not had a majority since autumn 1982, on questions of security policy. Due to its long pacifist tradition, the Radical Liberals Party, which otherwise supports the non-Socialist minority government of Prime Minister Schulter, regularly votes with the social democratic and left-socialist opposition. The government plan to provide more funds for the coming, long-term defense plan could fail in the face of this opposition. The Social Democrats have already announced that they favor a "zero growth", even though the Danish state does not pay for defense one-tenth of what is provided for social services. And this does not even take into account the possibility that Social Democrats and left-socialists (who previously called for Denmark to leave NATO) may win a majority in parliament in the next election, which will probably take place sometime this year. An increase in Danish defense efforts would then not be expected at all. Since it is repeatedly confirmed that German-Danish cooperation in the NATO Command, Baltic Sea Approaches, has proven valuable, there is reason to celebrate on the occasion of the anniversary.

SWISS ASSERT'S NORDIC CAPABILITY TO HALT SOVIET MARCHTHROUGH

Biel SCHWEITZER SOLDAT + MFD in German Dec 86 p 18

[Article by Erich Hauser: "Norway and Denmark: Defense Line for Protection of Atlantic Supply Routes. A Wintertime Trip to NATO's Northern Flank"]

[Text] A wrought-iron gate with two small decorative lanterns bars the way along the road which leads from the small (population 10,500) town of Kirkenes in northeastern Norway to the Soviet Union. Norwegian Brig Gen Inge Torhaug asks his visitors, a small group of journalists from eight NATO member countries, "not to take any pictures up to the border." Moscow included this proviso in the bilateral border treaty concluded in 1949. On the far side of the valley, Soviet sentries on a watchtower are eyeing us through their binoculars. On this side, there is a yellow wooden building, Torhaug's "official residence," with the jagged Norwegian military flag waving from the roof. Torhaug, the "commissar" of the Oslo ministry of justice, is responsible for the 196-km border with the Soviet Union. No other NATO member except Turkey has a common border with the Soviet Union.

"This is a closed frontier," Torhaug says. "But our relations are businesslike and courteous." This is why he has informed his Soviet counterpart, Lt Col Alexander Ivanovich Krilov of the KGB Border Troops, that he is bringing visitors along. He communicates with Krilov via an interpreter using a red telephone. Torhaug, who once held the post of military attache in Moscow and later served as a Norwegian intelligence officer, insists that he does not speak a word of Russian. The two border officials meet about twice a month. Once they have expressed their mutual satisfaction about the continuing tranquility along the border, they spend the rest of the day "in private"--eating, hunting or fishing or discussing literature. They are on a first-name basis and address each other in the familiar. (Who could imagine such a relationship along the border between the two Germanies?) "Ever since Gorbachev declared war on alcohol in Moscow," Torhaug says, "we have been drinking vodka out of teacups."

On the other side of the border it is only 15 km to the naval base at Pechenga (the former Finnish port of Petsamo) and 180 km by road to Murmansk. That is where the major part of the Soviet nuclear submarine fleet is based in addition to hundreds of other warships whose job it would be to interdict Western Atlantic supply lines in case of war. Torhaug commands only 550

soldiers. At any one time, half of their number man the seven watchtowers and barracks along the border while the other half is out on patrol. The battalion has only been issued light infantry weapons but no tanks or artillery. In peacetime, the unit's job is to see to it that there is "no border violation." In case of war, its job is to blow up this solitary road to the West in as many places as possible, allow itself to be overrun and to harass the invaders from prepared positions in the cliffs. They provide a perfect example of the kind of "non-attackability" that is being urged by SPD political leaders for the Bundeswehr. But in this case the terrain is devoid of people and difficult for armored units to operate in. The Oslo government does not permit NATO troop maneuvers or overflights in its eastern province of Finnmark. The border treaty has a background of its own. In the fall of 1944, Soviet troops liberated the eastern Finnmark from German occupation and in the fall of 1945 they withdrew again on Stalin's orders. In the south, for another thing, it is not far to Finland which has been tied to the Soviet Union in rather delicate fashion since 1949 by way of a mutual assistance pact directed against "Germany and its allies." In northwestern Norway, things are entirely different--not only as far as the harsh, long winters and the almost continuous daylight in the summer are concerned. The region reaching from Bodoe past Narvik far north of Tromsøe is to be held at all costs in case of war. Its airports (the SAS flight attendants remind passengers of the ban on photographing them prior to each landing) would be just as important for obstructing Soviet naval attacks from Murmansk against NATO's Atlantic supply lines as the fjords are as hiding places for Western naval units. Ever since World War II, all Norwegians seem to realize that this strategic corner of the world (which is as big as Belgium but has a population of only 150,000) cannot be kept out of a big power conflict. "To be sure," a Norwegian admiral tells us, "the population is opposed to nuclear weapons, particularly in Tromsøe, but in favor of our membership in NATO." Since the founding of NATO in 1949, the Oslo government has adhered to the principle of no stationing of foreign troops or deployment of nuclear weapons in peacetime--but only in peacetime.

"Even in a simple crisis situation we require NATO reinforcements," Norwegian commanders maintain. Every other year, this particular exercise is conducted during the winter months. This year's "Anchor Express" maneuver involving 20,000 men from nine NATO member countries was broken off prematurely following a serious avalanche disaster. For several years now, weapons, ammunition and equipment for the reinforcements have been "pre-warehoused" so that the troops themselves need only be flown in on the specified date. The supplies are sufficient for a Canadian 900-man battalion; a U.S. Marine brigade; British-Dutch infantry units as well as Norwegian reservists from the more densely populated south of the country. The latter are given just 12 hours to change over from civilian life and take part in the maneuvers. In case of mobilization, the five million Norwegians are able to field an army of 330,000 troops. The 1940 trauma lingers on.

The multinational SACEUR reserve under the command of U.S. GEN Rogers, the unit falsely labeled the "NATO fire brigade," regularly takes part in these maneuvers. It consists of Italian "Alpinis," Canadians, British troops as well as units from the United States and the Benelux countries. The sole contribution the Bundeswehr has consistently been allowed to make to these exercises in Norway has been a field hospital as well as some helicopters and

aircraft. The official reason given was the Finnish-Soviet mutual assistance pact but it has also been due to the lingering Norwegian feelings. "I have never been treated in an unfriendly manner--not even in Narvik," a German army captain who has taken part in various maneuvers of this kind has said.

"Even if nobody else dares fly any more, the German helicopters can still be relied on," a U.S. officer says. And just to prove it, our small group of journalists can see a Bundeswehr helicopter make a picture-perfect landing in a tight spot near Tromsø between the fjord, a high bridge, light poles and a tall antenna mast in order to rescue members of a British jeep patrol which was subjected to a fictitious sabotage attack. In fact, even the Norwegians assume that a small minority of their citizens will collaborate with the enemy in case of war, just as they did between 1940 and 1945.

About 250 times each year, Norwegian planes scramble off the coast to intercept unidentified aircraft. "In most cases we are the first to take pictures of new types of Soviet aircraft from all sides," says the commanding officer of the ring of radar stations which were built with money from the NATO infrastructure fund as part of the early warning system along the capes between Kirkenes in the northeast around the North Cape all the way down to the south. When an stray Soviet missile skirted Norwegian territory and went down in Finland, "we could have told the Finns exactly where to look for it," the Norwegian officer added. In contrast to the view they held 10 years ago, Norwegian officers now believe that in case of war the Finns (fielding an army of some 700,000 men out of a population of four million) and the Swedes would probably thwart a Soviet throughmarch to northern Norway in spite of the improved road conditions. There are hidden aspects to the so-called "Nordic balance." There are merely indirect indications of the fact that the military leaders of the three nations are in close touch with one another.

Not only for the political leaders but also for the military men of Norway and Denmark (the fourth North European nation) the so-called "Nordic balance" appears to have become something of an article of faith. Even social democrats like Damgaard know that Norway's and Denmark's membership in NATO are indispensable for the maintenance of Finnish and Swedish neutrality. Danish officers, too, are pleased with their nation's defensive capability: in case of mobilization, the Danish home guard can field more than 156,000 soldiers at least out of a population of five million. "A Nordic security pact between the four nations was discussed in 1949 but the idea was dropped because such a pact would not have provided sufficient security." This was a statement we journalists repeatedly heard on our trip along NATO's northern flank. The two Scandinavian members of NATO believe that they would be the victims of an attack from the east in case a conflict between the big powers broke out. Because their own strength is not adequate to the task, they count on NATO reinforcements (even in case of heightened tensions) to help deter a potential aggressor and thereby prevent war from breaking out. But both nations are also continuing to lend support to detente as part of the political strategy of the alliance.

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DANISH NATO COMMANDER WARNS SDP ON DEFENSE BUDGET

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 Dec 86 p 14

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard: "Danish NATO Commander Sends Warning to Social Democratic Party"]

[Text] The chief of the United Command, Lieutenant General N.-Aa. Rye Andersen, maintains that the threat from the East has not changed, that the Russians already have a Star Wars defense system, and that it is necessary that the Western conventional forces achieve a reasonable balance.

"We must aim at setting the insurance premium in proportion to the threat we are facing and to the obligations we have assumed," says the chief of NATO'S United Command in Karup, Danish Lieutenant General N.-Aa. Rye Andersen, in light of the forthcoming negotiations concerning a new defense compromise which is to go into effect in 1988. He warns the Social Democrats against believing that an unchanged defense budget will be sufficient to be able to maintain a credible Danish defense system.

"The threat has not changed. The Warsaw Pact still has such overwhelming conventional forces that they still constitute a serious threat to NATO's far weaker conventional forces," Lieutenant General Rye Andersen adds, who in addition to being the chief of the United Command is also operational commander of the Danish forces in time of war. Rye Andersen will retire in the summer and will be replaced by Air Force General Poul Thorsen.

"Now that Star Wars has been discussed in recent years, one is surely apt to overlook the fact that the Warsaw Pact is able to design and deploy an antiballistic missile defense system which will be able to make the nuclear threat from the West extremely questionable."

"In pace with such a development, one can in part be surprised at the Russians' lacking desire for the USA to set up an equivalent system, and in part it cannot be ignored that the less effect and the less deterrence there are in NATO's missile defense system, the more important it is that the conventional forces be built up to a reasonable balance," the lieutenant general says.

The Social Democratic Party's chairman, Ex-Prime-Minister Anker Jo/rgensen, has from the outset rejected an increase in the defense budget.

"The Social Democratic Party's problem is the balance for its own left wing and the SF [Socialist People's Party]. There has been talk of some tying to the cost-of-living index," Rye Andersen says, and he continues:

"If there is just tying to the cost-of-living index, then the armed forces will be very bad off. First and foremost because our materiel situation has developed as it has. We never got the compensation for the weapons aid which the politicians promised. The balance we have, with extremely low personnel strength, is due precisely to the desire to have the reserves of materiel, and especially of ammunition, built up."

Twenty-Five Years in Karup

The NATO United Command, called BALTAP in military jargon, is holding its 25th anniversary on 8 January. "At the end of the 1950's, after West Germany's admission to NATO, it was realized that reorganization of the defense of the north flank was necessary, and in the spring of 1961 the so-called Oslo Agreement was entered into, which established the framework of the present organization. The agreement was that it would always be a Danish general who would be the commander, and the first commander, General Tage Andersen, came to Karup on 8 January 1962," Lieutenant General Rye Andersen relates.

"Today the staff consists of one-third Danish personnel, one-third German, and one-third mixed American and British, plus a Norwegian and a Canadian."

"It has been discussed several times over the years, especially because the question was raised in the German press, whether it was fair, with the balance of forces which there was between the German and Danish, to maintain the rule regarding a Danish commander. But this has still not had its validity contested nor been changed. When one looks at the force contributions, it is the combat force which is decisive, and it is thereby still fair to have a Danish commander."

General Rye Andersen is convinced that the command structure will be able to be maintained. "It is my conviction that the developments and the defense discussion which we are facing do not have to rub off onto the balance. I think that the Germans understand our problems and that they consent to changes' not taking place."

"But it is clear that among our allies, and the Germans are certainly the closest of them, there is awareness of developments in the Danish armed forces. However, I do not think that this will change anything in the command situation."

Only 5000 Danish soldiers took part in the Bold Guard major fall exercise in Schleswig-Holstein. "In light of the fact that the exercise included 60,000 men, this was extraordinarily poor Danish participation," Rye Andersen says.

"This was due to the fact that the army was in a phase in which the new army structure was about to be implemented. We were at a very low draftee level, and we were in the course of adjusting the standing force. It is the intention in Danish quarters that in the next Bold Guard exercise we will turn up with a Jutland division of reasonable size. That is, we will be up to 12,000 men."

More Draftees

In the event of mobilization today, it would be necessary to call up draftees all the way up to 40 years of age in order to bring the combat force up to the 72,000 men established by law, but General Rye Andersen does not think that a drastic increase in the calling up of draftees is necessary.

"We must try out our mobilization system in a manner that we see brigades brought up to full strength. The problem is not to have more draftees in peace time. The problem is to have so many draftees that we can have a reasonable age for our mobilization forces, and with the falling behind that we have, it is surely desirable that the draftee force become bigger than where it is strictly necessary to routinely enliven it. We must make an extra effort in order to do away with the lack of balance," Lieutenant General Rye Andersen says.

"I think that the figure which the defense minister is operating with at the moment--a 2000-man increase in called-up draftees so that a figure of about 7000 men is reached--will solve our current problem. Much larger figures have been mentioned. But, of course, generals cannot get enough, and we must find a balance between what is desirable and what is economically feasible."

"There is another aspect which is desirable in connection with an increase in the draftee force," the lieutenant general adds.

"It is that sympathy for the armed forces is closely tied to compulsory military service. It is as though we have been losing touch with the people these years when the emphasis has been placed on regular personnel and when compulsory military service has been very low. With this the armed forces become something alien, and it becomes difficult to gain the necessary understanding of the necessity of the armed forces. This holds true also for the politicians, perhaps just with the exception of those appointed as spokesmen and specialists, who therefore have to deal with this."

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OFFICER URGES CREATION OF WAR MOBILIZATION FORCE

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE AFTEN in Danish 19-23 Dec 86 p 6

[Op Ed Article by Major Michael H. Clemmensen: "Save the Armed Forces; Forget the Ninth of April!" First paragraph is BERLINGSKE AFTEN introduction]

[Text] Our defense system is proportioned to the wrong threat, Major Michael H. Clemmensen believes. We think we must avert a surprise attack—just as on 9 April 1940. This also best suits the Social Democratic Party's labor union interests. Instead, we ought to put our stakes on a larger army of draftees which is to be mobilized only in time of war—as in the other Nordic countries.

Right since the Second World War the experiences of 9 April 1940 have blocked the ability of the Danes to think clearly about defense.

The shock which the nation got that morning has made it so that when we think of defense policy we forget the picture of the international situation which we in other respects are somewhat in agreement on. We think that the defense system must directly have to counter an attack—in order to prevent another 9 April. From this comes the fact that without closer consideration we want the defense system to have high "effort readiness."

Most recently, this feeling was worded in the Social Democratic proposal for modernization of the defense system:

"The standing force of the land defense system must—as a component of crisis prevention—be of such a size and composition that, without mobilization or other alarming stepping up in crisis situations, reasonable possibilities of action are achieved in the face of minor provocations and possible disquieting episodes, like, for example, landing exercises near Danish coasts."

"A substantial component of the effort concept (personnel with over 12 months of service) should be included in peace time in combat units, radio units, transportation units and in particular key posts in the mobilization force."

"The land forces are to be built up as mobile forces which in cooperation with long-range artillery and the air defense system can immediately support the Home Guard's effort against an attacker."

(From the Social Democratic Party's outline for modernization of the defense system, from the summer of 1986.)

The trauma of 9 April is only one of the factors--though the most important--behind the continued sticking to effort readiness.

The reason that it is necessary to take up this sensitive subject is that banking on the ability to immediately counter an attack, over and beyond being unnecessary today, is costly. It contributes to limitation of the possibilities of solving likely problems in a crisis or war. As far as the army is concerned, effort readiness in today's Denmark can, besides, only become a fiction.

Effort Readiness Is a Fiction

The effort readiness in the army which we have had for a number of years and that which the Social Democratic proposal puts forth have nothing to do with actual effort readiness. There is simply no imaginable attack that is so modest that it applies here.

The size of the forces included in credible effort readiness must in part be in reasonable proportion to the size of the territory threatened, and in part must have sufficient fighting power to stop the attacking force it is expected would be brought into action against Denmark in a war. That is, the need for effort readiness is the principal share of the field army. It is dimensioned precisely for this job.

However, the very little so-called effort readiness we have in the army is a paper tiger. Working hour rules, shortened days, vacations, leaves to take civilian and military courses, residence far from the place of service, as well as the situation that the readiness forces have to partake in exercises in other parts of the country, make it a self-delusion. In the event of a sudden attack the forces will probably be away or scattered. That is, they will first be at the defense system's disposal right before or at the same time as the rest of the army, which, cf. the "Orders," will be mobilized when the country is attacked.

Peacetime Army

There is also another reason that it is not possible to maintain real fighting ability in even a standing readiness unit in today's Danish army. As is natural in a peacetime army, the training is not particularly intensive or realistic. The working time rules and shortage of resources give it a comfortable pace. And realistic training would result in accidents and produce unacceptable loss of human life. But first and foremost the actual peaceful international situation serves as a quiet background for everything the armed forces do. Since the Cold War days around the Cuba crisis we have not kept ourselves ready for immediately going into action, in spite of a feeling that this was wrong. The air of readiness has disappeared, and the daily practical readiness at service installations has for over 15 years now been kept in accordance with outside reality. Making a Danish army unit combat ready is not something which can happen from hour to hour or day to day. It will take weeks, both mentality- and trainingwise.

For many reasons effort readiness is somewhat higher in the navy and especially the air force than the army. But these services' readiness forces will not be able to stop a sudden attack until their combat force is ready. And even if their combat force should be ready, this will not be able to stop the attack until the army is ready. The armed forces' effort readiness is accordingly a fiction also viewed as a whole.

If banking on effort readiness did not have negative effects in other respects, the fact that readiness is a fiction would not play a major role. Effort readiness in today's international situation is just an unnecessary luxury.

But why have we placed our stakes on it?

Why are the authors of the Social Democratic Party's proposal placing their stakes on it?

Bewilderment and Confusion

Effort readiness--that is, as mentioned, the ability to immediately counter an attack--must be clearly distinguished from two other concepts--readiness to repel and mobilization readiness.

The readiness to repel is the ability to be able to ascertain and counter invasions of land and sea territory and airspace.

Mobilization readiness is the ability to be able to establish combat-ready forces.

The confusion between effort readiness and readiness to repel can be due to the fact that they both require forces with readied materiel and ready-trained personnel. But the strength requirements are decisively different. The readiness to repel which has been tailored to the current situation must only ensure monitoring of and a response capacity for those places especially subject to violation, i.e., sea territory and airspace and Bornholm. In connection with the development of a local crisis, there can be need for a strengthened readiness to repel, for example, with longlasting or massive violations like the Soviet submarine violations of the Swedish skerries. For that reason--and because it otherwise takes months or weeks to make them ready--units of the navy must be kept in very high mobilization readiness.

An example of the confusion or mixing together of the two concepts is seen in the first of the three quotes from the Social Democratic proposal. A response capacity in the event of "minor provocations" requires just the readiness to repel which is now being maintained. If "reasonable possibilities for action" are to be had in the face of "possible disquieting episodes like, for example, landing exercises near Danish coasts," it will be necessary to have effort readiness equivalent to the majority of the navy, air force and field army in the sections of the country in question. But this is of course only necessary if we are disquieted over the exercises because of the international situation, and neither the armed forces nor the Social Democratic Party have been for a long time. No one saw it as a possibility that the exercises would gradually become an attack.

A partial confusion of effort and mobilization readiness is seen in another quote from the Social Democratic proposal. Only combat units (and in part radio units) enter into effort readiness (or their size is taken into consideration in an in part oversized and misplaced readiness to repel). To keep the remaining components standing is just to help improve mobilization readiness.

Misunderstanding of the Ninth of April

By the maintenance of effort readiness regardless of the international situation another 9 April will be safeguarded against. The next time we will be able to fight.

The fact is ignored that the course of the German attack was not due to the fact that we did not have the ability to establish effort readiness, but to political decisions not to utilize this ability. An ability which Denmark had used during the First World War, and as the Swedes did during the Second World War when the situation became critical. It is not possible in advance to guard against the government not wanting to be provocative by making the armed forces ready in a future international crisis. That the Social Democratic proposal's authors in the first quote regard Danish mobilization as an "alarming stepping up" (in contrast to calling up reinforcements) emphasizes this.

It is not possible to guard against the fact that a government will choose not to offer resistance with the use of the standing resources at its disposal. The government had decided this beforehand up to the Ninth of April, in spite of the fact that the readiness force at that time was considerably larger than the present and the Social Democratic proposal's "effort readiness."

To place our stakes on effort readiness regardless of the international situation costs so much that our ability—as in 1913-14—to establish effort readiness during an international crisis is reduced. We also reduce our ability to provide the mobilized forces with such size and quality, i.e., staying power, that it will be probable that allied reinforcements will be sent here or get through.

Politicians and Officers

It is noteworthy that our Nordic neighbor countries, also when they are in more vulnerable and important locations than Denmark, are staking on mobilization capacity and on the combat force's size and quality. But they did not experience our Ninth of April either.

Danish politicians and officers normally do not waste much energy on getting a realistic picture of the outside world.

The officer knows who is friend and who is foe. He is able to analyze the enemy's capabilities, which are then rounded off to a higher figure for the sake of safety—allowance must be made for uncertainty in one's information. The possible attacker's intentions are not his field, but that of the politicians. This is so convenient.

Politicians as a general rule are not interested in foreign or security policy. It is domestic policy which produces votes in a small country. Only the plain symbols which can be used in a domestic policy fight are drawn from the outside world. There is no time to get realistic--i.e. nuanced--pictures of the major powers, just arguments which confirm the preconceived notion. When the part of domestic policy which is called defense policy is discussed, it is therefore not possible to compensate for the limited point of departure of the experts. Influenced by a picture of the enemy carried over from Nazi Germany, the experts' professional point of departure--the worst imaginable situation--is not questioned.

Accordingly, of course, antagonism is preserved between the peaceful outside reality, which we all can perceive, and the perception of a threat, which forms the basis for our defense policy.

This tendency is strengthened by the desire not to deviate from the perception of the threat which it can be agreed on in NATO to be united on in public. It is also unpleasant to carry out necessary prioritizing if this is seen too clearly in strength reports to NATO. Denmark has surely a somewhat shady reputation to begin with.

Social Democratic Party's Proposal

There are two other reasons that the Social Democratic proposal prioritizes effort readiness so highly. They are both expressions of interests of the people who prepared it.

The proposal reflects organization interests of the Army Enlisted Privates and Corporals Association (HKKF).

Mobilization readiness and the training of draftees for the combat force rest on officers, sergeants and specialists, i.e., on military academicians, officials and tradesmen. HKKF, which gained greater influence on the proposal than the threat, represents the army's contracted "unskilled." Effort readiness cannot be based on draftees in training. It must be based on contracted enlisted privates. It is natural that HKKF is exploiting this fact in fighting for its own interests.

Secondly, the politicians who influenced the proposal have close ties to the Home Guard.

The motivation basis there has up to now been--without any deeper reflections--the perception of a need for high effort readiness. And it is essential that the rest of the armed forces "can immediately support the Home Guard's effort against an attacker." It is not understood that preservation of such a capacity in peace time can happen only at the cost of effective support after mobilization.

At the same time it can be a problem that, if there were no threat of attack against the country in peace time, the justification for the Home Guard people's having weapons and ammunition at home would seem less obvious, and if the weapons were stored centrally, the morale basis could crumble away.

Here again it was direct feelings and failing analysis rather than the actual threat which was the basis. If one just reflected a bit, one would reach the conclusion that, regardless of the fact that an attack is not an immediate possibility, it is very desirable that the Home Guard have weapons and ammunition in their homes. In a mobilization situation there will be an acute need for support and surveillance. To call the weapons in to depots would create another bottleneck in the progress of mobilization.

It would besides be a totally unnecessary attack on the symbol of the homogeneous democracy's determination to defend itself which the Danish Home Guard is.

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
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NAVAL HOME GUARD SLATED TO LARGER, SEAGOING CUTTERS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 23 Dec 86 p 6

[Article by Nils Eric Boesgaard: "Accommodations for Women on New MHV [Naval Home Guard] Cutters"]

[Text] New large seagoing vessels will increase the Naval Home Guard's effectiveness in the patrol service, searches in accidents at sea, and in the escort service for major yachting events, like "Around Zealand," for example.



The new 23.7-meter-long Home Guard cutter, which, among other things, will replace part of the old ones from the 1940's. Troels Marstrand's drawing is based on the sketch which Dwinger Marineconsult prepared for the Naval Materiel Command.

The Naval Home Guard will have new cutters with accommodations for both male and female crew members.

It is the intention that the vessels will be paid for with part of the extra appropriation of a half billion kroner which Defense Minister Hans Engell (Conservative Party) will ask the defense compromise parties for.

But how many cutters it will be a question of is not yet known.

In addition, the money will be used for new antitank defense missiles, ABC suits for all Home Guard people, improvement of the existing uniform system, and procurement of a new pack system.

The new vessels for the Naval Home Guard were designed by Dwinger Marineconsult A/S in Hørsholm. They will be 23.7 meters long, 5.6 meters wide and have a 2-meter draft. They will have two diesel engines each of which plies its own propeller. Its arms will be a 20-mm machine gun which will be able to be mounted on the fore deck.

Dwinger has already designed several other types of ships for the armed forces and has contributed most recently by designing a new type of rescue vessel, the so-called "Kattegat Type," which had such attractive characteristics that the firm was asked to look at the Naval Home Guard's cutter project.

At the moment there are 37 cutters in the Naval Home Guard. Some of these vessels are very old and therefore require inexpedient and very costly maintenance, Commander P. Højer Nielsen reports.

For this reason, the Home Guard Command in March of this year appointed a project panel which has prepared the basic military requirements for the ships. As part of the work, a full-scale "mock-up" model of the wheelhouse was constructed at the Naval Home Guard School at Slipshavn near Nyborg, in order to arrive at the best possible arrangement. This concerns, among other things, the ladies' room, which has been a decisive factor for the long awaited permission for members of the Women's Naval Corps to be included in the vessels' crews.

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BRIEFS

NAVY TO RECRUIT WOMEN—The navy will take in women. Women can now be trained and be permanently employed in the navy, the Defense Ministry has decided. This is happening after an experiment in which just under 100 women were taken in for training in the navy. Comparable experiments are under way at the moment in the other two services, the army and the air force. However, women's newly conquered ground in the navy does not include submarines, the Frogman Corps, inspection ships and the Naval Air Service. Here the "men" will still consist of men. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 20 Dec 86 p 4] 8831

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HEAVY RESERVE, TERRITORIAL PRESENCE IN MAJOR FALL MANEUVERS

Bonn LOYAL in German Nov 86 pp 6,7

[Article by Juergen Winkelmann: "Maneuvers in the Homeland"]

[Text] Exercises and maneuvers have since concluded. But two of these maneuvers are especially noteworthy because they took place on German soil, in our homeland, with considerable German participation and with just as considerable a proportion of reservists.

There was the NATO exercise "Bold Guard-86" in which approximately 56,000 men participated as exercise forces. In addition, there were an additional 7,000 men in the directing staff and as referees. And there was the 1986 army exercise "Franconian Shield" in which some 50,000 soldiers of the Field and Territorial Armies took part as exercise and directing forces. Additionally, there were 5,000 Americans, 3,500 Frenchmen and a Belgian contingent subordinated to the German maneuver command.

"Bold Guard," a NATO exercise, is conducted every 4 years by the allies in the area of Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland. The principal characteristic of "Bold Guard" then, is the multinational composition of the exercising units and formations. The participation of American, British, Danish, Netherlands, and German units demonstrated impressively again this time the solidarity of the alliance. Command of this NATO maneuver rested in the hands of the commander of the Allied Ground Forces Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland (COMLANDJUT), Lieutenant General Henning von Ondarza. In this NATO headquarters Danes and Germans alternate every 3 years in occupying the positions of commander and chief of staff.

For the NATO comrades, exercise phases in Jutland had already preceded the "hot" stage of the maneuver which primarily unfolded on either side of the Kiel Canal. Closely connected with the naval exercise "Northern Wedding," soldiers of the 4th Amphibious Marine Brigade were landed. This unit was then assimilated as a "reinforcement from the depths" into the defense. The Danish ferry "Dana Anglia" landed at Buesum and brought ashore a contingent of troops from Great Britain. From there, 900 soldiers with 120 wheeled vehicles were dispatched to the operational areas. Mixed British-Dutch marine infantry as well as British soldiers of the "United Kingdom Mobile Force" were sent into action at water crossings. After the 6th Armored Infantry division from

Neumuenster, the British, with about 15,000 soldiers, provided the strongest troop contingent in this exercise.

Many, many reservists, just as in southern Germany, had been called up for this exercise, and they reinforced the ranks of the regular forces. The 61st Home Defense Brigade, with 1,800 men, was deployed in the maneuver.

The Luftwaffe flew some 150 missions per day. About 15,000 wheeled vehicles, 2,400 tracked vehicles, and 150 artillery pieces were rolling on Schleswig-Holstein's roads in those days in September, and 150 helicopters were in action.

Once again the NATO exercise "Bold Guard" proved that the indispensable precondition of effective cooperation was achieved despite differences of structure and equipment.

Taking the large number of vehicles involved into consideration, accidents were kept within limits. During the maneuver 100 accidents were registered. Damage to crops was also less than expected. Fair and dry weather throughout favored the maneuver.

The Army chief of staff, Lt Gen Hans-Henning von Sandrart, emphasized in a press conference the good cooperation with the allies. "We had overseas reinforcements there who were not necessarily familiar with the central European terrain," the general said.

It was different during the army exercise "Franconian Shield." There, the German III Corps was exercising under the direction of its commanding general, Lt Gen Karl Erich Diedrichs. It was a national field training exercise outside of the NATO "Autumn Forge" exercise series, yet connected with the NATO air forces' exercise "Cold Fire-86." For the first time in the Bundeswehr's existence a major French unit, which during the course of the exercise was subordinated to a German division, participated in a German national field training exercise. A reinforced brigade of the 1st United States Infantry Division testified to the close cooperation of the allied armed forces.

Gen Diedrichs had established the following activities as the focal points for the exercise: the cooperation of the Field and Territorial Armies as well as of the ground and air forces; the command of subordinate major allied units and the procedure for operational collaboration; and, finally, the cooperation of the armed forces with offices and authorities of the civilian sector was to be tested.

Of course, this exercise also could not go along without equipment on a large scale. Thus, about 14,000 wheeled vehicles, 3,400 tracked vehicles, and 200 Army aircraft were in action. The Luftwaffe, depending upon operational requirements and the weather, flew up to 250 missions per exercise day. Within the framework of integrated air defense, American air defense units with the latest "Patriot" weapons system were deployed.

Here, as in the north during "Bold Guard," the interest of foreign military attaches, in their capacities as so-called CSCE observers, was very great. The Soviet defense and army attache, Major General Constantin Ivanovich Cheryomukin, showed up in the north as well as in the south.

The 54th Home Defense Brigade participated in the exercise with 2,700 soldiers, of which 1,300 were Ready Reserves. For the first time since the organization of the brigade, Colonel August Benischke was able to exercise the major unit on this scale. The brigade was mobilized at the Baumholder Military Training Area and then, in the course of the deployment exercise, crossed the Rhine in the area of Speyer.

Concerning the use of reservists, the chief of staff of the Army told journalists: "Some 12,000 reservists are involved in the army exercise 'Franconian Shield.' That means that about 25 percent of the German exercise participants are reservists. Naturally we wish to gain experience from this strong integration at the most diverse levels for the future concept of reserves."

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EXERCISE REVEALS RESERVE SHORTCOMINGS, POTENTIAL

Bonn LOYAL in German Nov 86 p 9

[Article by Manfred Werle: "With the Air-Rifle Against the Reds"]

[Text] Defense Minister Manfred Woerner did not mince words. Nor was it necessary when, during a brief press conference in the barn of a farmstead, he got around to speaking about the deployment of reservists in the autumn maneuver "Franconian Shield." He had previously taken a lot of time to converse with a number of reservists. To be sure, their mood had just taken a dive because they had been neutralized by the maneuver command--that is, they were no longer a part of it. The weapons drill just gotten under way by the platoon leader was not having a stimulating effect on the "boys" as Woerner got down on his knees to talk to the bolt-snapping reserve soldiers on their own level.

They belonged to the 478 reservists of the 12th Armored Division's 126th Motorized Infantry Battalion (only the commanding officer and a company commander are regulars) who had never before trained together at battalion-level. And here there were only about 60 percent of those originally called up. The others had, more or less justifiably, "declined." Only a very few were absent without leave. That called forth critical remarks and prognoses from the defense minister. In front of the press and some representatives of the German Bundestag's Defense Committee, among them Bundestag Member and Reservists' Association President Helmuth Moehring, he said: "It is, of course, with regard to reservist planning which we will be concerned with in the coming decade, a percentage which will not do. We will attempt to achieve better numbers, which ought to be in the vicinity of 80 percent, by exerting greater influence on the economy as well as on the reservists, and by greater awareness of what is required." Job problems surely played a role, the minister conjectured. For that reason appeals to the economic sector are urgently needed to ask for understanding for military exercises. Woerner summed up his experiences to date with reservists on maneuvers and the results of his discussions with reserve soldiers in the Franconian countryside this way: "The reservists and reserve units are certainly not to be compared to the regular troops--at least not yet--but they are achieving results which are thoroughly respectable. The new training organization which we will create for the reservists will improve that even more."

If the exercise ends with a satisfactory outcome, then it certainly is an accomplishment for the reservists as well, since, with 12,000 men, they represented about 25 percent of total strength. But the chief of staff, Army, Lieutenant General Hans-Henning von Sandrart, does not want to let it rest there. In 1988 an entire Territorial Command will be included in a major exercise. In this way experience is to be gained for the coming decade and the reservist plan of the future.

That more and more reservists are coming to the fore or are being pushed to the fore, naturally creates a certain uneasiness among the regular troops. The chief of staff understands this, since, for 20 of the Bundeswehr's 30 years of existence, there was enough to do with the creation of regular units. Though organizationally two-thirds of mobilized strength has consisted of reservists from the beginning, this was indeed noted on paper but not, however, in the soldiers' consciousness.

Now Von Sandrart is indeed demanding that they come to terms with this in the armed forces: "The intellectual challenge must be psychologically mastered" is his creed.

The reservists are getting more attention than ever before, not only because of their considerable numbers, but also in view of the territorial units' functions in "Franconian Shield:"

- Ensuring freedom of maneuver by directing and controlling traffic;
- Area and installation protection;
- Logistics and medical services; and
- Manning and operation of the "Citizens' Information Centers" (BIZ).

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RANK AND FILE DISCONTENT WITH RESERVIST ORGANIZATION CITED

Bonn LOYAL in German Nov 86 pp 10-12

[Article by Inge Dose-Krohn: "Understanding One Another: Cooperation in the League of Reservists Must Improve"]

[Text] It is not unusual for there to be tension between the top level and the rank and file of an organization, an association, a party, concerning the realization of planned goals. The desires of the members and the actions of the chairman or president—and vice versa—sometimes drift apart. Management boards pay no attention to the cares and needs of the lowest groups within the overall structure, and these groups in turn simply plod along or attempt to effect a fundamental change, all the while repudiating the hierarchical structure, "since nothing happens there anyway." The League of Reservists of the German Bundeswehr is one such organization. Are these types of problems in evidence here? Is any thought given to, say, what its purpose is as defined in Article 2 of the statute, or what the board's responsibilities are as defined in Article 9? LOYAL listened in at various reservist groups.

"The Reservists League is sustained by its members; it exists for us, not we for it." These are the words of the chairman of the Pfronten/Allgaeu reservist group [RK], Reserve Staff Sergeant Fritz Brunhuber. This basic wisdom is not new, but is of fundamental importance if one takes a close look at the relationship of the League to its rank and file.

Fritz Brunhuber has often been unable to shake the feeling that he instead "exists for the League." It is not enough to "hold on to" members and recruit new ones, to organize events on the local or perhaps district level or to put together evening group events. Nor to see to it that reserve soldiers are always viewed in a favorable light, as Bavarian Landtag representative Paul Diethel emphasizes at every opportunity, for example. Matters such as these are—at least in Brunhuber's region—no problem. But then there are the discharged draftees and long-term servicemen who must be gradually reintegrated into civilian life. "It is here that the League should take political action, so that long-term servicemen are not threatened by social decline.

The Allgaeu reservists also perceive a lack of support by the leadership of the League for appropriate assignments in the Bundeswehr. Age and career

determinants are applied stubbornly, without consideration to the personal achievements of reservists who have proven their abilities on the free market.

Fritz Brunhuber can name two examples of this from his RK. There is a reserve private first-class who worked as a head swimming instructor. This man--experienced, circumspect and with a solid knowledge of the region--demonstrates his physical fitness each day in his profession, wins sports medals every year. However, he cannot become a noncommissioned officer--which he would like to be, enthusiastic soldier that he is--because he is 45 years old. The other situation involves a master craftsman who through hard work, know-how and endurance has built a healthy, medium-sized business with eight employees and annual sales in the millions. This staff sergeant would now like to become a reserve officer. At 35, however, he is too old for the League, and he moreover does not have his high school diploma. Has this company manager, who is also a member of the municipal council, not long since demonstrated a comparable degree of education?

These are problems where reservists hope for and expect the support of the League in seeking flexible solutions. "Without the prospect of moving up, motivation is lost. A man starts to wonder, 'Why should I even train!'" Fritz Brunhuber says. He is also critical of the fact that reservists participating in training must still justify themselves to their employers, that there is not more educational work in this regard emanating from the League in Bonn.

Reserve SSgt Brunhuber has hard words in his overview of the situation: "It is our impression that the leadership of the League is occupied with their own image and shows too little interest in the rank and file. The gentlemen in Bonn should not try to fit in at the Ministry of Defense; they should instead discuss things seriously, and if necessary put up a fight, in order to implement our demands."

Nevertheless, gratitude and recognition for the Allgaeu reservists is forthcoming from all quarters of their fellow citizens and local politicians. Because of the intensive commitment of their RK chairman and members, they are socio-politically integrated; they also "get a little bit" from the active troops. But everything is different in Bavaria anyway, as they say. League president Helmuth Moehring naturally is familiar with almost all of these complaints, as are all the other members of the presidium. Moehring says, "Communication between 'the top' and 'the bottom,' thus between Bonn and the rank and file, could certainly be improved. Nevertheless, the interested parties will never be completely satisfied with the results." His comment that he and all the presidium members, not unlike other holders of elective office, function within the League in an honorary capacity, is significant. The FRG is, after all, a large area of jurisdiction, and the presidium is, after all, expected to maintain too many contacts, outside the League as well--contacts with the Bundestag caucuses in Bonn, with the ministries, with the Bundeswehr organizations, and with the very influential media in Bonn.

Moehring also knows that coverage of the reservists and care for their social security is a large task. He says, "Without both things and without the consent of his family and employer, a reservist will scarcely be willing to make a voluntary commitment to the Bundeswehr." The League will have to do

were applied for through the reserve staff sergeant at the VKK [Military Subregion Command]. Now the RK must apply with the administrative office, which then sends it to the VKK. I have absolutely no understanding of this type of 'organization.'"

Helmuth Moehring has grown accustomed to reacting to this type of head-shaking with an admonition: "Everything that pleases or displeases people is caused by people doing things. In the Bundeswehr and in the League." He asks, "Let us uncover faults, but let us deal with one another carefully in eliminating them! Because there are always ignorant people—in the Bundeswehr and in the League."

Moreover, we must all withstand periods of friction with dissenters with composure, he says. It is not complaining, but rather the better argument that convinces the critic, Moehring believes. Occasional irritation about the "leading officials" should not lead to an unfriendly division into "first- and second-class members." "Leading officials too are sometimes angered at honorary officials." Moehring issues a reminder: "The one is nothing without the other. If they take away our responsibilities and our staff paid by tax revenues because of alleged incompetence, the League will turn into a scarcely interesting Bundeswehr veterans' club, because it will then no longer be fulfilling the purposed established for it by the Bundeswehr and the government: promotion of the military and defense policy public relations work."

Similar to the comments of the RK chairman in Dusseldorf are those from the northernmost tip of Germany, from Hermann Bauer, chairman of the RK in Westerland/Sylt. "The League is in the process of overtaxing the RK leaders." He explained that, first of all, a chairman generally has an outside career; secondly, he has a family, and he is in the third place sometimes a member of or even a functionary in clubs that have to do with his hobby (life is, after all, more than work, family and national defense). However, Bauer says, if he is to take his duties as RK chairman seriously, then he must be a jack-of-all-trades. "It is incredible how many separate conversations, telephone calls, how much travel time, how many questions, initiatives, etc. have to be dealt with. There is supposed to be at least one activity a month, to say nothing of the fact that you also have to invite other groups (naturally with a meaningful program)."

He says that the RK chairman is not a high-level functionary of the League who "can delegate his good ideas to his staff. We must arrange everything by ourselves if we want to be certain that our activities are going to run smoothly. You end up asking yourself one day, 'Why am I breaking my back?'" At any rate, the idealism, the commitment, the time and even the money from one's own pocket bears no relation to what could or should be expected."

Because of the very fact that it is a small group, Bauer gets little help from its members. Sometimes there are one or two "new recruits" a year, but they play an active role only initially, he says. He added that every RK has a "know-it-all, who could do everything better if people would only let him." For the most part, however, these people only make things more difficult for

more in the future in the area of coverage and social security. Yet the president justifiably notes the first successes of these "original League duties," which have lately received more attention. "Our social assessment has already had an effect. Bundestag caucuses and the government are already working on legislative improvements."

At the Eller (South) RK in Dusseldorf, things are not going as smoothly as they are in Bavaria. Although there is appropriate contact with an active unit for service-related events surrounding military training, and although the reservists are always accommodated when they want to do training exercises there, "they were always glad when no one showed up and it fell through," according to Reserve Sergeant, First Class Bruno Koslowski. However, the RK chairman adds, "They have recently changed senior officer, company commander and company sergeant major; the new people are extremely receptive to reservists. This is where the letter by the chief of staff apparently bore fruit."

Koslowski has had some very exceptional experiences in his 21 years in the League, but particularly since he has been chairman. "It is always up to the leader of the group whether or not the statutes are applied in accordance with their purpose. Then the 'people' go along with it. But if he lets an information meeting lapse into a beer binge, then it doesn't look very good." In his public relations work, he sees to it that people know that the reservist group exists. People do know about it in the Eller section of Dusseldorf. The chairman, in his civilian life an attorney as well as chairman of the Eller Youth Center e.V., succeeded on the local level in getting for the RK invitations to official receptions from neighborhood politicians. And the reservists show up at these affairs in uniform.

However, there have also been problems with left-leaning politicians in Dusseldorf who do not like having him so involved in the Bundeswehr while holding a position at the youth center. This is because the RK does meet there once a month, when the center itself is closed. Ignoring these issues, however, the RK is relatively well settled amidst its surroundings. Training exercises with the 821st Signal Basic Training Company, with which a partnership exists, "are really useful for us"; for information gatherings, Bruno Koslowski can often use his contacts to bring in good people for speeches, and the citizenry in that section of the city accept the reservists.

But there is more: "There is a growing feeling that we officeholders at the rank-and-file level are being governed by the 'top officials,' who are giving the orders. We spin around here until we can't go on, represent the League, and in Bonn the functionaries prove their *raison d'être* using our work. If you want some support from them, they often say, 'We are employees of the League, not of you reservists.'" Koslowski asked, for example, that the staff member of the district group also be available for "use" by the RK for secretarial work. Refused. At present, the secretary from his civilian job is helping him.

"The reservist group, and thus the chairman, who can rarely prompt his members for support, has too much administrative work, which the League apparently cannot assume even a small part of. It used to be that service-related events

the chairman. The League leadership has "no idea of the kind of impossible, even ridiculous things that an RK leader has to put up with," Bauer says.

President Moehring is full of understanding when he hears that an RK chairman feels like "exploding" because he is under so much stress from his RK. "I have that sort of reaction too sometimes," he says. He poses the next question pensively: "Is this irritation really the result of a growing burden, or does it not also have something to do with the fact that 'the dear comrades,' in their preferred passive state, leave all the work up to the active ones?" Moehring provides his own answer, which to many might seem to hit the nail right on the head. "The problem is a long-term one, because the League will have to double rather quickly, only to disband, if we intensify our efforts to get comrades who are willing to assume voluntary duties in the leadership of the League at all levels. In that case, they must be assigned duties for which they alone are responsible and that they can also handle."

Reserve Captain Ulrich Bischoff, chairman of the Leichlingen RK, has had slightly more positive experiences with his members. Prior to the administrative reform, it belonged to the Wuppertal RK. The disadvantage of this RK is that it is "far away from the action"; Leichlingen is not a garrison. Nevertheless, the group functions rather well as such. For information gatherings, the town leaders make a room in the town hall available for a fee. The residents are delighted with soldiers in uniform. The reservists have international contacts; with Netherlands, Luxembourgers and Alsations. Joint nighttime marches or marksmanship training are not unusual.

Training exercises—weapon training and facility and installation protection—take place in Butzweilerhof. When it is a reconnaissance patrol, one of the comrades makes available a section of land that is then outfitted with everything that is needed for a realistic operation. "But we do all of that alone," Ulrich Bischoff says. Contacts with branch offices have been lacking. Moreover, "our experience has been that extended district board meetings are merely a formality. Who wants to drive x number of kilometers just to hear all that yacking?"

Connections with the League in Bonn are nil, "at most a little bit through LOYAL magazine. When the people in Bonn hatch something down there in their ivory tower, it doesn't make it down to the rank and file until they've already introduced reforms in it," the Leichlingen chairman says critically.

Reserve Major Karsten Knolle, member of the Bonn-Mitte RK, does not think that it is important to have either solid or loose ties with the League leadership. He belongs to the League only for the sake of solidarity. However, "I am not entirely dependant on the Reservists League for my advanced military training or for my military advancement," Knolle says. He himself maintains the important contacts that he needs for his role as a reservist, and he arranges his training exercises directly with Military District Command III in Dusseldorf. "I also call on the permanent personnel office in Cologne at irregular intervals. It's important that my 'commanding officer' know me not only from my file." Nevertheless, reservist Knolle participates in as many of the events of his RK or district group as possible, and praises the

organization and the imaginativeness of the activities, which he says are supported outstandingly by the Bonn 312th Military Subregion Command. However, Karsten Knolle does admit that not every reservist has the opportunity to maintain this type of direct contact with the relevant agencies.

Most are in fact dependent on their RK, or sometimes even on the goodwill of a district branch office, such as the vice chairman of the Rosenheim RK, Gerhard Mayer. He applied for a course in sharpshooting, arranged for his yearly vacation to correspond with that of the weekend courses, but received neither a positive nor a negative reply from the branch or any other office.

Thus, there is a little bit of support lacking on the part of subordinate offices within the League when it comes to comprehensive training events.

There is also a scant amount of decent support for planned training sessions on the RK level. "An RK is in a bad way," says reserve Ssgt Hans-Werner Steinhoff of Bonn, "if it does not have access to appropriate training personnel from within its own ranks. Of course such training is offered by the League. But to simply refer to the military requirements in the League magazine is not enough," he criticizes. What is clearly lacking, he adds, is pertinent background information. "In the view of active reservists, it is not enough to publish something somewhere in order to thus satisfy a obligation to information."

When an RK complains that the closest branch office, or even the next-highest level of the League, is insufficiently or not at all willing to cooperate "below," this is naturally cause for alarm for the people responsible "at the very top." Including the president. Thus, he says, "Hopefully bringing criticism out into the open stimulates the elimination of the problem." And he continues with a wish that should elicit reactions "below": "It wouldn't be a bad idea if the 'rank and file' would also send some kind words to Bonn whenever it has achieved a positive change because of commitment 'from above.'"

Moehring also has an instructive response for the "rank and file" concerning the problem of sending reserve soldiers to Bundeswehr courses, in connection with difficulties pertaining to vacation time and other "bureaucratic holdups."

He says that he has sent a letter to the Parliamentary State Secretary in the Ministry of Defense, Peter Kurz Wuerzbach, in which he referred to this "anti-reservist situation." According to Moehring, Wuerzbach promised careful study and improvement of the situation.

Chairmen of groups, as well as individual members without honorary functions, have rather harsh judgements, as we have seen, of the League leadership. However, they should bear in mind that negative criticism concerning cooperation (or at least communication) between the top, the middle and the bottom of the hierarchy first ends up at the next level. The top leadership is to be informed only if repeated complaints have no result.

This is because the national board is concerned primarily with general League policy. And for some time it has been necessary to draw up this policy with great precision whenever it is a question of wringing a forward-looking reservist program out of the Ministry of Defense. Ultimately, a great deal will be demanded of the reservists in the future, and this is to be "rewarded" with appropriate compensation. However, things such as this cannot be ironed out over a lunch hour. There are too many things to be considered. However, criticism from the rank and file should be one element of these considerations.

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MAJOR CHANGES IN RESERVIST ASSIGNMENT, TRAINING DEMANDED

Bonn LOYAL in German Nov 86 pp 20-23

[Article by Col Volker Glatt, commander of 53rd Home Defense Brigade: "Cooperation"; first paragraph is boxed biography of author]

[Text] A "man of experience" reflected on the growing importance of reservists to the Bundeswehr and wrote this article. Col Volker Glatt is the commander of the 53rd Home Defense Brigade in Dueren. It was not in this post that he first dealt with reservist issues. In 1960, when he was released from the Bundeswehr as a reserve lieutenant in order to pursue higher education, he was involved in the founding of the Reservists League. His proposals today concerning cooperation between the Bundeswehr and the reservists together with the League should stimulate responses by other experts. LOYAL wants to be the forum where this issue can be discussed.

The growing importance of reservists to national defense has long since been recognized. However, there remains a great deal of thought to be done on the question of how many more reservists should be included concretely in the defense structure of the Bundeswehr. This is why there are currently efforts underway in many places, including in the Reservists League, to harmonize what is necessary for the fulfillment of the commitment to defense with that which is feasible.

In my view, several points must be approached that concern both service requirements and consideration for the personal desires and ideas of the reservists, namely,

- motivation,
- the best possible deployment of the reservists, and
- partnerships between the Reservists League and mobilization units.

There are no doubt other sets of questions and individual questions of equal importance; one of my purposes is to initiate a discussion—or amplification—of the subject at hand.

Motivation

"Motivation" has become a catchword. This is regrettable on the one hand, but helpful on the other—motivation is no longer a foreign term.

In terms of the Bundeswehr and its reservists, motivation is the lubrication in the gears of desire and need:

—The Bundeswehr needs an increasingly larger number of reservists. They are intended to help fill in the structure of the 1990s;

—The reservists must be ready to contribute, they "must want to," if the plan is to work.

Motivation for service by the mobilization reservist is based on a concrete foundation, namely on

—adequate pay,

—guaranteed sustenance of the family,

—guaranteed jobs, and

—promotion opportunities in the Bundeswehr,

to name only a few points. This basic structure is to be created by the legislator, and it has in fact been tackled.

Operational capability and readiness are based on this foundation:

--in reserve or active duty training, through demanding service, through recognition in the form of certificates of achievement and decorations or through the assignment of billets with greater responsibility;

—outside of reserve or active duty training, in involvement in the Reservists League in particular or within the framework of the mobilization units.

Ideally, the readiness of the reservists to actively work as promoters of the defense concept and thus as promoters of the will for defense amidst our population will grow out of satisfying activity.

On many occasions this year, I was able to speak with a reserve officer who was completing the training program in the area of the 53rd Home Defense Brigade and was also participating in weekend advanced training at the Hammelburg infantry school, which has been reported on in various publications, including LOYAL. "Training the trainers" was the leitmotif. In response to my question concerning whether he would transplant his newly gained knowledge to the framework of the Reservists League, he said that he and several of his friends were not going to join the League. There was too much socializing and too little military training in the League, he said. However, he could not provide a convincing answer when I asked where as a trainer he would then apply his knowledge.

The first thing that should be said about this is that the Bundeswehr itself is supposed to train its reservists earmarked for mobilization. It must likewise be noted that preconditions comparable to those at the infantry school in Hammelburg exist only in a few places. The training of trainers is a welcome development--but it is necessary to consider where and how this training can be transplanted.

The more action that can be offered in a training exercise, the more satisfying it is for the soldiers in training; this is a human and plausible fact. In an operational sequence, however, the vast majority of the reservists earmarked for mobilization in the territorial army encounter something different: they encounter security and (area) protection responsibilities, without spectacular events.

Every trainer in the armed forces knows that even for active soldiers, for whom there is sufficient time to devote to preparation and attention to undramatic training segments, it is often difficult to recognize the correlation between such "low action activities" and the duty of defense. The classic example of this is engineering duty; sweeping statements about alleged loafing then make the rounds.

Against this background, the Bundeswehr is faced with several problems, if, for example, too many expectations are aroused by the initiatives of the Hammelburg infantry school that cannot be fulfilled by the training facilities and groups.

A second problem is that at present there are too many single initiatives emerging without any coordination. It may be true that the establishment of the representative of the chief of staff was supposed to provide a remedy, but a precondition for this was that life be breathed into the 1984 Liaison and Coordination Decree so that after 30 years the needs of the reservists and of the Bundeswehr could finally be united from two central positions.

While only the competent governmental bodies can work on and make improvements in the legal foundations, each and every superior concerned with the training of reservists should give some thought to the question of where the starting points for improvement in the internal domain of the Bundeswehr are--and not only with respect to one's own duty station. This would include any and all critical comments.

In this evaluation process, the actual duty of the reservists should always be the center of attention:

- as on-duty personnel in an active, partially cadred unit,
- as member of a mobilization unit, or
- in an independent function (such as liaison elements).

Not least of all, the necessary training must include discussion of the unspectacular aspects.

One topic that is not given much attention by the active troops but that is nonetheless important is the care of the reservists not earmarked for mobilization. It is not under consideration in this article.

As much as the Bundeswehr was and still is dependent on individual initiatives in reservist work, reservist training outside training exercises must to an increasing extent be given an organized form, to be shaped in conjunction with the Bundeswehr, and for which there must also be a spokesman on behalf of the reservists. Because of the Liaison and Coordination Decree, this can be only the Reservists League. The question of the extent to which the Reservists League, under these circumstances, will have to adapt its organizational structure to the new, concrete task should be studied by the League's top leadership.

... In the Right Place

When the Bundeswehr puts together a band, it does not occur to anyone in charge to allow soldiers in the band who must first learn to play an instrument. Soldiers with previous musical training are chosen. This is obvious.

This should clearly apply to other areas besides military music. With respect to the reservists earmarked for mobilization, the question arises of whether the Bundeswehr is in fact making adequate and proper use of their civilian training and education. This issue involves both professional know-how and the position achieved in one's profession, especially the capability and willingness to assume leadership responsibilities.

It is in contrast to this that there are continual newspaper references to "undemanding assignments," about which complaints are heard during troop visits by politicians, high-ranking military officials or by the Military Representative. If, as is the case in my duty area, a bank manager with the rank of staff sergeant is the chief accountant for a mobilization unit, the difference between military and civilian demands quickly becomes clear.

A formula drawn up in November 1985 on the training of approximately 7,500 reservists over a one year period at the motorized infantry training center of the 53rd Home Defense Brigade reveals two essential points that sound almost banal:

--The most significant and most burdensome deficiency in the area of mobilization units is the lack of and the often insufficient qualifications of noncommissioned officers (especially non-senior NCOs);

--The more closely the deployment of reservists matches their civilian careers, the more satisfied they are and the more they experience their training exercises with a sense of responsibility.

In the same context, it cannot be pointed out often enough that our reservists are promoters of the formation of judgements among the population concerning "the Bundeswehr." At least one conclusion can be drawn from this: Only when

the Bundeswehr succeeds in convincing its "promoters" of their duty will they be willing and capable of taking their own initiative in speaking up on behalf of the Bundeswehr. A step in this direction is the plan to prepare for the transition to reservist status through an extended military service period.

Putting the right man in the right place in the armed forces means giving him the rank corresponding to his qualifications and giving him the level of responsibility corresponding to his rank. This is generally done through taking prescribed courses--the higher the level, the more courses, the longer the absence from civilian life and thus the more difficulties. This is true in particular in the area of skilled labor, the area in which we have the greatest interest.

The Bundeswehr needs qualified personnel, so it must find solutions.

The intention here is not to propagate a "system modification" course, but in view of the growing numbers of reservists in the next 10 years, we must change our ideas in good time. Experience shows, for example, that the courses offered for voluntary attendance by NCOs are not being attended in a pattern that corresponds to expectations and needs. Because there are legal options for meeting the needs elsewhere, these options should be utilized on a large scale.

According to Paragraph 39 of the Military Service Act, it is possible to call up suitable representatives with no prior service from the public domain, with temporary ranks, and to help them along on the road begun in this way. With regard to needed public support of the task of defense, this regulation is of considerable importance.

However, it is unfathomable that more extensive use is not made of this option, which in principle applies to reservists with prior service as well. (On the other hand, the problem of how mobilization offices responsible for personnel and training records can gain a knowledge of skills acquired in the civilian sector remains unresolved. They are currently dependent on chance information and--extremely infrequently--reports from the parties in question.)

Despite the many reservations of which I am aware, I am emphatically in favor of the deployment of suitable reservists in functions that correspond to their civilian qualifications, initially independent of the rank attained during basic military service. Insofar as supplementary training in the general-military domain is necessary, it does not necessarily have to be made up for in course work. Service-related institutions (DVag), as well as correspondence courses or advanced training under the direction of the Reservists League, are possibilities.

It is highly probable that this will win over a number of suitable reservists for deployment as reserve NCOs (with chances for promotion), who have up to now shown little interest. The current situation for reserve officers is better, but the proposal applies to them as well.

Proposals

--It will be absolutely essential that the Bundeswehr take appropriate measures to encourage reservists to keep the personal information registered with the district selective service office up to date at regular intervals if the long-term goal of continually filling 15,000 training exercise positions a year, at all levels, is to be achieved. Consideration should be given to whether "compulsory reporting" or a system of questioning the mobilization offices is better. There is much to be said for the second option.

--No later than at the end of the training exercises, a further assignment on a leadership level corresponding to civilian training (without course work!) should be suggested immediately for especially suitable soldiers. (This also involves the unequivocal disqualification of unsuitable ranks.)

--As mentioned above, the acquisition of general military knowledge by particularly deserving candidates should be pursued in ways other than through course work (DVag, correspondence courses, through the Reservists League).

--Special note is to be taken of the fact that the present system of filling NCO courses exclusively with volunteers will not satisfy needs in the long run. Here as well, improvements are possible through NCO courses for the end of the tour of duty, with an extension of the basic tour of duty. However, since it may generally be impossible to send soldiers to these courses against their will, and while the reservists will continue to develop on an individual basis, the solutions proposed here will remain applicable in the future as well. At any rate, this should not founder on bureaucratic objections!

If the mountain will not go to Muhammad, then Muhammad must go to the mountain! Translated this means: If the reservists (in self-contained groups) will not come to the Reservists League, then the League, with stronger and more focused offerings, must go to them. One idea here is partnerships, which the League of Reservists of the German Bundeswehr should adopt for the "partners," the mobilization-ready units of the territorial army.

Many important things, and particularly many general things, have been expressed recently about reservists and their significance. What is essential, however, is the fact that the overall complex has nevertheless not penetrated the consciousness of a broad segment of the public. This is also true of the "Liaison and Coordination Decree" of 17 October 1984, which regulates the role of the Reservists League as the official spokesman for all reservists, and which is largely unknown "among the troops." The Bundeswehr increasingly needs the reservists, whom they have trained at great cost. For this reason, it must approach the reservists and should not wait for their initiative. The Liaison and Coordination Decree constitutes a significant precondition for the application of intended mediation between the two groups. However, this is not enough, since the decree presupposes voluntary steps on the part of the reservists. Only a few reservists come to the League without an outside stimulus. For that reason, it is necessary to create focused stimuli in order to overcome the barriers of normal human inertia; the proposal in this article constitutes just such a "stimulus."

Training is carried out in mobilization units at regular intervals. Unfortunately, it is rarely possible to train more than once in the same configuration of a unit. The fluctuation rate is rarely less than 20 percent; in most cases, it is over 30 percent. However, once one has witnessed the speed with which reservists feel "at home" when they meet their old friends from the last mobilization exercise after 2 or 3 years, it seems reasonable to seek better options in this direction. The old wisdom that a functioning unit is more than an organizational unit should be applied to more than active units.

This means that it must be possible to create conditions for mobilization units as well under which an "us feeling" can develop among the members of a unit. The prerequisite for this is not least of all that any and all steps be taken to recruit these units from geographically limited areas. Here as well, there should be no differences vis-a-vis active units, for which the current local recruitment trends have become standard practice wherever possible.

Stronger integration of the units requires more regular meetings.

Regular meetings require organization.

Organization requires a framework, space, initiative and the material preconditions.

Against this background, I understand "partnership" as the opportunity for a mobilization unit to follow the Reservists League as a unit, without it being necessary for each individual reservist to be a member. (This should already be so on an individual basis.) It is in the own interest of the League that it represent itself to the units attractively enough for this relationship to also benefit the League, and it is in the interest of the Bundeswehr that the League develop focused initiatives in cooperation with the mobilization offices responsible for personnel and training records, oriented towards the mobilization units.

It is well-known and helpful that the system of partnership between active and mobilization leagues works. However, the awareness of the troops and of the NCOs in particular is primarily oriented towards the unit or the element. Moreover, there are numerous units and elements in the territorial army that are not assigned to any league. The proposal is targeted at them in particular.

Experiences and Reflections

--On the one hand, there is, aside from the Association for Military Science, no national institution that supports the concept of defense as much as the Reservists League; on the other hand, there are a great deal of reservists who refuse to join a league, despite their receptiveness to the concept of defense.

--In its local and district groups, the Reservists League consists of soldiers from different branches of service. Its substructures are thus not well-suited as organizational elements for mobilization units. This is why corresponding

observations, such as those occasionally set forth in conjunction with "Wartime Host Nation Support," are not feasible.

The "partnership" proposal runs counter to cooperation.

--The League has an electoral structure that is set in stone, since it involves giving each reservist who brings with him interest and commitment the possibility, regardless of rank or mobilization orders, of becoming the chairman of his group, for example. In contrast, the mobilization unit has a hierarchical structure that can similarly not be curtailed.

—Cooperation between the Reservists League and the "(Name of the unit) Group" should consist of the following:

Invitations to events held by the local and district groups,

Stimulus for and consultation on the implementation of separate events by the main office organizational leader of the League in conjunction with and with the support of the mobilization offices responsible for personnel and training records, as well as material support in organizing events by the mobilization units, beginning with office materials and postage stamps.

Experiences in the territorial army have shown clearly that without an organizational framework, which the Reservists League could create, initiatives such as those suggested are scarcely possible. The individual mobilization unit is overtaxed if the commitment to cooperation by the units depends exclusively on individual initiatives.

The service-related advantage for the military forces of closer ties with the Reservists League is that a continual impetus for a combined structure emerges from the League's initiatives and plans. The ultimate corroboration, however, comes from what is created by the much-beseeched concept of "motivation."

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HELIBORNE RESERVISTS EXERCISE WOODCRAFT, PENETRATION TACTICS

Bonn LOYAL in German Nov 86 p 27

[Article by Kaspar Mueller-Bringmann: "Penetrated"]

[Text] The regular troops at Bergisch Barracks in Duesseldorf, especially the draftees, had never seen anything like it. A motley unit of about 50 men marched singing through the barracks. The oddity: The soldiers were wearing berets of various colors, Luftwaffe forage caps--even moleskins--and one petty officer the headgear of his service. On top of that, the unit had just arrived in a spectacular fashion shortly before: Six Bell UH-1-D helicopters of the 10th Army Aviation Regiment had landed almost simultaneously on the main parking lot. With blades rotating the men had jumped from the helicopters and run out of the way. Had someone accompanied these soldiers, almost all of them Duesseldorf reservists, during the previous 24 hours, he could hardly believe they had such energy. The considerable exertions of a penetration exercise did not show on the 47 men.

Karl-Heinz Noeding, former Z-12 soldier and captain of the reserves, now regional organizational director for the Duesseldorf reserve unit, had prepared the exercise. To his knowledge, this was the first time that reservists were flown to an exercise by Army aviators. Noeding: "I would like to make the reservists an interesting offer. They can personally experience something new and test their physical abilities in the process." How interesting the offer of the night penetration exercise in North Hessa was, was proven by the many applicants. But not all could come along. The air transport capacity was limited to 47 men. Besides, the Bundeswehr had previously required a qualification hike which was held on a Saturday with unbearable heat and went for 20 kilometers. Who got to come along was decided in part by the finishing time. Some reservists even broke into an interim sprint to achieve a good time.

--Thursday, 1200: The reservists drift into the barracks. They pick up a large duffel bag with webbed carrier, mess kit, eating utensils and canteen. In addition: uncooked food. For each one there is a raw cutlet, three potatoes and three slices of bread, and for each group a large onion and a bit of fat. Then safety instructions and the order to hand over everything not needed for such an exercise: cola can, cigarettes, money, chewing gum and so forth. The things are collected in bags imprinted with "I am for defense."

--About 1300: March to the local drill ground. The Bells land punctually. A good hour and 10 minutes later (flight over Lake Bigge and Kahler Asten), the aircraft set down, after a terrain-hugging approach, in a forest cutting in the Fritzlar Military Training Area. The flight mechanics spin around, point with both hands to the side doors which are not being torn open by the reservists. Bent over, they sprint into the woods and take cover. Later the men hear from the pilots: "Regular troops could not have done that better."

Assembly point for the groups is an old sandstone quarry situated about 500 meters into the woods. Two of the six groups already get lost in this first phase. In the quarry the men prepare their meal. In the process, the first incident--and the sole injury in the exercise--takes place. As luck would have it, the reservist medical services staff sergeant and oldest participant in the project, 52-year-old male nurse in a Duesseldorf hospital Hermann-Josef Hauser, cuts his hand so badly with a knife that the wound must be stitched up in a Fritzlar hospital.

--2200: With the last light for shooting, the fifth and final group leaves the departure point. A little while later it begins to rain in torrents. The soldiers get soaked to the skin. On top of that, it is not particularly warm: it reads only 12 degrees Celsius. The reservists' mission: Penetrate some 30 km during the night to their own lines. They will march with map, compass and a radio set.

--In the middle of the night, at the third checkpoint, halfway there: Noeding is getting nervous. With a switched-on flashlight he is standing like a lighthouse in the night to show the way to two groups. The reservists are overdue. Soon, however, they drift in. One group--the only one this night--gives up completely demoralized. It repeatedly got lost in the woods. One soldier has blood blisters on his feet. He is taken care of by a regular NCO medic. Medical Corps NCO Klaus Klimek (24 years old and Z-4): "I have to admire those people. They are all doing that voluntarily and in this weather on top of it. My hat is off to them!"

--Dawn: One group is still missing. It did not pass through the last checkpoint. The 1 and 1/2-hour long search involving three vehicles begins. Again and again the map is studied and the question asked "Where are they?" Then suddenly a one-sided radio contact. One hears very faintly how the group is giving the coordinates of its location over and over. Noeding makes a comparison with the map and is relieved: "They are at the objective." The goal was the military training area in Wolfenhagen.

On the flight back to Dusseldorf most are sleeping from exhaustion. Colonel Wolfram Nitsche, commanding officer of Military Region Command 32, hands out award certificates. Nitsche to LOYAL: "I believe that there will be more events of this kind, and I hope that the participants will tell about this exercise and woo recruits. Reserve unit training benefits us, the regular units." And for a finale there were drinks for all with Col Nitsche: draft dark beer. After a footmarch of at least 34 km, a well-deserved reward.

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STUDIED CHANGES IN MILITARY SCHOOLS AROUSE COMMENTS, PROTESTS

Changes to Politicize Schools

Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 1 Jan 87 pp 1, 9

[Article: "Attempt To Capture Military Schools Too. Draft Law Ready To Be Introduced"]

[Text] The government's demonstrated intention to alter the structure and operation of the armed forces schools (Army, Navy, and Air Force), as well as the preliminary draft law on the subject which has become public, arouse grave suspicions that this essentially represents an attempt by the party apparatus to seek control over and capture the schools.

Those acquainted with the matter observe that it is significant that the draft law divides the curriculum into two sections: a) the military education section and b) the university education section. Control over the university section is taken away from the Ministry of National Defense and transferred to the Ministry of Education.

The Mechanisms

The draft law makes this section subject to mechanisms similar to those provided for in the Law-Framework on Advanced Education Institutions. That is to say, this represents an effort to gain control over the advanced military schools, since the university section will include the greater part of the curriculum, grant degrees, and control teaching staff evaluations and appointments, etc. However, the most revealing fact is that the first phase provides for the permanent teaching staff now serving at the schools to be evaluated by unknown and unspecified organs, which are therefore completely unconnected with the present organs of the schools. Thus, there is the possibility that teaching staff will be downgraded or even removed on the basis of partisan criteria.

The alleged democratic nature of the draft law is totally irrelevant to the truth, because of course the purportedly democratizing measures (female students, student participation in the administration, course transfers, etc.) cannot hide the intention and goals of the draft law.

Special Degree

Another controversial and debatable innovation in the draft law is that it provides for students to receive a special, nonmilitary degree from the university education section. It does not, however, define the nature of the degree or the period of study required to earn it.

Observers add that a law of this nature will downgrade the level of officers' education and scientific training, since it makes it possible for students to become officers based only on their education in the military education section, even if they have not successfully completed the first year of studies in the university section.

Undoubtedly the response of the Ministry of National Defense to the concerns and suspicions about the intentions of the draft law will be that this is not the final draft which will be forwarded to the Chamber of Deputies, but rather a preliminary draft about which judgements cannot therefore be made.

At any rate, it is a fact that objections have been noted not only from those immediately involved, but also from the responsible directorates in the three branches of the armed forces. These note that the draft law includes completely unrealistic provisions.

It should be noted that when the Prime Minister was also serving as Minister of National Defense, he signed another draft law on the military schools, but nothing came of that.

Other Changes Needed

Athens TA NEA in Greek 5 Jan 87 p 4

[Commentary by Loukas Dimakas under the "Spotlights on Political Life" rubric: "Upgrading the Armed Forces"]

[Text] The short--but not necessarily minor--speech made by the chief of the National Defense General Staff, General Nikos Kouris, to the President of the Republic, Khristos Sartzetakis, at the new year's dinner at the Officers' Club is--or could have been--of great, earthshaking significance to the armed forces.

I say this because the chief of the National Defense General Staff emphatically raised the issue of "qualitatively upgrading" the armed forces. In doing so, he was expressing (on instructions) the credo of the ministry's civilian leadership, which (naturally) derives from the appropriate KYSEA decisions on the (new) "national defense policy" as they are laid down in the "guidelines for defense planning."

A qualitative upgrade "primarily through institutional and organizational measures, through modernized training methods, and through concern for personnel, both career and conscript."

Because--as the general said further on--our defense problem will not be solved automatically merely by the purchase of modern and extremely expensive materiel.

"At the same time," he said, "a number of measures are called for. These have been laid down and planned out so that we can make full use of what we now have, our marvelous human resources above all."

These are the goals of the leadership which--we are assured--"have been laid down and planned out."

These goals justify the tense of the verb which we used at the start: "The speech is of great significance."

However, we added: "or could have been of great significance." Now we must justify that.

It will turn out that the Kouris speech "could have been"--but was not--of great significance to the armed forces in 1987:

1. If the law on hierarchy and promotions (signed by one of the Junta) is not replaced by a modern one which, at least, will not make officers retire when someone younger is promoted!

2. If there are not many changes--some of them radical--in the military schools (Army, Navy, Air Force, and noncommissioned officers) so as to offer a solid university education in order to create "scientific" military personnel. The challenge of new technologies and defense dogmas and tactics is--literally--a life-or-death challenge.

3. If all the various bureaucrats do not [sic] persist in the plan they have prepared for the Defense Ministry's Civilian Personnel Organization. This retains (or even extends!!) military control over civilian personnel. In practice this control means that thousands of civilian employees are "emasculated."

4. If the draft Presidential Decree modifying the out-of-date Presidential Decree 785/78 on purchasing does not [sic] stay on the desk of the minister (who drafted it).

5. If there is not [sic] obstruction (again) to setting up a single, independent organization for purchasing, armaments, defense industries, and research centers to end the current system by which the same organizations set requirements, make purchases, and actually use the equipment.

6. If military regulations do not change.

We left for last this point, which is critically important to improving conscripts' life in the camp, not because it is less important, but because the existence of laws and decrees on this question is one of the preconditions--the most important one, naturally--for change. Here we need--

literally--a change in the way society thinks, from top to bottom naturally (leadership--career military--conscripts).

The list of if's does not stop here. We have pointed out (only) a few of the conditions necessary for upgrading the armed forces on the institutional level.

But these conditions are not sufficient.

To them must be added social and political consensus.

12593

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MILITARY REGULATIONS BILL BRINGS RADICAL CHANGES

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 25-26 Jan 87 pp 1, 3

[Article by Nikos Gerakaris]

[Text]: The National Defense Ministry draft bill includes very important changes in the existing laws and regulates all pressing military issues: buying out of the military service; exemption from military service; obligation for training; deferment due to studies; conscientious objectors; permanent residence abroad; furloughs; criminal sanctions (for a first offense) against draft dodgers; emigration of persons of military age; and the all-people defense.

The draft bill, which was prepared by various military and other appropriate services by order of Deputy Premier and Defense Minister I. Kharalambopoulos, was sent to his legal advisor N. Rigas, who, on the basis of specific guidance by the minister, will give its final form.

According to confirmed information this draft bill, which will soon be submitted to the Chamber of Deputies for approval, includes impressive innovations, most important among which are the following:

--Incentives are adopted for the purpose of strengthening the institution of the all-people defense and specifically the lengthening of time citizens serve in the National Guard. Those who stay in the Guard more than 24 months will have their military service reduced by 6 months.

--Buying out of the military service is completely abolished without exception. Thus, the present anti-constitutional discrimination will cease to exist. The constitution provides (Article 4) that every Greek able to bear arms must contribute to the country's defense as the laws dictate.

--The cases of military exemptions, which today are many, are limited to the minimum. Henceforth, exception will be given to clergymen and monks and those judged--by irreproachable criteria--unfit to serve for reasons of health.

--Important limitations are applied to the categories of those obligated to undergo training and those entitled to deferment due to studies, given that today massive deferments are given to students of higher education

institutions and high school until graduation even though they may be kept back and stay in the same class for many years.

--A new system of enlistment in the Armed Forces is being established. The Soldier Induction Councils are abolished for the additional reason that whole generations of Greeks have undergone hardships and have been disciplined with additional 2-month or longer periods of service, innocent as they might have been.

--All Greeks residing permanently abroad--no matter where--are considered as one and distinct category. Thus, all complicated and conflicting laws and regulations will be eliminated.

--Penalties are provided for all draft dodgers. Presently no such criminal sanctions are provided for such dodgers who number many thousands.

--For the first time a furlough is established for family reasons. Such a furlough in no way will be related to other types of leaves.

--All Greeks are free to travel and live abroad during the whole period they are not subject to military service. Under existing regulations no one can go abroad at least 6 months before his induction into one of the Armed Forces. Under the new law one can leave even a few days before his induction. For such cases, the other measures the new law provides constitute a safety valve.

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ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES PLANNED FOR AIR FORCE

Athens TA NEA in Greek 10 Jan 87 p 3

[Article: "More Flexible Air Force"]

[Text] A number of measures designed to produce a "modern, flexible, and antibureaucratic" staff were approved yesterday by the Supreme Air Force Council under the chairmanship of the chief of the Air Force General Staff, Lieutenant General N. Stappas. The Council also decided to forward these measures to the civilian leadership of the Ministry of National Defense for approval.

These proposals--which are based on earlier proposals from the Tactical Air Force, as well as on instructions circulated by the chief of staff--will be submitted "soon" to Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense G. Kharalambopoulos.

Yesterday's decisions:

--Abolish (or merge) directorates and services;

--Abolish the Air Force Control Wing (the 142nd PAE [Air Force Control Wing]) (since two Air Force Control Centers have already been established);

--Merge the Air Force Materiel and Air Force Training Directorates to create a single support directorate.

The civilian leadership's adoption of the proposals "will free human resources to man operational units," an authoritative military source emphasized to TA NEA.

"It is worth noting," the same source added, "that the Greek Air Force has more directorates (three) than the British Royal Air Force (which has two). The Danish Air Force, for instance, has one tenth as many administrators as the Greek Air Force."

The Ministry of National Defense issued a statement on the matter yesterday which emphasized that:

"The Air Force General Staff has for some time been studying various ways of reorganizing certain of its services. The goal of these studies is to create a modern, flexible, and antibureaucratic staff. The proposals will be submitted soon to Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense G. Kharalambopoulos."

In addition, the Ministry spokesman said in response to a question that Major General Tzeritas has not submitted his resignation (as was reported in KATHIMERINI).

According to reports, the timetable provides for the changes to be approved by the civilian leadership by the end of January (the ministry's statement makes it clear that the leadership is in agreement with the goals being pursued) and for them to be implemented by March.

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PARTICIPANT AT DEFENDORY FAIR ON ARMS INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT

Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish Dec 86 pp 33-34

[Article by Javier Taibo Arias: "Defendory '86"]

[Text] The tenacity of the organizers of the Greek exhibition of army, naval and air force materiel, Defendory, has in a matter of just a few years made it one of the most interesting fairs, even if its dimensions are not spectacular. The latest Defendory has revealed the boom enjoyed by the Greek national defense industry.

The real revelation of the fair, in fact, was Greece. Its industry and the agreements announced simultaneously with the fair, while not downplaying the innovations displayed by foreign enterprises, stole the show. First of all, one should emphasize the positive element that the organizers of Defendory have maintained their policy of providing an exposition for professionals, removed from the crowds, although, to be perfectly frank, one would have welcomed a broader schedule simplifying the work of those of us covering the fair.

Defendory, put on by the Institute of Industrial Exhibitions and with the full support of the Ministry of Defense, occupied a total area of 60,000 square meters, with 730 pavilions (43 percent more than in 1984), with enterprises from 24 countries and military delegations sent by over 50 governments. Once more, the general director of the fair was Dimitropulos.

Dawn of Greek Industry

As I have already stated, Defendory was an important showcase for the Greek national industry. Its presence was carefully planned and put together so that it would be the largest fashionable store with the best presentation. Some 15 enterprises, from shipyards (Eleusis Shipyards or Hellenic) to aeronautical complexes such as HAI, participated.

The EBO company group provided clear examples of its estimable power. Its activities embrace various fields: coins and nonferrous metal processed products, powders and propellents, various types of munitions, pistols, submachine guns, assault rifles, machine guns, mortars, nacelles (and pods) of different types, fuel tanks for planes, bomb loaders, and so on. EBO, which employs 1,800 persons, plans to begin manufacturing sports weapons soon, while its

showiest product, the Artemis antiaircraft system, will reach the milestone of the official delivery of the prototype in April.

Artemis is the fruit of a contract signed 2 years ago with the Ministry of Defense. It has a new configuration thanks to cooperation with the French firm Thomson-CSF [General Radio Company], which makes it possible to coordinate double 30-mm mounting with the Apollo (Crotale) missile units.

Another local company, Hellenic Aerospace Industry (HAI), signed, at the same time as Defendory, an agreement with Northrop of the United States concerning the joint development and production of remote-control aircraft for reconnaissance missions based on the Chukar III. Such aircraft, known as the Telamon, launched from the ground, sea or air, fly at speeds of 500 knots and have a range of 400 nautical miles. They can also be used on other missions, such as electronic warfare.

HAI is engaged in major maintenance, as well as the production of components (Airbus, Atar motor, the CL215, the Mirage 2000, and so on), gunnery control systems, laser telemeters and other equipment. In June, this national company signed an agreement with Dassault-Breguet, SNECMA [National Aviation Engine Design and Construction Company] and Thomson-CSF, stretching over 15 years, enabling it to acquire technologies in the fields of cells, engines and equipment, while establishing cooperation with Matra and SAGEM (French firms like those previously named) for the manufacture of Magic missile elements.

Steyr-Heilas is continuing its production of vehicles under a patent from Steyr-Daimler-Puch and Mercedes Benz (a model could be seen at their pavilion). This company hopes to sign a contract with the Greek Ministry of Defense soon for the delivery of 252 Leonidas armored transport vehicles and it is now working on the delivery of 4,500 light all-terrain vehicles.

N. Kiroleides, Inc. presented its military vehicles, including an example of its new tank trailer. It has just finished development of a railroad car capable of carrying 60 tons, ideal for transport of tanks, containers and heavy equipment. Pyrkal, specializing in munitions and fuses, displayed its new GRM20 mortar grenade, equipped with 20 submunitions, with the same concept as the Spanish ESPIN, although with fewer features. CHR Economides and Sons, Inc. and Epirus Foundries announced their partnership with the American Emerson Company for the manufacture of various electronic subsystems.

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DETAILS ON DEFENSE MINISTRY RESTRUCTURING

Organizations, Personalities Described

Madrid YA in Spanish 5 Jan 87 pp 7-9

[Text] Madrid--This year's celebration of the Military Festival presents major innovations involving the structure of the Spanish Army. The "new Army" is now comprised, on its top echelons, of men from various generations, with one feature in common: they did not participate in the Spanish Civil War. The present commanders come from the graduating classes of the Zaragoza General Academy following the war's end. The previous graduating classes from the ranks of the provisional second lieutenants who distinguished themselves in the Civil War have by now been transferred to reserve status.

This situation entails deepseated changes, both sociological and psychological. The old political notion of the "army of conquerors" is now in an obvious process of disappearing. The Spanish military, who are currently faced with the process of integration into NATO, have features similar to those of their comrades from other Western nations. It is an Army with increasing integration into civilian society.

During the past 4 years, the division of authority has undergone a complete change. Now, the defense minister, either by law or through the auspices of the government's prime minister, controls absolutely all matters relating to his department, into which the three branches of service are fully integrated. The missing "fringe areas," such as the office of the general director of defense police, were closed in the restructuring of the department approved by the last Council of Ministers in 1986.

"Military power," the cause of so much concern, no longer exists. As in the case of the democratic countries, the military merely have the autonomy necessary for engaging in the constant training of their forces. Nevertheless, in the fortunately remote event of war, our fate would depend on the personal and professional merits of those men. In a peacetime situation, their capacity for making the forces subordinate to them operative will cause the deterrence of the potential enemy to be easier or more difficult.

The structure of the ministry per se, both civilian and military, is what will have to bear the brunt, over the next few months, of the major reforms that

must be enacted to update the defense operation and to create a structure that is currently non-existent in many areas. One of the priority goals for this year is the intensification of reform in military instruction. As an odd feature, no woman appears on the list of the "strong men of defense" that we have offered our readers. The only one to hold an important position, that of deputy general director, is the prestigious diplomat, Maria Rosa Boceta.

Narcis Serra

Defense minister since 1982, in the first Socialist government, the appointment evoked surprise, because during the opposition years, he had not had any connection with defense matters. This reason and his reputation as an economist prompted Felipe Gonzalez to appoint the then mayor of Barcelona to the post. His amply demonstrated tact and patience have enabled him to carry out the reforms that his predecessors had left on paper, without daring to propose them. He has chosen his collaborators not only for their professional merits, but also for their backing for the modernization plans. All those around him know that he is very severe in applying discipline. He has been criticized politically for having avoided reforms that might entail a high cost for him, and for having tried to make the "bombs" explode in the hands of others.

Eduardo Serra

The state secretary, whose departure from the position has been speculated on during the past few weeks, as a preliminary step leading to his possible appointment as ambassador to Washington, is the "man in the shadows" of the defense minister's administration. A state attorney with the number one figure, he has spent nearly his entire career associated with industry; which prompted his appointment as undersecretary when Alberto Oliart occupied the ministry with the last UCD [Democratic Center Union] government. The defense industry owes everything to this man, whose personal opinion and action were essential for resolving such major issues as the purchase of 72 F-18A's at a cost of 300 billion pesetas. He is the hardest negotiator that the European countries and the United States have encountered. His replacement, when it occurs, will entail a real problem.

Gustavo Suarez Pertierra

The department's undersecretary attained the position more for his management capacity, proven by his performance in the Ministry of Justice's General Directorate of Religious Affairs, than for his knowledge of defense problems. In any event, being a professor of canon law was no obstacle to his devising what will be the most important reform that the ministry will approve during the current legislature: the law on the military function. He is an open person, inclined toward dialogue, who is currently bearing the heaviest burden in the department, namely, the reforms that will cause the greatest shrieking among the structures. His conciliating capacity will prove useful to him.

Emilio Alonso Manglano

He has been general director of the Superior Center for Defense Intelligence [CESID] since 1981. In this position, one of the most important, not only on the Defense Ministry's table of organization, but also on that of the Office of the Prime Minister of the Government, he has carried out a thorough "cleanup" of the center (particularly after the attempted coup d'etat of 23-F), and activated its functions, both internally and externally. In the department, it is claimed that the 5 years that he has spent as head of CESID are too many, because the position causes much "burn-out." He would have liked to end his military career in command of a captaincy general, but the government has been unwilling to replace him, because he is a totally effective person. He always wears civilian clothes, a small sign that, when transferred to the reserves, he may continue to hold this or another post in the secret service, as a civilian.

Luis Roldan

The first civilian to hold the position of general director of the Civil Guard bears a certain resemblance to Minister Serra, not only because of his beard, but also for that obsession with making reforms when he is familiar with all the problems and has explored all the possibilities. He has announced changes that will entail a greater civilian presence in the corps' leadership posts. He is aware of the need for coordinating many efforts with the Armed Forces, and one of his first meetings upon taking office was with the Army chief of staff, Miguel Iniguez. His harsh nature will be visible during the next few months.

Juan Gomez de Salazar

The deputy director of the Civil Guard, who is still becoming settled in the post, lacks the charisma that Andres Cassinello had, as well as the latter's knowledge of intelligence operations; but he is an effective person, who has emerged successfully from the positions that he had held. A great worker, he has extensive prestige within the corps.

Luis Reverter

He is far more than Serra's right-hand man. They met in the Barcelona city hall, and immediately became close friends. He is an easygoing man, who is quite familiar with most of the generals, and who is doing a very useful job for the minister. It is said of him that he would like to take part in the organization of the Olympic Games, and would be pleased to work at the Royal Residence. Nevertheless, this Socialist claiming to be a Catholic and to admire the monarchy tells whoever is willing to listen that he would really like to return to Barcelona, where he loves to work in his drug store.

Jose Andres Jimenez

The general director of weaponry and materiel, whose job is that of weaponry engineer general inspector, is a quiet man, disliking public appearances, who

is in charge of the extremely complicated area of the military industry. He is one of the military in whom Narcis Serra has placed all his confidence, although the results have not yet been quite as good as would be desired.

Eloy Rovira

The chairman of the Supreme Council of Military Justice is an affable man, who loves his profession and desires to provide the best possible service every day. He was the most trusted associate of the previous chief of staff, Saenz de Tejada, with whom he held the position of secretary of the Army's Superior Council. He was promoted to lieutenant general in 1985, and has several more years remaining in his career; which makes it quite likely that he will replace the captain general of Madrid, Gustavo Urrutia, in that post when the latter moves to the reserves.

Gonzalo Puigcerver

The defense chief of staff has enhanced his career with intensive personal experience abroad, which will help him to discharge this extremely important mission, because we are at a time of coordinating the Spanish Armed Forces with those of NATO. Before accepting the position, he considered it often, because his assignment as chief of the Military Sentry Squad at the Royal Residence was quite satisfactory to him. His appointment caused enormous gratification in the Air Force, which hopes to receive greater attention to its forces during the next 4 years. His charm will facilitate for him the coordination of the three branches of service, so as to be able to develop the unified doctrine of activity, which is one of the major strategic and military challenges of the present time.

Jose Santos Peralba

Chief of the king's Military Sentry Squad, he has had a career that any military man would have dreamed of for himself. He has held various operational assignments, has had the most interesting office positions (JUEM [Joint Chiefs of Staff] and Undersecretariat of Defense), has held a seat on the Atlantic Alliance Military Committee, and was Air Force chief of staff. Of an open, enterprising nature, while chief of staff he witnessed the arrival of the F-18A's, partially his "fault."

Valentin Barriga

The military career of the general director of infrastructure concluded in 1985, with his transfer into the active reserves; and, at that time, his civilian career began in the same position. General inspector of construction engineers, he has toured all the key posts in his special area (the previous one was in the Trusteeship of Military Residences), which has qualified him as the person best equipped to carry out the difficult task of selling the military buildings that are no longer useful to the Armed Forces. His qualities as a hard negotiator were especially assessed by the minister before appointing him to the post.

Jose Ignacio Moscoso

The general director of economic affairs, whose name seldom appears in the news media, is performing one of the most impeccable jobs since the Defense Ministry was created. Despite his youth, he is a prestigious economist, who is completely familiar with both national and international markets. A great negotiator, he is a key figure in the arms negotiations with the United States.

Antonio Flos Basols

The technical general secretary is an economist who acquired prestige in the profession after having planned the layout of Barcelona. He has known the defense minister for years, and is one of the supporters in whom Serra has placed all his confidence.

Jose Pardo de Santayana

A member of a family deeply rooted in the Armed Forces, Spain's military representative to NATO was promoted to lieutenant general and sent to the Alliance a few weeks ago; therefore, he has not yet begun to fully exercise his authority. A very well trained person, with a thorough understanding of international affairs, he was previously joint chief of staff, a post in which he succeeded in incorporating the three branches of service into the necessary unified doctrine. The position held by Pardo de Santayana will be of extreme importance during the next few years.

Most of the Army's "strong men" belong to what has been termed the "Serra generation." The ministry's policy on appointments has put in key posts individuals who have held positions of trust close to the minister.

Miguel Iniguez

The Army chief of staff's sincerity, integrity, and reliability in working are three of his principal virtues. A man who had the utmost confidence of Gutierrez Mellado, he overtly defends the gains made during that period, although certain conservative sectors have attempted to use this against him. His career has been a perfect blend of desk and operational assignments, which have provided him with the training required to hold the most important post in the Army. If he had known English, he would have been named defense chief of staff. He is responsible for the fate of the branch of service which is most sorely in need of restructuring, both of personnel and materiel. His human virtues will be quite necessary to enable him to cope with the discouragement that certain measures, such as staff cuts or the reduction of captaincies general, have been evoking. Some day, when he leaves the position, he will fulfill his dream of living peacefully in his native Burgos.

Francisco Veguilla

The captain general of Valladolid is one of Minister Serra's most trusted associates. Head of his office for 2 very long and difficult years, his appointment to Valladolid entailed the removal of General Yrayzoz, who was considered better trained for the position. When he has not yet held the post for 9 months, which will occur this month, he will be named general director of defense policy, under direct orders from Serra. His participation in various military commissions which took part in international agreements with the United States, and his knowledge of English and French, are more than sufficient arguments to support his assuming the major responsibilities abroad which the new position involves.

Gustavo Urrutia

This Zaragozan, who has resided for years in Madrid, will leave the Madrid captaincy general this year for reasons of age. A simple, good-natured man, he has managed to go by unnoticed in such difficult and complicated situations for the position as those relating to the judicial proceedings against those indicted for 23-F and 27-O.

Juan Castellanos

His appointment to the West Pyrenees Military Region was preceded, when he was a division general, by his transfer to the branch or corps assignment group, which was cancelled so that he might be promoted to lieutenant general. His military career has been marked by specialization in the most difficult types of work. He has certificates as a skier-climber, paratrooper, guerrilla unit commander, and tank specialist.

Francisco Ferrer Fores

The personality of the captain general of the Canaries recalls that of Saenz de Santa Maria. When the latter was general director of the Civil Guard, he even proposed Ferrer Fores to replace him, in a position that would unquestionably have delighted him. The military problems of the archipelago are highly complicated, owing to the need for creating a unified doctrine for the three branches of service, which is currently non-existent. The efforts on the part of this Zaragozan have not helped much, and his voice is still being heard in Madrid, at a great distance.

Fernando Gautier

The captain general of the Southern Military Region (Andalucia) has pursued a career that seems about to end with his holding the command of the southern part of the peninsula and the Ceuta and Melilla districts. The reunification of the military regions with headquarters in Sevilla and Granada was considered a priority, because our main military threat comes from the south, and Gautier has managed to accomplish it with enormous success.

Baldomero Hernandez Carreras

His appointment as captain general of the West Pyrenees Military Region, with headquarters in Barcelona, prompted the removal of the then captain general of Barcelona, Fernando Rodriguez Ventosa. Inasmuch as he has spent only a few months in the new position, he has not yet been able to undertake the restructuring of Catalonia and Aragon, for which he will have to use his recognized qualities as an organizer. From the time of his entry into the Armed Forces in 1941, to date, he has held "only" 32 assignments.

Juan Bautista Sanchez Bilbao

During his military career, the captain general of the Eastern Military Region has been typified by the desire to experience intensely the "warlike" assignments and to evade the desk ones. He has commanded the Second Helicopter Unit in Aaiun, and was chief of the Airborne Forces and chief of the Brunete Armored Division. His intellectual concerns prompted him to hold the directorship of the General Military Academy. He is one of the lieutenant generals personifying the gradual reduction in age in the Army.

The Navy is faced with the need for maintaining and reinforcing the naval operational strength, at a time when many of the units need to be replaced. The plan for construction of new frigates was curtailed, and the deadlines for the "Prince of Asturias" aircraft carrier are not being met. The Navy continues to be the Cinderella, despite the maritime nature of our territory and our international projection.

Fernando Maria Nardiz

The navy chief of staff, shy but determined, has an outlook open to the future. He is as concerned about the poor condition of his ships as were his predecessors, but he has a greater mind-set regarding the need to coordinate the operation of the three branches of service. He has held all the major operational assignments.

Jose Maria Sobrino

The captain general of the Strait has held fewer sea-going assignments than his colleagues, but he has held responsibilities in other highly important areas. Included among the latter is that of military representative in the Atlantic Alliance, which he left just a few weeks ago. He holds various foreign medals.

Eduardo Vila Corpas

Captain general of the Mediterranean Maritime Zone, he was an aide-de-camp of King Don Juan Carlos for several years when the latter was Prince of Spain. He has held important assignments in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense and the Navy Staff; and it is believed that he could do a brilliant job in the Mediterranean zone.

Eliseo Alvarez-Arenas

Land assignments predominate in the service record of the captain general of Cantabrico. A seaman with enormous prestige both inside and outside of the Navy, long before he was promoted to admiral, it was known that he would attain that rank.

Jaime de Inclan

In view of Spain's strategic interests, his position as general commander of the Canaries is among those with the greatest responsibility in the Navy. He has never held assignments outside of his branch of service. He has had tours in all the leading commands ("Dedalo," and the Fleet Air Naval Group); and his capacity for work and brilliant career have lent him sufficient merits to warrant his promotion to admiral within the next few years.

Octavio Alaez

He has the Marines under his command, and is ready to convert them into the elite unit which Spain unquestionably requires. He wants to procure a larger budget for the purchase of equipment, and hopes to have better luck than his predecessor, General Costa, who is greatly remembered within the Navy. He has served as an aide-de-camp to the king.

The Air Force high command has as its main challenge gearing the forthcoming arrival of the F-18's to the overall plans for defense of the territory. The increased strength represented by the F-18's will have to be supplemented by additional investments in other combat equipment and in the weaponry for the aforementioned aircraft per se.

Federico Michavila

The Air Force chief of staff belongs to the group of military who have been working with Narcis Serra since he took over the Defense Ministry. As he himself has admitted, he has spent several years dissociated from assignments connected with the Air Force. Nevertheless, the reasons that prompted Serra to appoint him to the post are his more than amply demonstrated qualities as a manager, which are quite necessary for undertaking the restructuring of personnel and facilities. He is a man who knows how to listen, as he has proven during the past few weeks at the Air Force Headquarters; but he is one who, ultimately, does not hesitate to make decisions, regardless of how difficult they may be.

Luis Delgado Sanchez-Arjona

A man of the world, he was a candidate, along with Federico Michavila, for the chief of staff post. He is one of the still few members of the military trained abroad (in addition to taking courses, he was air attache in Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay), and his intellectual capacity has led him to hold positions on the JUJEM Staff and at the Superior Center for National Defense Studies. He holds various foreign medals.

Antonio Garcia-Fontecha

The chief of the Tactical Command and the Second Air Region is one of the Air Force lieutenant generals with the greatest prestige. Associated for several months with Gutierrez Mellado, when he was vice prime minister of the government, he is quite knowledgeable regarding the Air Force's operation, as a result of the broad gamut of assignments that he has held. A serious, untiring worker, he has but little time remaining before he moves to the reserves.

Jose Garcia Matres

The chief of the Transport Command and the Third Air Region has held just one assignment in Madrid during his entire career. Born in Caceres, he has been moved constantly in Spain and Morocco, and he has never been attracted by the bureaucracy concentrated in Madrid. He is an efficient man, with a brilliant career.

Jose Maria Martinez

Although the division general and chief of the Canaries Air Command is a Basque, he has always shown a special preference for assignments on the archipelago. This position is one of the most important in the Air Force, which has given it to a man who has thoroughly studied the problems of the Canaries, which are extremely complicated in the event of a war.

Gabriel de la Cruz

The career of the chief of the Materiel Command is in keeping with the features typical of certified staff member both because of the assignments held and his team work mentality. His work in the Materiel Command is proving to be difficult and complicated owing to the monetary problems caused by the debt of 300 billion pesetas incurred by the purchase of the F-18A fighter-bombers.

Ignacio Martinez Eiroa

Although he now holds the post of chief of the Personnel Command, his entire career has been marked by active assignments, such as the command of the 402d Squadron, or the Special Helicopter Unit. His work to reduce personnel in the Air Force has been badly received by certain sectors affected by it, but hailed by his superiors; something which might mean his appointment, within the next few days, as general director of personnel for the Defense Ministry.

The Army is at the height of restructuring of its units, to make them more operative. Its three most powerful divisions: the Brunete, Maestrazgo, and Guzman el Bueno, have not been exempted from this change. The first, divided between the vicinities of Madrid and Extremadura, is commanded by Div Gen Ramon Progueres Hernandez, a military man of proven prestige who, at age 58, still has a long service career ahead of him. Prominent among his most recent assignments has been the command of the Zaragoza General Military Academy and

of the Royal Guard. The Maestrazgo division, with headquarters in Valencia, is commanded by Francisco Martinez Pariente. Its personnel is distributed throughout the entire East, with a radius of action smaller than that of the Brunete. The also division general, Enrique Martin Casana, commands the Guzman el Bueno, which has its establishments in Andalucia, looking for an invasion that might come from the South. These two latter individuals hold assignments that have served as a bridge for their promotion to general officer status.

Changes in Military Careers

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 21 Jan 87 p 11

[Text] Madrid--The Defense Ministry, as part of the technical work being done to prepare the law on the military function, is planning a deepseated change in the present system of lists in the branches of service, so that professional merit (and not seniority, as is the case at present) will be the determining factor when it is time to decide on promotions, according to a statement made by official sources in the department. Currently, seniority is the only criterion for promotions from lieutenant to colonel. No final decision has yet been made in this regard, but they have gone so far as to propose the abolishment of lists and, as an alternative, the periodic change in military grades.

With the future law on the public function, which is expected to be sent to the Cortes before next summer, the Defense Ministry is attempting to determine what the professional career of the military in Spain should be. At present, every promotion is listed according to the number attained at the conclusion of the person's stay at the respective academy. Upon leaving that center, all the military are lieutenants; and, from that position to that of colonel, all promotions occur in an order based on the number received at the end of the studies. With this system, there are even military who, regardless of the technical courses or assignments that they have had, know almost exactly the date on which they will receive their next two or three promotions.

Professional Training

The Defense Ministry is attempting to put an end to this current system, and is aiming at having the professional merits, technical training, or studies pursued take precedence over seniority when it is time to decide on promotions. In the event that the method of periodic changing of the grades were selected, every year or every 2 years, all members of each graduating class would be arranged in order based on their merits and assets acquired throughout their careers. In Chile, for example, for many years, the replacement on the lists has been made annually.

In Spain, the military lists are published every year, but the only corrections are those pertaining to the promotions of the previous year. All members of the military continue to appear on the lists, within their corresponding

graduating class, in the same order which they received upon leaving the academies. The lists of the three branches of service, on the other hand, continue to be headed, after the king and the defense minister, by the previous head of state, Francisco Franco. That for the Army also includes General Moscardo (who led the defense of Alcazar de Toledo during the Civil War); and that of the Navy includes Adm Luis Carrero Blanco, who was killed in an ETA attack in 1973.

Similarly, the law being prepared by the Defense Ministry will include the conditions that must be met by the members of the military in order to request specific assignments; a restriction that currently occurs in very few instances.

With this law, which will also include aspects relating to the constitutional rights of the military and matters associated with the disciplinary system, an attempt is being made, simultaneously, to unify the military career in the three branches of service. At present, advancement and promotions occur differently in each branch of service and, particularly in the case of petty officers, there are instances of comparative discrimination which usually benefits members of the Army, who have more chances for attaining officer rank than those of the Air Force or Navy.

Establishing a Career Model

With the law, the Defense Ministry is seeking to establish a "military career model," so that the professionals in the Armed Forces will know what type of courses, specialization or assignments could benefit their professional advancement, apart from seniority; a quality which, nevertheless, will continue to be an important factor.

In addition to a streamlining of promotions, the Defense Ministry wants the military, throughout their professional career, to be obliged to undergo some "screening" to attain certain ranks or positions. In the past, for example, the decision was made, and has not yet been really carried out, to divide the professionals in the branches of service, when they reach the rank of commander, between operational commanders and logistical or support commanders.


The general features of the planned reform in military instruction will also be included in this law, as noted recently by the defense minister, Narcis Serra, in a parliamentary response; although the possibility that a specific law on military instruction might be devised in the future has not been precluded.

Among the planned reforms, the ages for promotion of the military will be reduced, particularly in the highest positions. Hence, based on the drafts currently being worked on, one might attain the rank of general at age 54. At present, and after the reductions in age that have been experimented with in recent years, one attains general's rank when one is 57 or 58 years of age, at the earliest.

The fact that, to date, there has been no concrete text or reference regarding the suitable military career model has caused some commanders of advanced age to voice their complaints. The latter have been due to the fact that, throughout their stay in the Armed Forces, they had usually chosen assignments that might enhance their records when it was time to reach the highest ranks; and yet, at that particular time, other very different factors took precedence. According to high-ranking Defense Ministry officials, the law on the military function will be one of the most important in the reform undertaken in the department, because it will be the one most affecting the military careers of the professionals in the branches of service, among whom there is great suspense for learning the contents of the law.

Key to Chart:

1. Ministry of Defense
2. Minister of defense
3. President of the Supreme Council of Military Justice (CSJM)
4. Defense chief of staff (JEMAD)
5. State secretary
6. General director of the Superior Center of Defense Intelligence (CESID)
7. Spain's military representative to NATO
8. Undersecretary of the department
9. General director of the Civil Guard
10. General director of economic affairs (Digeneco)
11. General director of weaponry and materiel (DGAM)
12. General director of infrastructure (Digenin)
13. Technical secretary general (Segente)
14. Director of DRISDE
15. Deputy director of the Civil Guard



TEMESA S. DEL VADO



(1)

La integridad del territorio nacional.—La reestructuración de las Capitanías Generales —en el gráfico— y el despliegue de las Fuerzas Armadas intenta cumplir el objetivo de estar preparados para defender la integridad del territorio nacional. En ese sentido, el despliegue hace hincapié en el flanco sur, sitúa a las fuerzas en posiciones estratégicas fuera de las ciudades, para darles una mayor movilidad. La Defensa Operativa del Territorio elimina así el concepto de enemigo interior para centrarse en la posibilidad de una agresión exterior.

Key to Map 1:


1. The integrity of the national territory. The restructuring of the captaincies general (on the map) and the deployment of the Armed Forces are aimed at fulfilling the goal of being prepared to defend the integrity of the national territory. In this regard, the deployment stresses the southern flank, putting the forces in strategic positions outside of the cities to lend them greater mobility. The operational defense of the territory thereby eliminates the concept of the internal enemy, to concentrate on the possibility of an external attack.
2. Captain general of Valladolid
3. Captain general of Burgos
4. Captain general of Barcelona
5. General commander of the Balearics
6. Captain general of Madrid
7. Captain general of the Eastern Military Region
8. Captain general of the Southern Military Region (Andalucía)

9. Captain general of the Canaries
10. Armored divisions
11. Army chief of staff
12. Atlantic Ocean
13. Army
14. Mediterranean Sea
15. Balearic military zone
16. Canaries military zone



Key to Map 2:

1. Navy
2. Captain general of Cantabrico
3. Navy chief of staff
4. Captain general of the Strait
5. Captain general of the Mediterranean maritime zone
6. General commander of the Canaries



Key to Map 3:

1. Air Force
2. Air force chief of staff
3. Transport command (Zaragoza)
4. Tactical command chief (Sevilla)
5. Combat command chief (Madrid)
6. Canaries air command chief

LAS PLANTILLAS MILITARES (1)			
(2) Empleo	(3) Plantilla actual	(4) Reserva transitoria	(5) Plantilla 1991
Teniente general o almirante (6)	41		45
General división o vicealmirante (7)	145		93
General brigada o contralmirante (8)	291	1	297
Coronel o capitán de navío (9)	2.319	241	1.336
Teniente coronel o capitán de fragata (10)	3.395	240	2.847
Comandante o capitán de corbeta (11)	5.901	241	5.283
Capitán o teniente de navío (12)	10.391	701	10.233
Teniente o alférez de navío (13)	11.442	1.514	11.028
Alférez o alférez de fragata (14)	102	26	190
Subteniente y mayor (15)	8.632	791	3.685
Brigada (16)	8.346		13.115
Sargento 1º (17)	7.028	62	4.300
Sargento (18)	17.531	62	17.992
(19) Duración media de empleo	Comandante, 5-9 años (22)		
(20) Coronel, 3 años	Teniente, 3 años (23)		
(21) Teniente coronel, 2 años	Capitán, 5-6 años (24)		

(26) Electivos actuales de las Fuerzas Armadas y los previstos tras la reducción, en 1991. En la columna *Reserva transitoria*, número de militares que ya han pedido pasar a esa situación especial.

Key to Table:

1. The Military Rosters
2. Positions
3. Current roster
4. Temporary reserve
5. 1991 roster
6. Lieutenant general or admiral
7. Division general or vice admiral
8. Brigadier general or rear admiral
9. Colonel or ship captain
10. Lieutenant colonel or frigate captain
11. Commander or corvette captain
12. Captain or ship lieutenant
13. Lieutenant or ship ensign
14. Ensign or frigate ensign
15. Second lieutenant and major
16. Sergeant major
17. Sergeant first class
18. Sergeant
19. Average duration of position

- 20. Colonel, 3 years
- 21. Lieutenant colonel, 2 years
- 22. Commander, 8-9 years
- 23. Lieutenant, 3 years
- 24. Captain, 5-6 years
- 25. Includes group with branch or corps assignment, or Group B
- 26. Current Armed Forces personnel and that planned after the reduction in 1991. In the "temporary reserve" column is the number of members of the military who have already requested a transfer to that special status.

2909

CSO: 3548/40

PCE TO LAUNCH ANTI-BASE CAMPAIGN

Madrid YA in Spanish 14 Jan 87 p 8

[Excerpts] Madrid--Yesterday, Enrique Curiel, vice secretary general of the PCE [Spanish Communist Party] and spokesman for the United Left in the Congress of Deputies, accused the government of seriously jeopardizing the national security through the position adopted in the talks with NATO and the United States. The criticism was also applied to the secrecy that the government boasts of concerning these matters, concealing all types of information from the Parliament and the public. Curiel regards this attitude as intolerable and incompatible with a democratic system.

The PCE defense commission, chaired by Enrique Curiel, met last weekend to study all aspects of defense, including three very timely fronts: the American military bases in Spain, talks with NATO, and the sovereignty of Gibraltar.

On the concrete subject of the American military bases on Spanish soil, the PCE vice secretary general scored the precedence of American interests over strategic national interests; which prompted him to claim that, "It is untrue that the United States is acting as a friendly country and an ally; rather it is acting as a master."

Regarding the recent announcement made by the defense minister, Narcis Serra, to the effect that the Torrejon base would be reinforced, instead of being closed, Curiel said that this decision by the government is very serious, because it means a step backward in its principles, noting that nothing similar had ever before been stated.

PCE has already announced that, during the next few months, it will intensify the popular campaign against the bases. On 15 March, there will be another march to Torrejon; and, in the fall, a large gathering will take place in the capital of Spain. The Communist leaders deem it completely intolerable that a military base should be kept open so close to Madrid.

PCE also fears that the government may end up accepting the philosophy of replacing American personnel with Spaniards. Curiel pointed out: "That would mean that the armed forces would become even more integrated into the NATO military structure."

2909

CSO: 3548/40

NAVY CLAIMS ANTI-SUBMARINE ALARM NET CUTTING WAS SABOTAGE

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 4 Jan 87 p 6

[Articles by Roger Magnergard and Sune Olofson; first paragraph is SVENSKA DAGBLADET introduction]

[Text] Below are the third and fourth articles in a SVENSKA DAGBLADET series on foreign anti-Swedish intelligence activity. Previous articles were published on 31 December and 2 January.

The military's detection nets and antisubmarine nets have repeatedly been subjected to sabotage. They have suffered unexplainable damage or simply been cut to pieces.

The nets are placed at sensitive sea approaches along our coast, and their purpose is to make it difficult for intruders to get past. Several of those instances of sabotage can be related directly to foreign submarine activity.

Jan Tuninger, the Defense Staff's staff editor, confirmed to SVENSKA DAGBLADET: "It happens now and then that our nets are damaged. The reasons for it have not been pinpointed; every conceivable explanation is possible."

No Exact Number

We could not find out the exact number of nets damaged in 1986. When Tuninger was asked to be more specific, he said that "it happens every now and then."

At the end of September 1986, one of the Navy's detection nets at the entrance to the Musk Island Base was cut to pieces. This was confirmed to SVENSKA DAGBLADET by several sources, among them Captain Hans Tynnerstrom, commander of the East Coast Naval Base.

The net was located in one of the passages used by the intruding minisubs when they entered Hars Bay before the big submarine hunt in 1982.

A detection net—or alarm net—can be penetrated by a submarine. An antisubmarine net, on the other hand, is stronger, the hope being that it will prevent passage.

At the time of the submarine hunt in Karlskrona in September 1983, an unknown person sabotaged the antisubmarine net that was hanging under the bridge between Hassl Island and Alm Island.

Late one evening two sentries suddenly heard metallic noises coming from the net. One sentry climbed down and, with his flashlight, saw a man on the beach 15 meters away. The man was removing one of the ropes to which the net was fastened.

The man turned and began running toward the mainland. He disappeared before the sentry opened fire. In all, four of the ropes holding the net had been removed. They had all been cut with a knife.

Corpse in Net

It was discovered at the same time that the telephone cable leading from the sentries' tent encampment had been cut.

Just before Christmas in 1985, two civilian fishermen who had set out a net next to a mine line north of Ut Island in the Stockholm Archipelago made a gruesome discovery. When they pulled the net up, a dead man was caught in it. The military and the police conclude that it was probably the corpse of a diver from a foreign power.

Lieutenant General Bengt Lehander, commander of the Eastern Military Command, told SVENSKA DAGBLADET: "It is entirely possible that it was a foreign diver. But of course, it is hard to say how great that probability is when we are talking about an isolated incident."

The fishermen had illegally set out their net right up against the mine line. When they hauled the net up, they discovered that a dead person was entangled in it.

The fishermen were frightened and dropped the net back in the water without hauling the body into the boat.

They are sure that they saw a body in the net.

One of the fishermen said: "But I could never swear that it was a diver, although it looked like one."

Their opinion is supported by the military and police investigation, even though definite proof is lacking, since the body was never found again.

The fishermen sat on their secret for several days. But eventually, one of them revealed to his mother what had happened. She works for the East Coast Naval Base on Musk Island.

The mother immediately sounded the alarm, and military divers were sent out to look for the net. They found it rather quickly.

But by then it had been cut at the top and bottom, and what was left was in a complicated tangle. The area around the net and the mine line was carefully searched by military divers, the Coast Guard, and a private diving firm that was hired to look for the body.

In January, the remains of the net and the fishermen's knife were sent to the National Laboratory of Forensic Science (SKL) for analysis.

According to the SKL, it is clear that the net "was cut with a sharp-edged tool." But the question of whether it was cut with the knife found in the fishermen's boat must be left open.

One of the police officers who investigated the matter says: "I know the fishermen out here so well that I consider it extremely unlikely that they themselves cut up their net."

Police investigated the possibility that the net had been cut up by a whirling propeller. But the remarkable thing was that it was the part lying nearest the bottom--and as heavy as lead--that had been cut. So the police ruled out that theory.

Probable Theory

The police and the military also suspected that the fishermen had caught the corpse of a drowned civilian in their net. But following extensive searches in the area, that theory was also written off. If the holes in the net had been caused by its being caught on the bottom, with the body being pulled loose at the same time, the body should have been somewhere in the area.

According to the experts, what probably happened was that a foreign diver got caught in the net and died and was then recovered by his companions.

The most likely explanation is that the diver had been sent out from an intruding underwater vehicle to investigate the mine line. He then got entangled in the net, which according to Swedish law should not have been there, and was unable to cut himself loose. His air supply ran out, and he died.

When his diving time had expired, he was missed by the crew in the underwater vehicle, which sent other divers out to get him.

Experts explain how the crew was able to find the victim by reference to the system used among divers on the oil rigs in the North Sea and elsewhere.

Those divers are equipped with something almost like a reflector. A signal is sent out from the underwater vehicle. When it encounters the diver's "reflector," the latter responds, and the position can be homed in on and pinpointed.

Lt Gen Lehander says: "Moving about under water is not free of risk, so if you are using people in such operations, you naturally must have some way of

finding them if they get into a tight spot. It would not be strange if foreign powers had equipped their divers with reflectors."

More evidence that someone tightly entangled in the net had been cut loose was found by the first divers on the scene. Flatfish that had been caught in the net had also been cut to pieces.

Strange Cable Found in 1983

A cable laid on the sea bottom off one of the most sensitive supply depots at the Musk Island Base was found at the end of October or in early November 1983. The cable, which has perplexed the Armed Forces, was probably made in Poland and may have been used for radio intelligence.

In itself, the cable is concrete evidence that a foreign intruder has operated far inside Swedish waters and in an area closed to all navigation.

The discovery was made by military divers who were investigating caterpillar tracks on the sea bottom in one of the most sensitive areas at the Musk Island Base, but it was kept a secret. One reason for not making the find public was that there was no conclusive evidence linking the cable to a particular country.

Field of Application

There is only one use for the cable, and that is the transmitting of signals. The Swedish Armed Forces use similar cables to forward signals from underwater microphones which, for example, pick up the sound of propellers or are used to detect submarines. Presumably, this particular cable was connected to some kind of measuring instrument, but no such instrument has been found.

Another application might be that of tapping into information from Swedish communications systems simply by hooking the cable to Swedish cables.

In Good Condition

The facts are these:

1. The cable had not been in the water a very long time before it was found. It was in relatively good condition when it was found.
2. It could not have come from a Swedish naval vessel, because the Swedish Armed Forces do not use that type of cable.
3. It could not have been laid on the sea bottom by a surface vessel. The area where it was found is a prohibited area, and civilian vessels or vessels from another nation cannot move through the area without being detected.

When the cable was found, it attracted a lot of attention in the military and was subjected to thorough analysis. SVENSKA DAGBLADET was able to examine one of those analyses. One of the experts making that analysis talked about it.

May Have Been Made in Poland

He said: "There is a very great probability that the cable was manufactured in the Eastern states, most likely in Poland. But there is no conclusive proof of that."

Since the cable was found in late September or early October 1983 [as published], it was eventually linked to the submarine hunt in Hars Bay that had taken place in October the year before.

The cable has a diameter of just over 1 centimeter--11.3 millimeters, to be exact. It consists of five different strands (thinner cables inside the main cable). Each strand measures 3.18 millimeters and contains 26 different wires. They are made entirely of copper.



These are pieces of the cable that was found on the sea bottom off the Musk Island Base 1 year after the submarine hunt in Hars Bay in October 1982. The color combination on the cables does not exist in any highly industrialized country. The cable was probably manufactured in Poland and used to transmit signals from underwater microphones.

"That is unusual, since it makes them less durable. Cables like this normally have only a thin copper layer."

Outdated Method

The strands are insulated with natural rubber--a method no longer used in the West because that material is considered outdated.

The outside is coated with a layer of EP rubber, which is a relatively modern material.

All cable is manufactured with a number of marking threads in various colors so the manufacturer can recognize it. This cable is no exception, but what is remarkable is that the color combination--red, yellow, brown, and blue--is one that does not exist in any official or unofficial registers.

The expert says: "It was not manufactured in a highly industrialized country. The only West European countries to have made similar cable are Portugal and Spain, but I am extremely doubtful that it was manufactured there."

The cable does not have a long service life--3 years at most. When it was discovered, it had not been in the water very long. A cable's service life also depends on the signal it carries. The stronger the signal, the shorter the life of the cable.

11798

CSO: 3650/44

ARMED FORCES SUFFERING FROM INCREASED EARLY LEAVING OF OFFICERS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 12 Jan 87 p 7

[Article by Anders Ohman: "Training of Conscripts Must Be Reduced--460 Officers Left Forces in 1986"; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] The large numbers of early departures of well-educated professional officers continue to drain the forces. Over 300 officers left the Army last year, and the corresponding figure in the Navy was 160. The departure of officers from the Army and the Navy has increased since 1983.

The situation is most troublesome in the Army. Of the approximately 10,000 officers, there is a shortage of about 1,100. There is a shortage of 637 captains, 444 first lieutenants, 278 majors, 18 lieutenant colonels and 671 second lieutenants. A surplus of older officers adjusts the total vacancy figure.

Certain units are now judged to be crisis units. An example is the engineer unit Ing 1 in Sodertalje, which has an allowance of 140 officers, and over 50 vacancies--between 30-35 percent.

"If this departure of officers continues Sweden is facing a serious security policy crisis in the shortage of trained military personnel. We must immediately reduce conscript training until the officer situation improves."

This was said by Major Olle Sundhaag, age 41, ombudsman in one of the officers' unions (SOF) [Swedish Association of Army, Navy and Air Force Officers], which is affiliated with SACO/SR [General Association of Salaried Employees/National Federation of Government Officers] with about 7,000 members.

Threshold of Pain Reached

He believes that from the union's viewpoint the threshold of pain has been reached, and measures must be taken quickly before the crisis deteriorates further.

A platoon of soldiers needs three officers to give it complete training. In Army units the bitter reality often is that one, or at the most two officers

have the responsibility for a platoon of about 40 men. The officers themselves also lack the necessary training.

At A 4 in Ostersund, for example, a cadet by himself is the platoon commander and trainer. He would normally be the platoon's fourth man, after the platoon commander and two instructors.

"Things cannot continue like this. People are getting worn out, the social situation is getting untenable. As a rule military personnel are unusually healthy," said Olle Sundhaag. "An officer has an average of one or two sick days per year."

SOF has submitted a document to the Defense Committee giving its views on the officers crisis within the services. The officers union points especially to the lack of balance between tasks and personnel resources. The 1982 Defense Decision contains a deathblow against the officers, with reduced numbers. The reduction was carried out, but the tasks were not reduced to a corresponding degree. Instead incident and readiness tasks were increased.

During the 90's

SOF believes that the most important reasons why officers are leaving the services are worsened working conditions, poor wages and uncertainty about changes in the peacetime organization.

"Units which are worked the hardest must reduce basic training. The lost conscript training must be repeated during the 90's, when the number of conscripts is smaller than it is today," said Olle Sundhaag.

Chiefs of the Navy and Air Force have requested the Defense Committee to increase their strength by 125 and 250 officers per year respectively. The motive is increased preparedness tasks.

SOF believes that the departures of officers can be directly associated with too much incident activity, and that these departures are tending to "increase greatly."

"The overtime situation in many Navy units shows that there is still a large imbalance between tasks and personnel resources," wrote SOF to the Defense Committee.

Investigation of Needs

The officers union is critical of the so-called investigation of officer needs, which dealt with quality and quantity within the wartime organization, and thereby also the peacetime organization.

According to SOF, the investigation of officer needs did not sufficiently analyze the changes in the threat picture which the Defense Committee reported in its document "Swedish Security Policy Entering the 90's."

The investigation found that the number of officers should be further reduced. Older officers could be used in troop service and incident activities.

SOF responded in sharp language that older officers in staff and administrative positions can not fill the need for young officers in training and readiness positions. The conscript soldiers' confidence in the forces and their own ability to carry out their tasks in wartime is determined by the availability of well-trained and qualified officers.

In this acute crisis SOF would, for example, reduce Ing 1 in Sodertalje, which has 47 vacancies, by a company of 140-150 men. That would ease the load somewhat for the officers.

Left the Army for Computers

One of the young officers who left the Army during 1986 is Anders Westkamper, age 25. Last fall he ended his military career as deputy chief of the platoon officer students at the Commando School at KA 1 on Rindo near Vaxholm. Now he is working at a civilian career as a computer salesman.

As a lieutenant his base pay was 8,500 kronor per month.

His new monthly pay at the computer firm Swe-Mark Print in Nacka is about 10,000 kronor.

As a fully accredited salesman he will earn significantly more.

But it was not the attraction of higher pay which caused Anders Westkamper to break off his military career. The decision came after mature consideration. He tried to weigh all the advantages and the disadvantages, and the prospects for the future.

"I could not in the foreseeable future see any change in those things of which I am critical," he said.

Anders Westkamper was a Coast Artillery Commando, and in the military was an elite soldier in a special unit. In all the submarine incidents since the beginning of the 80's the commandos have played an active, working role, mostly in searching for foreign submarines.

During the incidents he has participated on occasions when reliable intelligence clearly indicated the input of weapons, but the whole operation ran out in the sand. Ineffectiveness or deliberate submissiveness--this caused frustration on the part of the commandos.

"I compare myself with a police dog which is trained to search and search. If he never gets to catch anything he grows tired."

Anders Westkamper desires more open information from the armed forces staffs about submarine incidents. Such an attitude would strengthen the motivation of military personnel.

He says that the imbalance between tasks and resources was a strong reason why he quit. Because of the personnel shortage an officer is forced to have several positions. It is assumed that he will do an equally good job in all positions. This is impossible, and has negative consequences.

"Then comes the higher commander who promises improvements. But nothing happens. The feeling arises that action is impeded."

Anders Westkamper became an officer in 1983, at the same time as a new officers program, NBO, was introduced into the services. In the new "spirit of NBO" military personnel were being brought up under new leadership, an entirely new idea. An officer should both point with his whole hand and give orders, but at the same time be a model, and be able to motivate the soldiers.

But all officers did not accept this new thinking. So according to Anders Westkamper there are two generations of officers in the services.

"The older officers are prophets, but seldom pioneers. They preach the new leadership, but seldom apply it."

Too much military activity is conducted in the old way. "The major does it, the captain does it, the lieutenant does it," is often said. The division between the generations of officers makes it more difficult to break the old patterns.

"The soldier's dilemma is to obey the order, and at the same time to decide: is this that I am ordered to do both relevant and reasonable?"

Anders Westkamper compares it with his present role as a salesman. He has a car, a telephone, and other aids to help him in his work. The firm knows that if he does not succeed he is not a good salesman.

Anders Westkamper expects to remain in the service as a reserve officer. In order to get his former colleagues to remain he is recommending improvements in both the working environment and training. Bad barracks must be rebuilt. Service functions improved. New solutions to problems must be tested. Appreciation must be shown. Commendation is more important than censure. Talk less, act more.

Commandos used to joke about the "civilian darkness," and that there was never a demobilization, only a "pause in the training."

"In that case I can see light in that "civilian darkness." The pause in the training will perhaps last until I am 65. But certainly I miss the experience of nature in the archipelago and the fine comradeship. It was a difficult decision to leave," said Anders Westkamper.

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DEFENSE STAFF STUDY OF CENTRAL EUROPE FORCES' BALANCE VIEWED

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 15 Jan 87 p 2

[Commentary by Olof Santesson: "Talk About Military Superiority of East Bloc Modulated in the Europa Project"]

[Text] Sweden would be negligent if we generally knew little about the balance of strength in Europe.

Security policy and military defense rest ultimately on a good intelligence service, energetically run by the most skillful people available. One may assume that this is an area to which the Defense Staff always gives the highest priority.

It was reasonable to expect that there was nothing qualitatively completely new in the task which the government gave the OB [Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces] in 1984 to study, in cooperation with FOA [National Defense Research Institute] the "military-strategic, military-operational and military-technical conditions in Central Europe."

Much of that which is now being presented, after a certain amount of bustle over secrecy, in a "sanitized" final report and summarization for external use appears no different than one would expect of military staff work which otherwise is conducted without a grand project name. Still the government task brought about an unusual assembly of power for special studies, crises and war games.

As it said in the news columns of Wednesday's newspaper, perhaps the most important conclusion of The Europa Project is that one cannot really draw a definite conclusion about the true significance of the Warsaw Pact's talked-about superiority in the conventional area in Central Europe.

That should not come as a surprise.

The result agrees rather well with a judgment released several years ago in "The Military Balance" by the respected (in the West) London Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

In the latest edition (1986-1987) there is among other things the statement that "the conventional balance is still such that a general military aggression would be a very risky undertaking, no matter which side started it." Of course the effect of surprise was stated, but according to IISS even with a surprise attack, neither side would have sufficient strength to feel certain of victory.

"The results for an attacker would still be completely unpredictable and the risks, especially of escalation to nuclear war, remain impossible to calculate."

It is unfortunate that this conclusion did not have a greater impact on the political debate in the Western world.

Neither should one in the future, perhaps, raise his hopes that very many in our country pay attention to careful judgments. But it should mean something that Swedish authorities responsible for security policy have a modulated and reasoned judgment of the East-West balance in Central Europe.

Possibly one can say that the Swedish officers and FOA experts are more inclined than the IISS people to state the West's qualitative advantages, primarily in aviation. Although it is pointed out that the differences in areas prioritized by the Soviets shrink when weapons systems are put into operational use.

It is of certain significance that it is so strongly emphasized that NATO's possibilities for creating conditions for extensive ground operations appear small. Something similar was asserted last fall by SIPRI [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute] when the new chief Walther Stutzle spoke before the Peace Forum of the labor movement.

Emphasis of that kind should give a certain perspective to the generally pessimistic pronouncements about new "offensive" doctrines and weapons expenditures on the NATO side.

The Warsaw Pact has somewhat different conditions, but according to the Europa Project "a large amount of surprise" seems to be "a necessary precondition in order for an attack against West Europe, without very great sacrifices in the beginning phase, to attain more extensive geographic goals than just limited parts of West Germany."

It is therefore not just a question of rolling over NATO.

Still the report tones down the direct operational value during a Soviet breakthrough of limited use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield or against reserve forces by NATO.

And the East's motive for resorting to nuclear weapons is judged to be limited as long as the conventional forces are not threatened with decisive reversals.

One can see that both lines of reasoning put into question a number of common ideas about the immediate inevitability of a nuclear war in the event of an

armed conflict between the blocs.

According to the directive, however, the nuclear weapons question was not the subject of special examination. Perhaps even a greater shortcoming was that the study did not more fully assemble a pattern of war in Central Europe, with the growing speculation about the importance of the North Atlantic and Northern Europe in a future war.

But the directive was formulated in its time, considering the need for a broadened Swedish basis for the Stockholm Conference on Measures for Creating Confidence and Security.

As the results are now being officially released, it is surprising that there has been internal conflict over what should come out.

The Foreign Ministry has been unnecessarily concerned about the effects of the Swedish study. But even officers who have chosen to talk about their jobs should expect meager interest on the part of the Swedish people in all the details of this kind of staff work, which is taking place the world over.

It would be more valuable to allow members of the Committee on Defense, for example, to take part in our operational planning so that the politicians would have a better idea of the effects of the Defense Decision.

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ARMED FORCES WORRIED OVER ELIMINATION OF NEUROSURGERY UNITS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 20 Dec 86 p 9

[Article by Erik Liden]

[Text] Wartime medical care will be given priority in the 1987 defense decision as a follow-up to the investments made in 1982.

At the same time, the county councils are preparing to close such important units as clinics for neurosurgery and burn injuries without contacting military authorities or the county government boards.

The chief surgeon for the Eastern Military Command, Captain Bengt Dahlgren, wrote a letter to the Stockholm County Council on 8 September 1986 in which he criticized as unreasonable the closing of the neurosurgical clinic at Stockholm's Southern Hospital. According to the county council's budget plans, which were approved on 27 November, 90 beds will be centralized at the Caroline Hospital in Solna.

The county council completely ignored military views, saying that the civilian medical service cannot give priority to the greater needs of wartime. That led the Army Staff's chief physician, Anders Suneson, to write a letter to Maj-Britt Sandlund, director general of the Social Welfare Board, in which he called attention to the impracticability of treating head injuries at only one place in the Malar Valley, since the roads from there to the county's southern sections might be cut off in a wartime situation.

"I have contacted Public Health Commissioner Bo Konberg and County Commissioner Peggy Lagerstrom, who is in charge of the county council's wartime planning. They insist that the county council cannot take into account the views put forward by the commanding general or even the regional director of civil defense, Governor Bengt Gustavsson in Nykoping."

"Very Unfortunate"

Anders Suneson says: "Centralizing neurosurgery at the Caroline Hospital is very unfortunate for the entire total defense organization. A surprise attack on the country's capital would have serious consequences for over 1 million

people in the civilian population and mobilized military personnel. The difficulties involved in keeping the bridges open even to a limited extent will mean that a good half of the county's civilian population will be unable to reach the Caroline Hospital."

The Army Staff physician also maintains that the northern parts of the county already have access to neurosurgery in Uppsala, a fact that speaks in favor of a clinic south of Stockholm, from where the distance to Linköping, which also provides neurosurgery, is too great for patients to be taken there.

Wartime Operations

"Besides, the government has ordered that defense preparations in the civilian components of total defense be adapted primarily to the way military defense is set up to operate in wartime. Consequently, the responsibility of medical authorities for medical care in wartime must affect all community planning."

The serious criticisms now being directed by civil and military authorities at a single county council are of basic importance because planning is supposed to be uniform all over the country. This is the first time that the director of civil defense and the commanding general have criticized changes in peacetime medical care.

"Act Quickly"

The Social Welfare Board is urged in the letter to act quickly so that the changes decided on in Stockholm can be prevented.

During a debate in Parliament with Gunnar Biorck (Conservative Party), Minister of Defense Roine Carlsson said that implementation of the 1982 decisions on wartime medical care was behind schedule. He also said that well-functioning medical care in wartime would be given priority in the 1987 defense decision.

Roine Carlsson said: "Questions related to medical care must not be assigned a secondary role in preparedness planning. I assume that the Defense Committee is proposing appropriate improvements in preparedness."

Gunnar Biorck referred to the Social Welfare Board's 5-year plan through 1992, which notes that only a fraction of the drugs required has been procured to date. This despite the fact that the Armed Forces Medical Board has offered to buy the drugs and store them in suitable supply depots.

Shortages Criticized

Roine Carlsson admitted the criticized shortages and the delays that had occurred, but said he was relying on an improved climate of cooperation between the state and the county councils.

"That sounds hopeful, but we have been deceived before," says Anders Suneson. "There are problems throughout the country like those in Stockholm. I need

only remind you that hospitals are often located in totally unsuitable places--in the vicinity of military targets, for example--that operating rooms are located on the top floors of hospitals, and that there are inadequate evacuation plans in such invasion areas as Norbotten and Skane. Will it really be possible to provide medical service in Kalix, Boden, or Trelleborg when fighting is going on around the hospital buildings? Combine that with the Army's total lack of splinter protection for tens of thousands of soldiers, and the result may be devastating."

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BRIEFS

COMBAT VEHICLE 90 ORDERED—The FMV (Defense Materiel Administration) signed new defense orders worth a total of 1 billion kronor during the workweek just before Christmas. The FMV's 140-million-kronor order to the HB Development Corporation for the development of armament for two versions of Combat Vehicle 90 (with a 40mm gun for one and a 25mm gun for the other) was finalized on Friday. Earlier in the week (on Thursday), as SVENSKA DAGBLADET reported in its Friday edition, the FMV's 850-million-kronor order to Ericsson for the new Ground Radio 8000 was finalized. The HB Development Corporation is jointly owned by Hagglund and Sons, Incorporated of Ornskoldsvik and the Bofors Corporation of Karlskoga. Combat Vehicle 90 is the collective name for a family of light armored vehicles. Five different chassis are included in the program. They are intended to be part of the armored vehicles that will equip future mechanized battalions. The decision on series production and procurement will be made in 1990 or 1991, and delivery to the units may take place 4 years later at the earliest. Combat Vehicle 90 is one of the FMV's largest Army projects for the coming decade. [By Bo Ostlund] [Text] [Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 20 Dec 86 p 38] 11798

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